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My dissertation explores ordinary Black South Africans' perceptions of the law 
and how these perceptions impact their views of the desirability and appropriateness of 
appealing to courts when they have problems accessing constitutionally guaranteed 
services. Specifically, I study why people choose not to use courts to secure access to 
water, healthcare, education, and housing when it is both legal and possible to do so. 
Since it transitioned to democracy, South Africa has become one of the leaders of 
socioeconomic rights protection through courts. It is globally recognized for its 
progressive constitution buttressed by an expansive system of rights and a powerful 
Constitutional Court empowered to enforce them. The post-apartheid Constitution 
granted everyone the right to have access to adequate housing, health care services, 
sufficient food and water, and basic education to remedy the inequalities created by 
apartheid. Since its adoption, the Constitutional Court has been active in enforcing these 
rights. Considering this context, we might expect a high demand for justice and an 
inclination to turn to courts for basic services among ordinary South Africans, especially 
after twenty-five years of democracy. 
Despite the central place of rights in post-apartheid democracy, my dissertation 
shows that ordinary Black South Africans have developed doubts about the utility of 
rights and the law as meaningful institutions. And even though South Africa is commonly 
hailed for its record of aggressive socioeconomic rights protection, my interviewees 
rarely expressed willingness to use courts to lay claims to these rights––even when they 
were in dire need. I argue that an individual's choice to litigate depends on how they 
interpret the lack of access, the alternative solutions they believe are possible, and the 
perceived risks of turning to courts given South Africa's political and legal corruption. 
These findings are derived from multi-sited fieldwork across the KwaZulu-Natal 
province and Johannesburg. My findings help move scholarship away from the 
assumption that litigation is a desirable, feasible, and even thinkable way to solve rights 
problems and towards a focus on how perceptions of the legal and political system's inner 
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INTRODUCTION   
 
A. Introduction  
 
 This project started with a simple question posed by my Introduction to 
Comparative Politics professor at John Jay College of Criminal Justice. Knowing that I 
recently took Introduction to Constitutional Law, she asked me, “how can we use courts 
to solve poverty?” I replied, “if there were a set of rights against poverty issues and a 
court where people could sue to protect these rights.” She then gave me one of the most 
influential books on socioeconomic rights litigation, Courting Social Justice: Judicial 
Enforcement of Social and Economic Rights in the Developing World by Daniel Brinks 
and Varun Gauri. Through reading, I discovered South African courts’ work in 
addressing poverty by protecting the right to access basic services.1 I was mesmerized by 
the idea of the marginalized poor suing the government to challenge poverty, forcing the 
government to respond to people’s everyday needs.  
 From my reading of the book, socioeconomic rights seemed like the solution to 
the long-standing problem of gross poverty and inequality worldwide, or at least that is 
how the landmark cases from South Africa, Colombia, and India made it seem. There 
was an allure about the possibility that people, like the homeless I passed every day on 
busy New York City streets or economic migrants like my family, could sue the state to 
better their conditions if only they had the right to do so. What I overlooked was the 
extent to which ordinary people could believe such action was possible. After all, 
growing up in America where legal ideas and rights talk is part of life's everyday rhythm, 
 
1By basic services I am referring to the constitutionally guaranteed services, adequate housing (which includes 
electricity), healthcare, water, social security, and education. 
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it was easy to expect the same from people in countries with seemingly more progressive 
constitutions and institutions. I soon learned that was not the case.  
During my first trip to Johannesburg in August 2015, I spent the majority of my 
time at Constitutional Hill (The Hill), the home of the Constitutional Court and the Old 
Fort Prison Complex.2 As a celebrated beacon for constitutionalism, human rights, and 
democracy, I expected to hear praise of the work of rights and the Court from everyday 
Black South Africans. Instead, I heard grave skepticism and cynicism in my 
conversations with Black street vendors, craftsmen, maintenance workers, and daily 
visitors to the Court. Unlike de Tocqueville in the 1830s, who found that law and legal 
discourse permeated American society “right down to the lowest ranks,” I found serious 
doubt in the law and, more surprisingly, in rights (de Tocqueville 2012). The people I 
interviewed stated things like “rights, now they aren’t serving any purpose. They are a 
disguise so our country can be open for investments” (Trader 2) and “the Court is just a 
mirage, it is not a place for me” (Trader 1). Some people further questioned the role of 
courts and rights in addressing socioeconomic inequality– the very problem scholars said 
they could solve. A particular conversation was the most surprising. One afternoon, I 
stumbled upon a protest at the Hill for land rights. With harmonious singing of songs of 
struggle in the background, the protest organizer argued:  
Rights only exist on paper. People are still oppressed here, but they can’t talk 
about it. There is a myth of this rainbow nation, yet majority of Blacks still live in 
the townships they were sent [to] by the apartheid government. Blacks still have 
the worst healthcare.  Schools for Black kids are the worst. We still find some 
Black bodies treated the same way they were in apartheid. There is a right here to 
housing, but what kind of housing? Water and sanitation, we don’t have water for 
 
2The prison housed many anti-apartheid activists including Mahatma Gandhi and Nelson Mandela while he awaited his 
Rivonia Trial for treason in the early 1960s. The Court also functions as a museum where international tourists and local 
South Africans are encouraged to visit to learn about South Africa’s dark past and celebrate its achievements and 
promising future.  
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all people. There are some places without sewage, like in Squatter Camps in 
Diepsloot, places near Grahamstown (now called Makhanda) in the Eastern Cape 
only have a bucket system.3 
  
I was shocked by these responses, given the lauded work of South African legal 
institutions since 1994 and the elaborate monuments I visited that celebrated the 
country’s commitment to rights, justice, and equality. What was even more perplexing 
was people made these statements directly in front of the Court, which donned the words 
“Constitutional Court” with rainbow letters in all 11 official languages symbolizing the 
move to equality and justice. The contradiction between what I read about South Africa, 
socioeconomic rights, and the Court and what people felt became apparent. I began to ask 
just how far has South Africa come. The promise of a rainbow nation seemed to be 
failing. There was a disparity between what the international community credited South 
Africa for and what Black South Africans thought of their everyday reality. 
Conversations with legal professionals further confirmed this paradox. One explained, 
“the U.S. perspective of the [South African] Constitution is a lot more positive than it is 
here. It is less ideal here. One big problem is the Constitution isn’t really embedded 
here.” I began to ask the following questions: 1) if rights and courts have a problematic 
presence (or for some no presence at all), how else do people think about the lack of 
access to basic services and how to solve it?; 2) why do people have this perception of 
rights given the struggle against apartheid in which they were hard-won?; and 3) to what 
extent did these perceptions limit the way people thought about using legal institutions to 
solve their everyday problems with services?  
 
3 Diepsloot is one of the poorest townships in South Africa.  
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My dissertation offers an answer to these questions by examining Black South 
Africans’ perceptions of law, rights, and courts and how they impact people’s willingness 
to use courts as a means to access basic services. In particular, I investigate the ways 
people perceive and experience problems with services and the law and how those 
perceptions discourage the use of legal strategies to mobilize around issues of access. In 
doing so, I assess when it is “thinkable” for citizens to make rights claims in the formal 
legal sphere and when it is not. As Michael Schatzberg describes, thinkability is a literal 
term: “Can we, do we think these thoughts?” My findings uncover a series of what I call 
“roadblocks to access,” factors that inhibit the thinkability of using legal intervention to 
access basic services. I argue that ordinary citizens’ thinkability of making rights claims 
in court depends on their perceptions of the lack of access, the solutions they find 
possible, and the act of suing the government given corruption at various parts of the 
state. I find that it is the way people perceive and make sense of the existing roadblocks 
of legal mobilization and what new ones that may emerge because of how they perceive 
the act of going to court for these problems, that hinder people from being willing to go 
to courts.  
Despite the central place of rights in the post-apartheid reconciliation, this project 
shows that ordinary Black South Africans have developed doubts about the utility of 
rights and the law as meaningful institutions. And though South Africa is globally 
recognized as the poster child for social rights litigation, my interviewees rarely 
expressed willingness to use courts to lay claims to these rights––even when they were in 
dire need. My findings help move scholarship away from the assumption that litigation is 
a desirable, feasible, and even thinkable way to solve rights problems and towards a focus 
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on how perceptions of problems and the legal and political system’s inner workings can 
impact legal mobilization. In the remainder of this chapter, I describe the case of South 
Africa, the research I conducted, and the implications of my findings.  
B. The South African Case 
 
Legal mobilization for socioeconomic rights is a new kind of struggle for 
rights made possible by social rights constitutionalism–the widespread inclusion of 
rights to access basic necessities like healthcare, housing, water, food, social 
security, and education in constitutions, and the consequent state obligation to ensure 
access. This style of constitutionalism made judicialization of socioeconomic 
challenges possible, giving citizens another arena to mobilize against deprivation, in 
addition to democratic participatory institutions like elections and protests. The 1996 
South African Constitution was designed in this spirit, making it the most progressive 
constitution in the world. 
The inclusion of socioeconomic rights in the South African Constitution, as 
Sandra Liebenberg, South Africa’s leading scholar on socioeconomic rights, asserts, 
“must be viewed in the context of the fundamental changes to South Africa’s legal 
system which facilitated the transition to democracy” (2010, 1). Apartheid’s racist system 
institutionalized white privilege in all aspects of life. The prioritization of white South 
Africans came at the expense of the native Black population, who were subjected to 
systematic discrimination in their access to vital socioeconomic goods and services. 
Apartheid’s white minority rule regulated all aspects of socioeconomic life such as 
housing, healthcare, and work through racially discriminatory laws. The apartheid-era 
legal system provided few legal mechanisms to challenge these blatant socioeconomic 
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rights violations. The system of parliamentary sovereignty inherited from the British 
allowed the state “to ride roughshod over individual liberty without fear of judicial 
obstruction” (Dugard 1986, 20; Meierhenrich 2008). Unconstrained by judicial review, 
parliament had the authority to create the legal construction for racial segregation without 
legal opposition, further entrenching the Black population's socioeconomic 
marginalization. The British common law system also had no tradition of recognizing 
socioeconomic entitlement claims. 
The Apartheid government also used courts as an instrument of social hegemony 
and political repression (Brown 2015). To continue its domination over both politics and 
the law, the apartheid state wanted to end the struggle with legal practitioners against 
apartheid. While some lawyers used procedural protections to articulate political claims 
against the regime, this action was never entirely successful. It was met with significant 
backlash (Brown 2015). To quell any further rejection of apartheid legislation, the 
National Party redesigned the legal system to be autonomous, prohibiting courts from 
engaging in politics. The 1953 Reservation of Separate Amenities Act prohibited courts 
from voiding subordinate legislation on the grounds of substantive inequality 
(Meierhenrich 2008). Therefore, judges, who were still committed to the rule of law, 
were only allowed to decide case facts, not question the law's content concerning 
discrimination claims. Judges who did not conform risked being removed and even being 
declared terrorists for siding with the resistance. Some legal practitioners, who were 
vocal about their political position in favor of ending apartheid, like Albie Sachs, were 
met with violence. By separating law and politics, the National Party isolated the South 
African legal system from the everyday struggle for equality (van Huyssteen 1995; Abel 
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1995). Ultimately, the legal system during this period was incredibly weak in protecting 
the Black population's rights, but effective in cementing their socioeconomic deprivation.  
Apartheid’s collapse marked a new beginning, one that was supposed to be non-racial, 
equal, and free. The African National Congress’s (ANC) 1994 election victory was met 
with hopes that poverty and inequality would be abolished. The pro-black and pro-poor 
party promised “a better life for all,” declaring that alleviating poverty and deprivation 
would be the first and top priority of the new democratic government. Months after the 
election, the government handed down its Reconstruction and Development Programme 
(RDP). As a part of this push to alleviate poverty, constitutional drafters included 
socioeconomic rights in the 1996 Constitution’s Bill of Rights in Section 26-29 in 
Chapter 2 of the Constitution (i.e., see Table 1). The Constitution also guarantees 
socioeconomic rights to detained persons in Section 35. 




Housing  Section 26: 
(1) “Everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing.”  
(2) “The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available 
resources, to achieve the progressive realization of this right.  
(3) “No one may be evicted from their home or have their home demolished, without 
an order of court made after considering all the relevant circumstances. No 
legislation may permit arbitrary evictions.” 
Health care, food, 




(1) “Everyone has the right to have access to—  
(a) health care services, including reproductive health care.  
(b) sufficient food and water; and  
(c) social security, including, if they are unable to support themselves and their 
dependents, appropriate social assistance.  
          (2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its   
                 available resources, to achieve the progressive realization of each of these rights.  
          (3) No one may be refused emergency medical treatment.”  
 
Children Rights Section 28 (1)(c): “Every child has the right to basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care 
services, and social services”  
Education  Section 29:  
            (1) “Everyone has the right – 
            (a) to a basic education, including adult basic education; and  
            (b) to further education, which the state, through reasonable measures, must            




The construction of socioeconomic rights in South Africa imposes both positive 
and negative duties on the state. The dominant narrative of the philosophy of fundamental 
rights holds “that rights impose exclusively or primarily negative obligations on the state, 
and that rights operate only between a citizen and his government, not between private 
citizens” (Möller 2012, 2). Under this narrative, constitutional rights were seen as 
individual protections against the aggressive state, not as entitlements to be provided by 
the state. Early constitutional designs, like that of the 18th century, were consistent with 
this narrative. By the 1970s, constitutional rights law abandoned this construction of 
rights when positive obligations or “protective duties” became established (Möller 2012, 
5). Rights are no longer regarded as exclusively imposing negative obligations on the 
state. Instead, they also imposed positive duties, which mandate that the state must act in 
particular ways. The South African Constitution explicitly embraces a positive 
obligations framework. In the introduction of the Bill of Rights, Section 7(2) places an 
obligation on the State to “respect, protect, promote and fulfill the rights in the Bill of 
Rights.” Also, each right is accompanied by a clause that outlines the state’s obligation to 
fulfill its duties, “the state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its 
available resources, to achieve the progressive realization of these rights.” Under this 
legal framework, not only must the government not infringe on people’s ability to access 
socioeconomic goods and services, but the government is required to promote and protect 
access to goods and services. This dual construction gave socioeconomic rights teeth. 
 
Rights of arrested, 
detained, and 
accused persons  
Section 35 (2)(e): “Everyone who is detained, including every sentenced prisoner, has the 
right to conditions of detention that are consistent with human dignity, including at least 
exercise and the provision, at state expense, of adequate accommodation, nutrition, reading 
material, and medical treatment.” 
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Instead of mere aspiration goals, the state is constitutionally required to address service 
delivery to carry out its constitutional mandates effectively.  
Despite the constitutional mandates and the ANC’s promise to alleviate poverty 
and class inequality, successive presidents did little to further this goal after Nelson 
Mandela’s presidency. According to Seekings and Nattrass (2016), neither Thabo Mbeki 
nor Jacob Zuma showed any significant proclivity to use their power to address poverty 
or class inequality (206). Instead, the new democratic South Africa experienced growing 
corruption, anti-poor policies, and woeful neglect and mismanagement with service 
delivery in Black communities– a reality that closely resembled life under apartheid. 4 
With new legal tools, a newly active civil society turned to courts for help with the 
growing socioeconomic challenges. By the late 1990s, the South African Constitutional 
Court had started to play a prominent role in socioeconomic justice activism, which 
garnered global recognition (Gauri and Brinks 2008; Langford 2008; Langford et al. 
2014). Landmark cases such as Government of the Republic of South Africa v. 
Grootboom (2000), Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign (2002), and Khosa 
v. Minister of Social Development (2004) laid the foundations of socioeconomic rights 
jurisprudence, strengthening the realization of the right to access services.5 Through the 
legal victories in early socioeconomic rights cases, South Africa earned the title as one of 
“the oft-touted leaders of socioeconomic rights protection through courts” (Gauri and 
Brinks 2008, 1).  
 
4 For example, shortly after the adoption of RDP, the government adopted the Growth, Employment and Redistribution 
(GEAR) a macro-economic policy that prioritized big business leading to significant economic losses for the poor 
(Bond 2000; Ngcamu 2019).  
5 Government of the Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom (2000) “the right to housing”; Minister of Health v. 




C. The Landscape of Justiciable Socioeconomic Problems 
Despite the government’s proposed commitment to poverty reduction and the 
available institutions to address socioeconomic problems, poverty and inequality of 
access is still a growing problem in South Africa. The country is more unequal now than 
it was before apartheid (Wilson and Dugard 2014). As of 2014, approximately half of the 
population (about 30.3 million people) is living at or below the national poverty line 
(R992) (World Bank 2020). An estimated 18.9 percent of the population lives at or below 
the international poverty line of $1.90 per person per day (World Bank 2020). The 
disparity in service delivery reflects the high-income inequality. “South Africa’s poor 
remain unemployed, and without access to adequate health care, education, housing, and 
basic municipal services” (Wilson and Dugard 2014, 35). With regard to inequity in basic 
services, class and race intersect. The majority of the poor population who experience 
severe challenges with services are Black. The remainder of this section overviews 
common challenges with basic services experienced by South Africa’s largely Black poor 
population. These problems are issues that people have mobilized through courts, which 
the courts have recognized as violations of socioeconomic rights. To assess people’s 
perception of socioeconomic problems, I relied on these problems in my hypothetical 
scenario questions. 
1. Shack Evictions 
 
Access to adequate housing is a human development challenge experienced by 
many developing populations. On the African continent, adequate housing has a 
complicated policy history largely shaped by discriminatory colonial policies. With 
growing mass urbanization, adequate urban housing has become a pressing issue in 
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African countries. Apartheid’s decades of forced removals and spatial segregation left the 
Black population out of urban centers, which today are areas of high economic activity 
and job opportunities. Because of this, many Blacks have chosen to leave rural areas and 
live in informal settlements close to urban areas with the hopes of finding employment. 
Unfortunately, with the rise of a Black middle class, these settlements have become the 
source of contention between local government structures, the middle class, and the poor. 
The middle class finds the settlements unsightly and the source of trouble. As a result, 
they rely on local government officials (councilors) to do something about the erection of 
shacks. Because councilors rely on the upper- and middle-class for support during 
elections, they order evictions. These evictions are usually violent, destroying shacks, 
dwellers’ belongings, and sometimes involving physical harm. Shack dwellers have 
successfully pursued legal action to stop impending evictions and hold municipalities 
accountable for damages. Shack dwellers who are part of Abahlali baseMjondolo (the 
shack dwellers’ movement) have also sued municipalities to challenge their plans 
designed to “clean up” cities that would eradicate informal settlements, which has also 
been successful.  
Inner-city informal settlers also live in dilapidated buildings in the central 
business district in Johannesburg. These buildings are a hallmark of the city’s housing 
problems. The buildings were abandoned by owners who either died, left the country 
during the sanctions in the 1980s, or retreated to the suburbs north of the city after waves 
of urbanization in central Johannesburg. Others abandoned the properties after giving up 
hope of ever collecting rental income. People who came to the city seeking employment 
took refuge in the empty buildings. They face eviction from either the City of 
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Johannesburg or what they refer to as “hijackers,” people who attempt to take over the 
buildings for personal economic gains without having any legal rights to the properties. 
Hijackers masquerading as the rightful owners of the building attempt to collect rent from 
settlers with the threat of eviction and violence. My respondents report that “hijackers” 
are usually foreign nationals from neighboring African states.   
South African courts have protected the right to housing against evictions. Two of 
the most notable cases are Government of South Africa. & Others v. Grootboom (2000) 
and Occupiers Of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township And 197 Main Street Johannesburg v. 
City of Johannesburg (2008). In Grootboom, a community of shack dwellers in 
Wallacedene, an informal settlement in Cape Town was evicted. The settlement was on 
private land that the city earmarked for the development of formal low-cost 
housing. Upon vacating, the residents created shelters out of plastic at a sports center next 
to Wallacedene. The shelters lacked basic sanitation and electricity. They were evicted 
again from the sports center. The group brought the case to court under the constitutional 
right to adequate housing. The Court ordered the various governments to “devise, fund, 
implement and supervise measures to provide relief to those in desperate need.” The 
government provided applicants with basic amenities as a result of a settlement.  
In Occupiers, the City of Johannesburg ordered the eviction of more than 400 
residents in two buildings that were deemed hazardous and unhealthy. The city ordered 
the evictions as a part of its “Inner City Regeneration Strategy,” which aimed at cleaning 
up central Johannesburg by destroying 235 “bad” buildings. The municipality regarded 
these buildings as “development sinkholes” that needed to be removed to make way for 
private investment in the city. The Johannesburg City Council obtained urgent eviction 
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orders. With the order, the city would carry out the evictions in the middle of the night 
and without advance prior notice or the offer of alternative accommodations (UN-Habitat 
2007). Under threat of eviction, the residents filed a claim against the city. The lower 
court judge dismissed the city’s eviction applications and issued an interdict, stopping the 
evictions until the residents received alternative accommodations. On appeal, the 
Constitutional Court ordered that the city engage with the residents to find a mutual 
solution. The two reached an agreement that provided the occupiers with affordable and 
safe accommodation in the city to live free of the fear of future eviction. The Court also 
invoked the Constitution's language, arguing that if the residents remain after a court 
order of eviction is granted only then is an eviction is valid. Despite the wealth of 
jurisprudence protecting the right to housing, evictions still regularly occur in South 
Africa.  
2. School Infrastructure 
 
Since the end of apartheid, there has been a considerable improvement in access 
to education. More children are enrolled in schools every year to receive basic education 
due to the established right to education. However, the lack of proper school 
infrastructure constrains the actualization of this right. There is a significant difference 
between the quality of education accessible to the Black poor in South Africa and their 
more affluent counterparts regardless of their race. Although more affluent Black families 
have chosen to send their children to formerly all-white private schools, most Black 
Children in South Africa's primary source of education is through a government school 
(public school). Children in government schools face overcrowded classrooms, limited 
resources, and poor infrastructure, especially in rural areas. At present, around 3,600 
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schools operate without electricity. In 3,898 schools, pit latrines are the only form of 
sanitation for students and faculty as oppose to standard toilets (Equal Education). Equal 
Education reports that 92% of schools do not have proper libraries (Butana 2012). The 
learning challenges these conditions create are acute.  
South Africa’s poor infrastructure problem in government schools is a product of 
government neglect and corruption. As Mark Heywood, the former director of Section 
27, stated of the tragic death of Michael Komape – a six-year-old boy who drowned after 
falling into a dilapidated pit latrine at his school in Limpopo, “Michael Komape died 
because of corruption and state capture. The failure to build toilets in schools is a result 
of corruption and state capture” (Postman 2019, 1). In some instances, government 
officials’ egregious looting of public funds enables underspending of their province’s 
allocated budget on education. In other cases where there are funds, the funds never 
actually get to the schools due to various actors' mismanagement, from state officials 
down to the principal. Civil society organizations like Equal Education and Section 27 
work towards keeping local and provincial government structures accountable for 
addressing infrastructure problems in schools and accessibility to learning materials. 
They have petitioned the courts on behalf of parents to address these issues.   
Equal Education’s #FixTheNorms case inspired the school infrastructure 
hypothetical scenario. For over two years, the organization campaigned to get the 
Minister of Basic Education, Angie Motshekga, to publish minimum norms and standards 
for school infrastructure. These standards would have helped address the problem of 
underspending on education in the Eastern Cape province, eradicating pit latrines and 
classrooms made of mud or corrugated iron shacks. At the time, the provincial 
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government only spent 28% of its R1.45 billion annual school budget because the 
minister refused to set the standards the province must meet. After failing to publish the 
standards, the organization filed a claim against the minister, all nine members of the 
Executive Council, and the Minister of Finance in the Bhisho High Court. Four days 
before the case was heard in 2012 the Minister Motshekga agreed to create binding 
standards in an out-of-court settlement. When the minister failed to meet the deadlines 
agreed upon in the settlement, Equal Education reopened the case in June 2013. In 
another out of court settlement, recorded by the Court, Minister Motshekga agreed to 
work on regulations to create binding minimum norms and school infrastructure 
standards. Since then, the organization has pursued further legal action to address the 
norms and standards' vague language and force the minister to establish a monitoring 
mechanism. The #FixTheNorms case is one example of how state neglect results in the 
continuation of poor infrastructure and also shows the courts' role in holding state 
actors accountable. Despite the use of legal institutions in this way, improvements in 
school infrastructure remain slow and non-existent in some regions in the country.  
3. Government Hospital Lacking Resources and Denying Treatment 
The right to health in the 1996 Constitution entails access to health care services, 
including reproductive health care. The right also mandates that no one may be refused 
emergency medical treatment. Lower income blacks rely on government (public) 
hospitals and clinics for medical services. These facilities often serve a large number of 
people with limited resources. During my time in field, people complained about 
government hospitals and clinics not having resources and hearing that people have been 
denied treatment at some of the hospitals because of this. The availability of resources 
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and what constitutes an emergency can impact how one is treated at government facilities 
and the means of recourse. This scenario was inspired by the first socioeconomic rights 
case, Soobramoney v. Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal (1997). Soobramoney, who had 
chronic renal failure and needed regular renal dialysis, was refused admission for 
treatment at the state hospital because he did not meet the admissions criteria. The 
admission guidelines were put in place because the hospital had a shortage of resources. 
The guidelines stated only those who could be cured within a short period and those with 
chronic renal failure who are eligible for a kidney transplant could be admitted for 
treatment. Upon the admissions denial Soobramoney applied to the High Court to order 
the hospital to provide him with ongoing dialysis treatment without charge and that the 
state should make additional funds available to the hospital. When the application was 
dismissed, Soobramoney appealed to the Constitutional Court claiming his right to health 
and right to life, as lack of dialysis posed a considerable threat to his life. Even though 
the court’s decision was unfavorable for Soobramoney due to concerns over the state’s 
budget, the case was the first instance in which someone attempted to mobilize law for 
socioeconomic rights and in which the Constitutional Court acknowledge the 
justiciability of the right to health claims.  
4. Water & Electricity Shutoffs or Lack of Proper Connection 
 
Like most developing countries with growing populations, South Africa 
experiences incredible stress on its vital resources like water and electricity. In addition to 
establishing the right to health, Section 27 of the Constitution lays out the right to water. 
Although the right to electricity is not explicitly in the Constitution, the Constitutional 
Court has established the right is implied through the right to adequate housing in cases 
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like Grootboom. Water and electricity shutoffs are sometimes caused by landlords not 
paying municipal rates that cover water and electrical bills even though their tenants have 
paid them for these services. Disconnections are also caused by vandalized equipment or 
mismanagement from the municipality due to corruption of sorts. In other situations, 
people who reside in informal housing structures like shacks, dilapidated buildings, or 
one-room cinder block structures lack formal access to these services. They either rely on 
illegal connections from neighbors or live without access like the residents in 
Grootboom.  
Since Grootboom, the courts have continued to uphold the right to electricity and 
water services. The most notable cases are Joseph v. the City of Johannesburg (2009) and 
Residents of Bon Vista Mansions v. Southern Metropolitan Local Council (2002). In 
Joseph, tenants paid their electricity bill to the property owner regularly, yet the owner 
failed to pay the city’s electric company, City Power. As a result, City Power 
disconnected the property giving the owner notice, but not the tenants. The tenants 
argued that the disconnection without notice violated their constitutional right to access 
adequate housing, implying a right to electricity. In challenging the disconnection, the 
tenants also challenged the constitutional validity of City Power’s by-laws that allowed 
termination without giving notice to the tenants. Similarly, in Residents, the Court found 
that the local council unlawfully disconnected the water supply, establishing that the 
disconnection of water supply for non-payment was illegal as it arbitrarily deprived 
people of their rights. Despite the Court’s established jurisprudence on the right to water 




D. The Research 
 
My investigation of Black South Africans’ perceptions of socioeconomic 
problems and the law is an exploration into ordinary South Africans rights and legal 
consciousnesses. Rights consciousness refers to “the understandings of law and the social 
practices through which individuals and groups come to embrace, ignore, manipulate, 
remain unaware of, or consciously reject rights in relation to their everyday experiences” 
(Engel 2012, 424). These understandings also include what Wasby (2005) calls “the 
general awareness of rights to be claimed or asserted against others” (459). While 
different scholars have proposed various definitions of legal consciousness, in this 
project, legal consciousness refers to the way people experience and think about the law 
and its related institutions, mainly courts (see, e.g., Albiston 2006, Ewick & Silbey 1998, 
McCann 1994, Merry 1990, Nielsen 2000).  
People’s perceptions of legal institutions are critical factors in understanding their 
legal behaviors (or the lack thereof) when problems strike. There are three necessary 
perceptions for litigation for access to services to become a thinkable strategy. Firstly, 
people must have a rights consciousness that frames everyday service delivery challenges 
as justiciable rights issues they can lay claims to. Framing service delivery problems as 
rights issues helps transform the nature of the problem from a matter of circumstance or a 
consequence of being poor to a rights issue with legal standing where the state could 
provide a legal remedy. Secondly, people must also believe that the state is responsible 
for solving the problem. Making rights claims to the state requires that people blame the 
state for the lack of services. People will seldom turn to the state for help if they do not 
believe the state is responsible for service delivery. As Gauri and Brinks (2008) assert, 
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“before some aspect of the human predicament can become a need–particularly a need to 
be satisfied by the state –it must appear to reasonable people that the state can satisfy this 
need” (309). And finally, mobilizing through the courts for services requires that people 
view courts as a place to protect their rights and a resource they can access. They must 
also believe that the law is fair, accessible and can hold other state actors accountable for 
failure to fulfill their legal duties in providing services. Legally codified rights and 
functioning courts may help disadvantaged groups develop this consciousness, 
encouraging legal mobilization. However, I show that people’s everyday encounters with 
the law, the state, and socioeconomic problems can prevent this consciousness's 
development by casting doubt on legal institutions’ utility in solving problems in 
everyday Black lives. Collectively, these perceptions make up what I call the 
“thinkability of legal mobilization.” 
1. The Fieldwork 
To uncover ordinary Black South Africans’ perceptions, I conducted multi-sited 
fieldwork in the KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) province and Johannesburg. I interviewed 146 
ordinary Black South Africans from August 2018 to April 2019. My participants included 
71 residents from the semi-rural town of Empangeni, 39 residents from Umlazi 
Township, 20 members of Abahlali baseMjondolo (the shack dwellers’ movement), ten 
members of The Inner City Federation, four housing claimants from the Legal Resource 
Centre, and two Johannesburg residents. I also interviewed ten lawyers and activists from 
socioeconomic rights oriented civil society organizations, the Centre for Applied Legal 
Studies (CALS), The Socio-Economic Rights Institute of South Africa (SERI), The Legal 
Resource Centre (LRC), Black Sash, Pro Bono, and Section 27. 
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Figure 1: Map of field sites 
 
KwaZulu-Natal is the second most populous and the third poorest province in 
South Africa (Stats SA). It is the home of seven million Zulu-speakers and prominent 
civil society organizations that advocate for socioeconomic rights, like Abahlali 
baseMjondolo and the Unemployed People’s Movement. During apartheid, KZN was an 
epicenter of conflict. Like Johannesburg it was a place of mass public protest and a push 
for rights. Since then, the province continues to be a site for political action in response to 
poor or unstable socioeconomic goods and services provided by municipalities, 
particularly those related to housing. State-led evictions are prevalent in KZN. This 
situation is exacerbated by unresponsive local councilors elected to represent residents. In 
addition to issues of access to housing, some residents of KZN have mobilized against 
poor municipal service delivery like electricity and water. I chose two field sites in 
KwaZulu-Natal to provide contrast. Although I am interested in meanings generated 
among one racial group, no single racial group is homogenous. Differences within a 
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racial group are deepened when its members live in vastly different areas, with their own 
political histories and institutional structures. 
Empangeni is a semi-rural town located in the City of uMhlathuze. The city is 
mainly composed of rural areas that are also under traditional authority. Empangeni is 
one of four business districts in uMhlathuze. As a semi-rural town, residents of 
Empangeni have access to both formal government institutions and traditional councils.6 
In Empangeni, participants consisted of adult (18 and older) non-elites of different 
genders. Individuals were chosen using respondent-driven sampling (Heckathron 1997). 
Respondent-driven sampling is a network sampling method mainly used for studying 
hard-to find or hard-to-study populations, like the socioeconomically marginalized or 
people who are more conservative in disposition. Respondent-driven sampling relies on 
initial informants who act as “seeds” to recruit up to three members in their network to 
participate (Bernard 2006,194). Prior to this fieldwork trip, I lived in Empangeni for two 
months in 2017, where I established connections with twelve Zulu families who 
facilitated access to other families in their networks. I had also immersed myself in their 
family life, which granted me access to the families’ other social networks like church 
groups, neighbors, and workplace colleagues. 
Umlazi is the second largest urban township in South Africa. It is located on the 
outskirts of metropolitan Durban. As a township, this area experiences problems typically 
associated with township living inherited by apartheid’s spatial and economic isolation 
 
6 Although residents of Empangeni do have access to traditional institutions, traditional courts do not have 
jurisdiction over constitutional matters, like socioeconomic rights. While traditional courts cannot hand 
down a decision on socioeconomic rights, people may see them as an avenue to address problems with 




policies. Today, there is a mix of slums and formal houses built by the post-apartheid 
government. Some residents in Umlazi live without access to sufficient housing and 
stable access to basic electrical services. Umlazi residents have been vocal about issues of 
access to municipal services. Duncan (2016) notes of her observations “as early as 2009, 
Umlazi appeared to be a particularly unhappy place, with several wards marching about 
dissatisfaction with service delivery and their ward councilor” (64). In 2014, Abahlali 
baseMjondolo launched a branch in Umlazi igniting activism for the rights of informal 
dwellers. While there is no direct access to traditional courts in Umlazi, residents do have 
access to formal courts in the broader Durban area, approximately thirty minutes north. 
Like my participants in Empangeni, participants in Umlazi consisted of adult (18 and 
older) non-elites of different genders. However, unlike the residents in Empangeni, the 
majority of my participants in Umlazi were unemployed. I relied on my connections with 
one Umlazi family to access my interviewees. Instead of living in Umlazi, I lived in 
Musgrave, a Durban suburb north of Umlazi and commuted daily to conduct interviews. 
In addition to these two sites in KZN, I also conducted interviews in 
Johannesburg.  Johannesburg is the largest city in South Africa, located in the wealthiest 
province, Gauteng. Johannesburg is also South Africa’s legal hub. It is the home to the 
Constitutional Court, the South African Human Rights Commission’s Head Office, and 
many legal advocacy organizations (LAOS) which advocate for socioeconomic rights 
protection. Like most growing urban centers, Johannesburg has areas of economic 
stability and areas of great hardship. Inequality in access to land, housing and basic 
services has been a recurring theme in the city’s history. Like the Durban municipality, 
the Johannesburg municipality has been criticized for its treatment of informal settlers 
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and over-priced service delivery, which is often inadequate. Urban development plans 
have enabled mass evictions of those living informally in dilapidated high-rise buildings, 
apartments, houses, rooms, parts of rooms, and balconies, a problem the courts have 
tackled on a case by case basis with the help of LAOs. In Johannesburg, I interview past 
claimants at SERI and Section 27. I also interviewed lawyers and advocacy personnel 
from CALS, Black Sash, SERI, and The Inner City Federation.   
2. Interviewing Technique  
  I asked my participants three types of questions to assess the thinkability of legal 
mobilization for socioeconomic rights (see appendix A). The first set of questions asked 
broad questions about rights: whether people believed rights existed in South Africa; if 
they felt they personally had rights; whether they believed that constitutionally 
guaranteed services were rights; and what having rights meant and how they had come to 
have rights. 
 The second set of questions examined people’s perception of socioeconomic 
problems and possible ways to overcome them.  I asked participants to respond to five 
hypothetical scenarios: shack evictions, poor infrastructure in government schools, 
government hospitals not having enough resources and refusing to treat sick persons, and 
water and electricity disconnection or lack of formal connections, like water coming 
through the taps and stand-alone electrical connection. I first asked respondents to 
determine if the issue in the scenario was a problem. I intentionally did not ask 
participants what kind of problem (legal, personal, or political) they thought the scenarios 
were, so I did not lead them to what they thought the “right” response was. Unlike civil 
and political rights, socioeconomic rights issues straddle two planes, legal/political and 
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personal. Before the codification of socioeconomic rights, not having access to services 
was a personal problem, one that was a matter of misfortune and a result of being black 
under apartheid. Although the Constitution establishes legal entitlements to basic services 
in the form of rights, it is through the courts that access issues have become legal 
problems, at least in theory. While it seems evident that these scenarios' issues are 
problems, I wanted to assess whether the shift from “daily misfortunes” to “justiciable 
problems” has transcended to ordinary citizens. In the third group of questions, I explored 
people’s legal consciousness by asking what they thought about law and courts, and their 
experiences with the law. These questions also included follow-up questions to the 
hypothetical scenarios. In this section of the interviews, I asked participants if they 
believed they could sue the government for the scenarios they identified as problems.  
E. Broader Implications  
 
1. Contributions to Legal Mobilization  
 
This project is poised to make several contributions. First, this project marries two 
important literatures: legal mobilization and legal consciousness. A persistent question 
law and society and public policy scholarship focus on is the courts' role in creating 
policy and social change. Much of the debate concerning the effectiveness of legal 
mobilization surrounds perspectives on the courts (Butt 2006; Edelman 1994; Rajamani 
2007; Hamilton 1788; Rosenberg 1991; Vanberg 2001; Scheingold 1974; Gabel and 
Kennedy 1984; Epp 1998; Whittington 2005). While these assessments of courts help us 
understand how activists and ordinary people might choose strategies to address 
problems, how people understand their problems and their rights are equally as important.  
 31 
 
What is absent from the existing canon on legal mobilization is an assessment of 
how people perceive their rights related to specific problems and the impact of this 
interpretation on their approach to problem-solving. This dearth is in part due to rights-
based problems being pre-determined as a legible grievance. Foundational texts on legal 
mobilization mainly explore political and civil rights-based problems, problems which 
we have come to accept as clear rights violations. The separation of racial groups and the 
unequal treatment based on race, gender, and sexual orientation are issues where we 
(mostly) no longer question if an injury has occurred. As a relatively “new” set of rights 
protections, there is an additional challenge with legal mobilization for socioeconomic 
rights, one that concerns the framing of poverty issues as rights violations.   
Before the inclusion of socioeconomic rights in formal documents, there was no 
legal requirement for governments to protect against poverty and deprivation. Likewise, 
governments also had no obligation to address the inequality in access to public goods 
and its consequences for the poor. And thus, poverty and its related challenges were 
personal problems, ones that only could be addressed by the capitalist formula of hard 
work. The advent of socioeconomic rights shifted the problem of poverty from the 
personal to the legal. With codified rights against poverty, everyday socioeconomic 
challenges are now justiciable legal problems. But as with any new concept, these frames 
take time to take root in society. Legal mobilization for socioeconomic rights is unique 
because it requires that one see their current conditions as a problem, and in particular, a 
problem that the state and courts can resolve. 
 Unlike political and civil rights, legal mobilization for socioeconomic rights 
requires a particular kind of imagination. Such imagination involves individuals seeing 
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themselves as “worthy” of mobilizing their poverty issues and a belief in the capacity of 
courts to deliver access to socioeconomic goods and services. As Gaventa (1982) writes, 
deprived groups must go through a process of “issue and action formulation by which 
they develop consciousness of the needs, possibilities, and strategies of challenge” (24).  
The development of this kind of consciousness is complicated by many factors, including 
the way people perceive the law as an approach to problem-solving. If an injured person 
does not think the courts can solve their problems and facilitate change in their immediate 
circumstance, they may choose different advocacy strategies (protests, legislative 
lobbying, trying to change public opinion, etc.), but if they believe the courts can have a 
meaningful impact, they will develop an ongoing legal mobilization strategy. Thus, this 
project broadens the literature on legal mobilization by examining people’s perceptions 
and experiences of the law as an additional constraint on courts.  
2. Contributions to Legal Consciousness   
 
 My investigation into how ordinary Black South Africans perceive the law and 
socioeconomic problems builds on legal consciousness scholarship. Legal consciousness 
scholars have documented law’s variable and complex character in various contexts 
((McCann 1994; Nader 1990; Nader 1997; Ewick and Silbey 1998; Engel and Engel 
2010; Massoud 2013; Chua 2014; Hendley 2017; and many others). According to this 
line of research, people regularly assert their own meanings of law and legal institutions, 
even in contexts with official written laws and formal legal institutions (McCann 1994). 
These meanings and resulting legal behavior are sometimes shaped by social networks, 
organizational resources, and local cultures (Nader 1990; Nader 1997; Ewick and Silbey 
1998; Engel and Engel 2010; Massoud 2013; Chua 2014; Hendley 2017). People's 
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various meanings about the law result in the law having varying relevance in people’s 
lives (Glesson 2010, 564). For example, Kathryn Hendley (2017) argues that ordinary 
Russians are reluctant to take the state or a powerful individual to court while being 
willing to sue insurance companies for failure to pay damages following an accident. 
Engel and Engel (2010,153) find that in Thailand, for some, the formal law has become 
disconnected from custom and from “the unofficial system of village-level injury 
remediation” that has been passed down from their ancestors. As a result, people are less 
likely than before to turn to the law or even conceptualize personal injuries in legal terms.  
Regarding human rights, legal anthropologists like Merry (2006) note that the 
legal framework of the human rights enshrined by international treaties is not static, but 
instead, is constructed. Even after crossing a certain threshold of democratic governance 
and human rights awareness, which is understood to be an important prerequisite for 
mobilizing the law, people’s interpretation of legal institutions can still vary. Especially 
since linguistic, temporal, and political context can strongly influence localized 
understandings of “universal” rights (Langford 2014, 18). To highlight the importance of 
people’s interpretation and experiences with the law, legal consciousness scholars have 
primarily focused on everyday life experiences rather than legal institutions. This project 
brings institutions back in. Instead of focusing just on everyday life experiences, I 
explore how everyday experiences shape people’s interpretation of institutions and 
people’s willingness to engage with them.  
F. Political Implications  
 
 This research also has significant political and social implications. In uncovering 
how the meanings of rights and courts affect people’s choice in using them to solve their 
 34 
 
problems, this project puts the aspirations associated with legal institutions to the test. 
Since the end of World War II, there has been overwhelming faith placed on courts, 
progressive constitutionalism, and the rule of law to achieving the material well-being 
and liberty of society (Friedman 2006, Tate and Vallinder 1995). Since then, more and 
more countries have turned to judicial review and independent courts to play an 
important role in protecting human rights and establishing legitimacy on the world stage. 
Scholars and policy analysts have supported the belief that well-functioning legal systems 
(those that invoke the rule of law) are necessary for economic growth (Mahoney 2001). 
Despite these institutions' theoretical benefits, their theorized aspirations may only come 
to fruition if they are interpreted as such. The benefits of legal institutions have been 
taken as a given. Few question whether the ideals associated with democratic legal 
institutions have taken root in society, in that the ideas and norms related to these 
institutions have seeped into people’s consciousness. 
This study uncovers the extent to which the principles and ideals of a newly 
adopted constitution are embedded in society and the factors that hinder these principles 
from being entrenched even after decades after political change. For new and 
transitioning democracies, there are still significant questions about what I call 
“constitutional embeddedness”– the extent to which the ideals and the guarantees of 
newly adopted constitutions are embedded in society. Scholars and practitioners of 
comparative law disagree about what happens to borrowed laws and institutions once 
they are planted in foreign contexts (Markovits 1993). For some, the law is the ideas of 
experts, the creation of clever lawyers, that is easily transplanted and useable by even 
more clever lawyers elsewhere (Watson 1993). Others reject the notion that legal 
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transplants can successfully take root in foreign soil because the law is socially 
determined. Even when it appears that legal transplants have flourished in another legal 
culture, they may change shape, meaning and even may not survive the journey from one 
context to another. When new institutions enter diverse contexts with deep histories and 
cultures, we must study how the broader society understands these institutions in light of 
their past and present lived experiences. South Africa is one place we can begin to 
grapple with this question. By elucidating the meanings people make about these 
institutions and their subsequent behavior, my research shows how citizens’ perceptions 
of turning to rights and law pose a challenge to the scaling down of democracy’s grand 
promises to the everyday such that they are meaningful in practice. My findings speak to 
critical questions like “Do constitutions, or more specifically, a bill of rights matter?” Or, 
as Friedman (2006, 261) asks, “Are [courts and rights], so commonly bandied about, 
even meaningful concepts?”, Or to put it simply, does law matter?   
My dissertation’s empirical chapters develop distinct yet complementary 
arguments about the various perceptions that prevent people from turning to law for 
socioeconomic rights. In Chapter 2, I review the roadblocks to socioeconomic rights 
litigation the literature identifies (e.g., resources, institutional constraints that courts face, 
and jurisprudence changes in socioeconomic rights cases). I then introduced my concept 
of thinkability and its relationship to the existing roadblocks. In Chapters 3-5, I describe 
the various perceptions that make up the thinkability of legal mobilization in South 
Africa. In Chapter 3, I show that while NGOs, legal aid, and lawyers working pro bono 
have successfully litigated for socioeconomic services, ordinary people still believe going 
to court is risky. I argue that people’s perception of how the legal system works has 
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generated mistrust in courts and casts doubt on the broader legal system’s ability to 
administer justice and the promises of post-apartheid democracy as a whole. Chapter 4 
addresses the following question: when people experience an injury that could form the 
basis for legal action, like the lack of access to services, what strategies have they 
pursued instead? In this chapter I show that people are more willing to use non-legal 
strategies to address service delivery problems. People will choose these alternative 
strategies because they see access problems as just problems and not legal issues. As a 
result, they believe going to court is an inappropriate way to solve service delivery 
problems. In Chapter 5, I outline under what conditions will people turn to courts for 
services in light of the perceived mistrust and available alternatives. I demonstrate civil 
society's importance in increasing awareness about rights and motivating people to 
pursue litigation for services. This chapter shows how informal settlers’ alliances with 
civil society organizations have increased their understanding of informal settlement 
evictions' justiciability. I also show people’s participation in these organizations has also 
improved people’s trust in the law as a resource to solve socioeconomic problems making 



















TRADITIONAL ROADBLOCKS TO LEGAL MOBILIZATION  
 
A. Introduction  
  
There is little question that legal mobilization has been integral to the global 
achievement of social, economic, and political change. Since World War II, judges have 
increasingly been involved in national and international policy-making (Tate and 
Vallinder 1995; Hirschl 2004; Hirschl 2008). In the U.S., courts and rights-based 
frameworks helped advance the Women’s movement, the Civil Rights Movement, the 
push to protect the rights of the LGBTQ community, and more recently, immigrants. 
Abroad, these institutions have also been the driving force behind marginalized groups’ 
political liberation and development. Since the early 1990s, adjudicatory bodies across 
the globe have intervened to protect a wide range of socioeconomic rights from intrusion 
and inaction by the state and increasingly non-state actors. By 2008, twenty-nine national 
and international courts handed down over 2,000 decisions on socioeconomic rights 
(Langford 2008). Courts have halted forced evictions, reinstated social security benefits, 
ordered reconnections to municipal water supplies, and demanded the enrollment of poor 
minority children in schools.  
As political activity, legal mobilization requires that courts are both the agent and 
arena where people can mobilize change. Because of this dual role of courts in legal 
mobilization, potential litigants face two sets of roadblocks. The first set of roadblocks 
concern the supply-side of legal mobilization. These roadblocks are the limitations for 
those who can aid in legal mobilization, like courts and lawyers. The second set of 
roadblocks impact the demand for law by potential claimants. The literature on legal 
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mobilization, especially from the U.S. perspective, has concentrated primarily on the first 
set of challenges––those experienced by legal institutions, who act as agents of change, 
mainly courts.   
B. The Literature on Supply-side and Demand-side Constraints   
Despite the prominent role of courts in human rights protection, scholars have 
fiercely debated the role of litigation as a mobilization strategy and whether courts can be 
agents of change since Robert Dahl declared the U.S. Supreme Court a “national policy-
maker” in 1957. Much of this debate concerns the capacity of courts. On the one hand, 
scholars argue that judicial decisions inevitably create policy, and thus courts can affect 
change (Butt 2006; Edelman 1994; Rajamani 2007). On the other hand, scholars have 
argued that courts are constrained in that they face various limitations that hinder them 
from making policy, and thus, legal mobilization cannot bring about change (Hamilton 
1788; Bickel 1962; Horowitz 1977; Scheingold 1974; Rosenberg 1991; Vanberg 2001).  
The most cited argument regarding courts’ limitations in affecting change is 
Gerald Rosenberg’s Hollow Hope (1991). For Rosenberg, courts face several 
unavoidable constraints that prevent them from affecting significant social change. These 
constraints include limitations set by the law and politics. As arbiters of the law, judges 
must remain within the realm of law and legal precedent when deciding cases. Judges’ 
decisions are bound by legal rules and precedent, which set parameters for their decision-
making. While there is room for creative adjudication, judges cannot hand down 
decisions overly out of bounds of the constitution's principles and existing precedent. 
Without specific formal legal rules which enable judges to decide particular types of 
cases, courts are constrained. With rights violations, lawyers can only bring claims based 
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on rights enshrined in or implied by the constitution. Although there is room for legal 
innovation, a lawyer may face rejection when trying to mobilize claims for a rights issue 
without the law and existing precedent to support those claims' justiciability.  
Courts also face roadblocks because they lack the ability implement their 
decisions (Rosenberg 1991; Horowitz 1977). Judges are unlikely to assert themselves in 
cases unless they have structural independence and institutional freedom to decide cases. 
However, courts, especially in democracies, are highly dependent institutions. With 
democracy’s decentralized approach to governance, courts' ability to create policy is 
contingent on cooperation from the other branches of government. This dependency 
presents a “hollow” hope for those looking to advance change through the courts. A 
judge’s limitations in handing-down and implementing progressive decisions in support 
of rights claims can pose significant challenges to legal mobilization. However, these are 
not the only roadblocks. These constraints mainly concern judges’ and lawyers’ capacity 
as agents of change in the legal mobilization process. For judges and lawyers to even 
encounter the challenges they face in the process, everyday potential claimants must first 
decide to approach the law for a resolution. Legal mobilization begins with claimants’ 
demand for law, which only occurs once people believe a justiciable problem exists and 
that the law is an accessible arena to mobilize their rights claims.  
 The goal of this project is to shift the study on roadblocks to legal mobilization 
from the examination of the supply-side constraints (e.g., constraints experienced by 
courts and legal practitioners) to a focus on the impact of how people experience the 
demand-side constraints. Specifically, this project focuses on the role of people’s 
perceptions of the law and socioeconomic problems in whether people believe everyday 
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problems are rights violations, and whether courts are the place to solve them in light of 
other available strategies. Citizens’ demand for law has long been an interest of legal 
scholars and practitioners (Miller and Sarat 1980; Zemans 1982; Genn 1999; Michelson 
2007; Albiston et al. 2014). To assess people’s demand for law scholars have explored 
the extent to which people’s grievances become legal claims (Miller and Sarat 1980; 
Felstiner et al. 1980; Albiston et al. 2014). This project builds on this literature by 
uncovering the various perceptions people have about rights, the law, and problems and 
how they impact people’s thoughts about legal mobilization to solve those problems.  
In the remainder of the chapter, I argue that while the challenges covered by 
existing literature are present in South Africa, these roadblocks are only a fraction of the 
difficulties people face when trying to legally mobilize their issues of access to services 
through courts. This chapter begins with an overview of ways people can mobilize the 
law to address their problems. I then outline the various institutional constraints to 
mobilizing for socioeconomic rights in South Africa given these opportunities. And 
finally, I introduce my concept of thinkability and its impact on citizens’ demand for 
legal mobilization for socioeconomic rights.  
C. Explaining Opportunities for Legal Mobilization for Socioeconomic Problems  
 
South Africa’s constitutional transformation established a legal infrastructure 
favorable to legal mobilization for socioeconomic rights. Under apartheid’s system of 
parliamentary sovereignty, there were few opportunities for ordinary people to use the 
law to hold the state accountable let alone make rights claims. In a system predicated on 
legalized racial discrimination, the law was difficult to access and particularly hostile to 
the non-white population. While courts were supposed to be a means of recourse, the 
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apartheid state used courts as an instrument of social hegemony and political repression 
during apartheid (Brown 2015). Despite the existence of a national high court, the 
principle of parliamentary sovereignty inherited by the British granted the National Party 
(NP) government license to implement discriminatory policies (Meierhenrich 2008). The 
principle of parliamentary sovereignty meant that legislation enacted by parliament was 
final and could not be contested in court by those who opposed it. This enabled the state 
“to ride roughshod over individual liberty without fear of judicial obstruction” (Dugard 
1986, 20). Unconstrained by judicial review, parliament created the legal construction of 
racial domination without legal opposition, rendering courts relatively weak.  
 Despite this, some legal practitioners did use courts to mobilize against apartheid. 
Such activities laid the foundation for the robust public interest litigation we see today in 
South Africa. Litigation against colonialism and apartheid date back to the nineteenth 
century. Like Anton Lembede and Pixley kaIsaka Seme, many of the early activists were 
lawyers who turned to courts to address issues of land dispossession, racial 
classifications, and disenfranchisement (Brickhill 2018). By the 1970s, many lawyers, 
especially from small black law firms like the Mandela and Tambo Attorneys, used the 
law to defend political activists (Brickhill 2018). For practitioners, legal mobilization was 
a way of contesting apartheid politics. According to Brown (2015), “some litigants and 
lawyers used procedural protections to articulate political claims against the interest of 
the state” (131). Despite some victories, legal mobilization during apartheid was never 
entirely successful. Instead, legal activists were met with significant backlash. 
 To continue its domination over both politics and the law, the apartheid regime 
needed to end the struggle with legal practitioners against apartheid. To quell any further 
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legal opposition, the NP government moved to redesign the legal system to prohibit 
courts' engagement in politics entirely. The 1953 Reservation of Separate Amenities Act 
prohibited courts from voiding subordinate legislation on the grounds of substantive 
inequality (Meierhenrich 2008). Therefore, judges, who were still committed to the rule 
of law, were only allowed to decide case facts, not question the law's content when it 
came to inequality. Those that did risked being disbarred and even being declared 
terrorists for siding with the anti-apartheid struggle. The state retaliated with violence 
against some legal practitioners who were vocal about their political position in favor of 
ending apartheid, like Albie Sachs.1 By separating law and politics, the NP government 
insulated the South African legal system from the daily struggle for equality (van 
Huyssteen 1995; Abel 1995). Ultimately, the legal system during this period was 
incredibly weak in protecting the needs of the majority of the population, but effective in 
cementing the perpetration of injustice under the apartheid regime.  
After the 1994 election, instead of following African states’ tendencies to create 
parliamentary sovereign democracies, communist-party states, and socialist military `The 
1996 Constitution was largely imbued with a liberal style of legalism (van Huyssteen 
1995; Nonet and Selznick 2001; Langford 2014; Sachs 2016). This new system included 
a new commitment to the power of judicial review, the rule of law, independent 
institutions, and individual rights, strongly reflecting rights declarations in international 
treaties. In constructing a free South Africa, increased faith was placed in courts and 
progressive constitutionalism by constitutional drafters and negotiators. The adoption of a 
new constitution reshaped “the possibilities of politics in the courts” (Brown 2015, 131).   
 
1 In 1988, Sachs was blown up by a car bomb placed by South African security agents, while in exile in Maputo, 
Mozambique. Sachs lost an arm and sight in one eye. 
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The Constitution revolutionized South Africa’s procedural and substantive legal 
environment (Brickhill 2018). Of the many transformations, the most significant included 
the shift from parliamentary supremacy to constitutional supremacy, new legal 
institutions, and expansive justiciable human rights. Procedurally, the Constitution also 
expanded rules of standing, broadened courts' powers to remedy problems, and 
established what Brickhill (2018) calls “a protective regime relating to the cost of 
constitutional litigation” (5). Through these changes, opportunities for legal mobilization 
for rights became possible, and courts became important sites for politics in the post-
apartheid era. 
 Today, once individuals decide to use legal institutions to address their rights-
based problems, they have three ways to legally mobilize (see figure 2.1). The first is to 
lodge complaints with public interest law organizations, referred to as legal advocacy 
organizations (LAOs). LAOs were created during the late seventies by anti-apartheid 
legal advocates like John Dugard to provide legal services to the disadvantaged. Due to 
resources constraints, these organizations have to make strategic choices about which 
people to represent. If a complaint is found to be a violation of rights and fits the 
organization’s specific cause, the LAO will then approach the courts on behalf of the 
complainants.  
 Changes to pre-constitutional common law rules of standing enhanced ordinary 
people’s ability to access justice through LAOs. Prior to the new constitution, only 
persons who had been impacted directly by the alleged wrong had standing in court. This 
restriction limited the chances of accessing justice for groups of people, which is often 
the nature of rights-based litigation. Section 38 of the Constitution extended standing to 
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anyone alleging that a right in the Bill of Rights has been infringed.  It includes: 1) 
Anyone acting on behalf of another person who cannot act in their own name; 2) Anyone 
acting as a member of, or in the interests of, a group or class of persons; 3) Anyone acting 
in the public interest; and 4) An association acting in the interest of its members. This 
expansion of standing allowed claims to be brought by persons and organizations with 
more resources on behalf of the marginalized poor, increasing the possibility of legal 
mobilization.  
 The Constitution also established a Constitutional Court and made it the country’s 
highest court in all constitutional matters. In addition to regulating disputes between the 
various spheres of government, the Constitution granted the Court exclusive jurisdiction 
in determining whether the President and/or Parliament has failed to fulfill its 
constitutional obligation. In terms of increasing access to courts, Section 167(6)(a) of the 
Constitution also empowered the Constitutional Court to function as a court of first 
instance, allowing citizens to directly access the court “when it is in the interests of 
justice and with leave of the Constitutional Court.” Under this provision, individuals can 
access the courts directly by lodging a complaint through the Court’s Registry. This is the 
second way people can make rights claims for services. This mode of action is usually 
chosen by the socioeconomically disempowered, who have failed to secure legal 
assistance elsewhere and lack the resources to hire a lawyer (Dugard 2006).   
The third way of making a rights complaint is through the South African Human 
Rights Commission (SAHRC) Chapter 9 of the Constitution established SAHRC.  The 
Commission has the authority to “investigate and report on the observance of human 
rights” and provide appropriate redress for rights that have been violated. As an 
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additional arena to legally mobilize rights claims, people can report rights violations to 
the Commission in writing online and orally in person or on the phone. Complaints must 
be made at the Provincial Office where the violation took place. People can lodge 
complaints on behalf of another person or an organization. Once a person lodges a 
complaint, the Provincial Manager and the Head of Legal Services will investigate 
whether a rights violation has occurred. The Commission may then begin to conduct legal 





 These new legal institutions, constitutional design, and persistent socioeconomic 
conditions make South Africa a most-likely site for mass legal mobilization for 
socioeconomic rights, at least in theory. However, since the Constitution’s inception, 
scholars have documented the various roadblocks in achieving socioeconomic justice 
Persons who have decided to 
moblize the law (e.g. lacks access)
Seeks help from 
Legal Advocacy 
Organization (LAO)
LAO denies petition No solution
LAO takes case Court















Complaint is denied No solution
Figure 2.1: Pathways to legal mobilization in South Africa 
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through the law. Much of this work echoes the argument made by American socio-legal 
scholars, like Rosenberg (1991), who argue against courts’ ability to effect social change.  
D. Institutional Roadblocks to Legal Mobilization  
 
1. Roadblocks faced and created by Legal Practitioners  
 
 Although the new Constitution extended standing, allowing LAOs to advocate for 
marginalized groups, these legal practitioners also face roadblocks in their efforts to 
legally mobilize socioeconomic rights claims on behalf of claimants. Scholars highlight 
three major challenges South African public interest litigation organizations face: 1) The 
lack of funding; 2) Lack of experienced and skilled staff; and 3) The oppositional attitude 
from the government (Marcus and Budlender 2008; Cote and Van Garderen 2011).  
Unlike private firms, which can generate revenue to sustain themselves, LAOs 
depend on private donor funding for support. Consequently, they have limited available 
resources which plays a decisive role in how many cases they can litigate. All LAOs must 
be strategic in the types of cases they take to ensure their resources go towards the cases 
with the greatest impact, materially and jurisprudentially. After all, funders are invested 
in how organizations spend their resources. As one lawyer noted,  
There was an issue before where funders were looking at and considering impact 
litigation?  Is it really working?  Because sometimes, it takes up to five to ten 
years to come up with a successful judgment, and it’s not guaranteed. So, you 
spend five to ten years on a matter, and you don’t know what the outcome is 
going to be. And in the meantime, there are cost implications with litigations. So 
even funders have been grappling with impact litigation as a mechanism to secure 
socioeconomic rights or any rights for that matter (L1).  
 
Resource constraints pose a challenge to LAOs’ capacity. Many organizations have 
turned away more cases than they take on due to the availability of resources. One LAO 
lawyer stated of his experience turning away claimants,  
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It’s not a nice thing to experience because I always see some type of facial 
expression when I tell people I can’t take on their case. I mean, some would even 
think that, so you are trying to say that their case doesn’t have merits, or it is not 
strong enough to be successful or not. But the problem is I don’t have the capacity 
to do it. I have to refer it to someone else (L2).  
 
Organizational resource constraints also impact their ability to reach potential claimants, 
further limiting the possibility for legal mobilization, especially in more rural areas. 
While South Africa is home to nineteen LAOs, most of these organizations are 
concentrated in major cities in the country’s three most populous and wealthy provinces, 





Although LAOs are willing to take cases from across the country, limited resources pose 
a roadblock to who the organizations can access. When I asked Section 27 lawyers Sipho 
and Thembi if they felt confined by their geographical location, they explained:  
Sipho: Yes, we do. At the same time, we are compensating. We do because we 
would consult with someone at the end of the line and say we need a document 
they are complaining about. They don’t have WhatsApp. They don’t have any 
other means to send them to you. They are in the rural areas. We do have field 
researchers in specific provinces, Limpopo, Mpumalanga, Eastern Cape, that we 
can depend on them to reach out to those people. But what happens if we get a 
court form? You remember the woman, the one I just told you about? Our field 
researchers are not based there, and when I listen to this client, that says, “I’m in 




Kuruman.2 Will you be able to get to me?” We think as an organization, “we 
don’t have necessary resources to even go there.” So, that frustrates you. It’s an 
access issue. They know that Section 27 can help get their child in school. But the 
principal is like, “I know, they sent this letter, but I’ll wait for them [the lawyers] 
to get here,” knowing that the chances of us getting there, because of where they 
are, are slim.  
 
So, you guys face your own roadblock when you trying to help others access 
justice because of geography.? 
 
 Sipho and Thembi: Yes 
 
Thembi: (interjecting) Or language barrier. The lady who was scheduled for an 
operation3, the one I was telling you about. She can’t speak any other language. 
She only speaks French. She came here on the 27th, and she tried her best to say I 
can’t speak any other language. Luckily, I knew a translator who’s just on the 6th 
floor. They came to translate. She came by herself, and luckily, she found 
someone to understand her. Now imagine, even in this space, you speak, but 
people can’t hear you. We want to, but because of this barrier, and the resources 
to get that barrier cut down like every other organization, having an interpreter, is 
something we should consider, seriously, but it is not easy (L3).  
  
 The lack of funding poses additional challenges to the staffing of LAOs, which 
impacts their capacity to take on many cases. Cote and Van Garderen (2011) note,  
The endemic skills shortage in the South African market affects the NGO sector 
as well. It is difficult to recruit skilled, experienced lawyers with the limited 
salaries and benefits, which are offered by most NGOs due to limitations in 
funding. Funding agreements restrict the use of money and incentive programmes 
are difficult to create and implement (176).  
 
And so, while LAOs usually attract many recent law graduates, they struggle to retain 
their staff. LAOs often suffer from a high turnover rate as lawyers in entry-level positions 
move on to other opportunities, leaving the LAOs with the task of hiring and retraining 
new staff rather frequently. As an example, two of the lawyers that I interviewed in 2015 
 
2 Kuruman is a town in Northern Cape located over 400 km (297 miles) from Johannesburg, where Section 
27 is located.  
3 This claimant was a migrant from the Democratic Republic of Congo, who had painful fibroids and 
needed to have them removed. When she went to the public hospital, the staff told her to come back later 
and then failed to schedule the surgery. She turned to Section 27 for help.  
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during my preliminary research in Johannesburg no longer worked for the organizations 
when I returned to the field in 2018/2019.  
 Despite LAOs’ mission to help people achieve socioeconomic justice by 
protecting key provisions of the constitution, their work is not always socially accepted or 
well supported. Because LAOs actively help people sue the government for failing to 
fulfill its constitutional obligations, their work is sometimes seen as an attack on 
government. Cote and Van Garderen (2011) note of Lawyers for Human Rights’ (LHR) 
experiences with the government,  
In LHR’s experience repeated litigation over something like immigration 
detention can quickly become personal with government lawyers attacking the 
bona fides of NGO lawyers. In more than one case, the state made spurious 
accusations that LHR lawyers engaged in the litigation were illegal foreigners in 
their own right, and therefore did not stand to be trusted on affidavit. Judges have 
explicitly found that such remarks are vexatious and false. But it serves as an 
example of how personal such attacks can get (175).  
 
Sipho stated similarly, “people would send emails, critical emails, saying “that’s how 
useless you are to me. Also, in the media, we have these opinions in the newspaper, if 
you were to pay careful attention on those, you find that one that is always criticizing 
civil society.”  
Because of these challenges LAOs end up playing a gate-keeping role in the legal 
mobilization process. When a claim is denied by one organization, it is likely that it will 
be denied by other organizations due to the lack of resources and the capacity of the 
organizations, leaving the potential claimant with few options of how else to legally 
mobilize. One lawyer explained of when a claim is denied,  
 
Our referral system is quite extensive in a sense that now I have to also make sure 
that the person is helped because it’s a question of trust as well…Because in other 
organizations they simply say I can’t take it, go somewhere else or go to this 
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person and this person. And then the person keeps on going up and down. I mean 
for a general working-class person, that is a very expensive procedure, to have to 
go home and come back tomorrow and look for a different organization, go home 
come back tomorrow different organization, all the time. I don’t think it is 
something very nice for them to go through (L2). 
 
As this lawyer reports, a potential claimant may end up with little knowledge of possible 
next steps without being referred to another organization, which further decreases their 
chances of mobilizing their claims through the legal system. In this way, while help from 
LAOs could lead to successful legal mobilization, these constraints force them to become 
gatekeepers in the legal mobilization process.  
2. Roadblocks faced and created by Courts  
South African legal actors and courts face the challenge of government's slow 
implementation of judicial decisions for socioeconomic rights. As American scholars 
have noted, courts rely on coordinate branches of government to execute their decisions. 
This is especially true with socioeconomic rights cases where court decisions include 
mandating that the state create policies and fund programs to facilitate access. In a 2015 
interview with a litigator from one of the LAOs, she explained, 
The Con [sic] Court is progressive. It is the political side where things get 
messed up. For example, Grootboom was the first case with success. 
However, the lady [Irene Grootboom] died without a house, still living in 
a shack. I think the courts got it right. It’s the executive and legislature 
where we don’t see the materialization (L4).  
 
When I asked why she thought this was so, she later explained, “it’s the respect for the 
separation of powers that plays a role. The Court can tell them [the government] to come 
up with a policy, but then nothing happens.” This litigator echoed what legal mobilization 
scholars have noted of the challenges of turning to courts to solve problems, e.g., judges’ 
inability to implement their own decisions.  
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 In South Africa, this “respect” or what some critics call “angst” about separation 
of powers presents an additional set of roadblocks for legal mobilization (Dugard 2007, 
977). South African legal scholars have criticized the Court’s deference to the other 
government branches, which has led to more conservative (or modest) rulings in 
protecting socioeconomic rights. While existing South African law and the Constitutional 
Court’s willingness to rely on international precedent when necessary are favorable to 
more progressive decision-making on socioeconomic rights cases, the Court has been 
cautious with its rulings due to separation of powers concerns. Dugard (2007) argues that 
while the Court accepted the justiciability of socioeconomic rights, “when poor people 
have secured legal assistance to bring cases through the judicial hierarchy, the Court has 
interpreted SER in an overly cautious way that has provided few incentives to poor 
litigants to seek relief through constitutional litigation” (973). Instead of adopting more 
activist decision-making and hands-on monitoring of government performance 
concerning these rights, the Court has chosen to mainly inquire into the reasonableness of 
the socioeconomic policy at hand in light of the state’s resources rather than outlining the 
state’s obligation to provide direct access to services being denied. This approach has 
diminished the possibility for innovative socioeconomic rights protection.  
While many scholars have argued against the Court’s reasonableness approach 
and for what has been termed a “minimum core” obligation, in which “the most urgent 
survival interests” protected by a right is realized without delay (Bilchitz 2003), much of 
the Court’s record on socioeconomic rights decisions are characterized by what critics 
have called “jurisprudential conservativism.” (Dugard 2007). Because socioeconomic 
rights issues concern allocating resources and the state’s budgets, the Court has been 
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reluctant to hand down substantive relief to claimants. The Court’s resistance to more 
progressive decision-making lies in its concerns about usurping the role of the 
democratically elected branches of government.  
The Court’s reserved approach to socioeconomic rights cases was evident in the 
first socioeconomic rights case, Soobramoney v. Minister of Health KwaZulu- Natal 
(1998). In the decision, the Court expressed its reluctant to intervene with “the rational 
decisions taken in good faith by the political organs and medical authorities whose 
responsibility is to deal with such matters,” instead of ruling in favor of what would have 
been life-saving renal dialysis for the claimant (para 29). The Court further indicated that 
it was hesitant to make orders on how scarce resources, like those of the Department of 
Health, should be allocated. The Court believed such decisions were best left to those 
with more expertise and the constitutional authority to do so. Not only are the courts 
limited in their inability to implement their decisions, but judges are also constrained by 
what some scholars have called an “oversensitivity” to the institutional roles of the other 
branches of government as prescribed by the separation of powers doctrine.  
E. Roadblocks People Face: Cost and Time  
 
1. Litigation Costs  
 
South Africa’s formal legal system makes litigation a costly and lengthy process 
for most ordinary Black South Africans, for whom poverty and job insecurity are 
especially acute. Various factors contribute to the high cost of litigation, including the 
adversarial system of adjudication, with contestation through hired legal representatives, 
and a formal legal process that includes extensive filing of legal documents (Dugard 
2015). Recognizing that the high cost of litigation would limit people’s constitutional 
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right to access courts, constitutional drafters included provisions to expand the poor's 
possibility of accessing justice.  
  Section 35 (3) of the constitution outlines the constitutional mandate for 
government-funded legal services known as Legal Aid South Africa (LASA). LASA’s 
work mainly concerns access to justice for criminal, and to some extent, civil matters. 
However, there is no constitutional right to legal representation at the state’s expense in 
non-criminal constitutional issues.  
As Dugard (2015) notes, “There remains a vast amount of civil litigious matters 
for which Legal Aid is not available. These matters include key areas for transformation 
including gender relations, property relations, and socioeconomic rights” (113). Although 
the expanding of standing allows for representation through university-based law clinics, 
LAOs, and pro bono lawyers from private firms, there are not enough free legal services 
to cover all potential socioeconomic rights claims in South Africa due to funding and, by 
extension, capacity constraints.  
 Because of the cost and complexities in making claims through the formal court 
process, potential claimants could attempt to approach the Constitutional Court directly. 
However, such an attempt is not without significant challenges, mainly the Court’s 
restrictive interpretation of which claims warrant direct access. Unlike national courts in 
other new democracies, like Colombia, Costa Rica, and India which all have institutional 
mechanisms to increase access to courts, the South African Constitutional Court is a less 
accessible institution.4 In a study evaluating the Court’s role as an institution of first 
 
4 While the Indian Supreme Court does not have formal rules enabling direct access. The 
Supreme Court has creatively interpreted the rules to allow direct access by any means, 
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instance, Dugard (2006) found that from 1995-2003, the Constitutional Court refused a 
majority of direct access applications under the grounds that claimants failed to comply 
with one or more of the criteria (273). As a result, only a handful of claims were granted 
direct access. In a later study, Dugard (2015) finds that from 1995-2013, only 18 direct 
access applications were to the Court were granted (127).  None of these cases concerned 
claims from ordinary people to socioeconomic goods and services.  
While constitutional mechanisms have attempted to overcome the imposing cost 
of litigation, as I have outlined in this chapter so far, these provisions are not without 
their problems, creating additional challenges for ordinary people to legally mobilize 
against socioeconomic problems. Consequentially, cost and the extensive time 
commitment of litigation remain as roadblocks. During my interviews, I found that the 
cost and length of engaging with the court discourage people from thinking about turning 
to court for help. One lawyer stated of potential litigants:  
Legal courts in South Africa are very expensive. So, for them [potential 
claimants], they can’t just come in and say now let’s go to court, because for them 
[potential claimants], they view it as a very expensive procedure. Usually, they 
[potential claimants] all start with protests and all that stuff before they can even 
come and think about the legal solution. They first exhaust as much as option and 
remedies that are there before they take court as a last resort, but if you remember, 
it is difficult for someone whose very poor, typical working-class person to ever 
think about court (L2).  
 
Sipho stated similarly,  
 
Generally, they would be like, “oh, court is expensive! I need a lawyer. You’re an 
NGO. Attorneys are paid differently.” So, access to court is an issue in South 
Africa. Apart from your geographical distance, is finances. If you don’t have 
money, generally, it is a universal truth here that you are not going to go to court. 
And it’s a fact that is used everywhere. You go to a director of health, and you tell 
 
including hand-written petitions. In Colombia and Costa Rica, claimants can lay claims 




them that, oh I’ll take you to court, they will be like, good! Go to court. We’ll 
frustrate you for the next five years (L3).  
 
As the lawyers indicate, litigation costs act as a deterrent to pursuing legal solutions for 
ordinary people. As a result, people will doubt the possibilities of getting help from 
LAOs as Sipho revealed, and first seek less costly routes like protest, as the first lawyer 
stated.  
 My interviews with people who had not gone to court for access also show that 
people fear the cost associated with losing the case. In the pre-constitutional era, the 
losing party would generally be ordered to pay the successful party's costs (Jephson and 
Mngomezulu 2018). These adverse cost orders not only hindered marginalized groups 
from approaching the courts, but they also discouraged early public interest litigation 
organizations from taking cases they believed were challenging to win, given their even 
more limited resources at that time. In the post-apartheid legal environment, the 
Constitutional Court recognized the importance of LAOs in developing constitutional 
jurisprudence. Therefore, they have reasoned that strict adherence to the adverse costs 
principle would have a devasting impact on these institutions’ abilities to litigate on 
behalf of claimants. As a result, the principle of adverse costs has been relaxed, 
protecting litigants engaging in constitutional litigation from the risk of adverse cost 
orders (Jephson and Mngomezulu 2018, 156).  
 Despite this protection, ordinary people still fear adverse cost orders. When I 
asked Briton 22, a college student at the University of Zululand if he could take the 
government to for a shack eviction, he explained:  
Briton: No. It is unrealistic  
 




Briton: I would not have the power to take the government to court. And if I lose 
the case, that automatically means that I have to pay for the costs. And therefore, I 
would not afford those costs (Empangeni 15).  
 
Umlazi residents, Mongisi, 25, and Mthokozisi, 23, argued similarly,  
 
Could you take the municipality to court?  
Mongisi: I have a right to that. 
Mthokozisi: Yes, you can.  
Mongisi: But now our fear is failure… 
Mthokozisi: (interjecting) Because taking the municipality to court could cost you 
who you are. It will cost you very much… 
Mongisi: (interjecting) And secondly, you are challenging someone who is going 
to provide you with his lawyer. After you’ve lost your first case, you have to go 
there again. That will cost you money, it will cost you your time. So, we just 
complain, gather our people, then march. 
 So, you’d rather go march?  
Mongisi and Mthokozisi: Yes!  
Like these respondents, most ordinary people are unaware that there is no adverse cost 
principle in constitutional matters. The fear of such cost is still present and effective in 
discouraging people’s willingness to turn to courts for help with socioeconomic rights.  
2. Lengthy Legal Process  
 
Legal mobilization scholars have noted that in addition to costs, lengthy court 
proceedings also discourage the use of legal institutions for problem-solving (Galanter 
1974; Kritzer 2008; Sandefur 2012; Sandefur 2019). After all, while litigation can 
provide relief to justiciable problems, such relief is not immediate and could take years to 
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achieve. The same is true in South Africa. A lawyer, who litigates against shack 
evictions, where immediate relief is required to address the present homelessness that 
results from an eviction, stated, “speed, that’s the actual problem that we always have... 
but that relates to the court system, you know judges. We have the regulatory framework 
in place to actively defend socioeconomic rights, and we certainly have the cases. It’s just 
the wheels of justice taking the turn slowly. But that’s the case everywhere.” Sipho 
explained the impact of time on potential litigants specifically. He stated,  
If it’s not an urgent application, normal time applications apply. There’s the 
pleading process, the exchange of affidavit, which can take months to years, you 
understand. With that knowledge, some people get frustrated that the court is not 
gonna [sic] solve the issue now. They think we need alternative routes. We need 
to get their attention. And in most instances where the government has faltered, it 
has worked because each time there’s interruption [because of protests], the 
government would act. When people request normally by letter, saying please do 
this for us, the government ignores them (L3). 
 
According to Sipho, absent an urgent application where immediate relief can be provided, 
claimants will opt for alternative strategies, like protests, because they believe the 
government would respond quickly in response to the disruption. My interviews with 
ordinary people seconded Sipho’s assessment of the impact on time in people’s approach 
to problem-solving. For example, when I asked Judith if she thought courts could help 
with access problems in South Africa, she stated,  
Judith: Yea, they can. Though it’s a long process you see. If you don’t have a 
lawyer, your own lawyer, your own anything you just have to follow all the 
processes. So, it becomes a lengthy process. The process is there to help you, but 
it won’t help you efficiently (Empangeni 5).  
 
While cost and time were common factors that discouraged my interviewees’ 
willingness to litigate for services, these roadblocks were only expressed once I 
introduced the idea of legal intervention as a remedy. In fact, when unprompted people 
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only stated litigation as a strategy 17 times out of a possible 360 times (72 interviews, 5 
issue areas) in Empangeni. In Umlazi, people reported litigation as a strategy only10 
times out of a possible 195 times (39 interviews, 5 issue areas) prior to my probing. This 
finding suggests that there are other factors that shape the way people think about turning 
to the law than what scholars have uncovered.  
F. Thinkability as a Roadblock  
Although the existing roadblocks covered by the literature are present in the South 
African case, encountering these existing roadblocks only becomes possible once an 
individual believes they can go to court. To even experience the institutional costs and 
time constraints to accessing justice through the legal system, one must first conceive of 
approaching the courts to be the appropriate, desirable, and feasible course of action. The 
existing roadblocks to legal mobilization mainly concern supply-side limitations, 
constraints only experienced once a person believes litigation is the appropriate course of 
action. Scholars who have tried to assess citizens’ demand for law as additional 
roadblocks to legal mobilization have only examined the objective conditions that may 
hinder people from pursuing legal action, like the cost and lengthiness of the legal 
process. However, how people perceive and experience these conditions also impacts 
whether they think they can mobilize their issues through the law. These perceptions and 
experiences make up what I call “the thinkability of legal mobilization,” that is the way 
people think about going to court for justiciable problems. The thinkability of legal 
mobilization for socioeconomic rights in South Africa consists of the following factors 





Thinkability is comprised of all the ways people perceive and understand the law, 
the justiciable problems in their particular context, and themselves. Thinkability is a 
literal term, “Can we, do we think these thoughts?” (Schatzberg 2001). Thinkability is 
dependent on the time, geographic location, and legal environment as people’s 
perceptions of the law, their problems, and the existing constraints are contingent on their 
present context. With regards to legal mobilization for constitutional issues, thinkability 
also includes the ways people see the state and how best to engage with the state to solve 
their problems. Thinkability or the lack thereof can act as a roadblock to legal 
mobilization because such perceptions shape what people think about approaching the 
courts and using the law to solve their problems. In this way, such thoughts can render 
litigation as a problem-solving strategy undesirable, infeasible, and inappropriate, which 
can hinder people from thinking about pursing legal action. As a result, thinkability is the 
culmination of all the ways people make sense of the conditions that impact their demand 
for the law. As such it is the pre-condition to the supply-side constraints. And thus, 



























 Legal mobilization scholars are correct that there are various challenges people 
face when turning to the law to address problems. Existing research on South Africa 
further confirms some of these challenges especially with socioeconomic rights litigation. 
However, by focusing on the limitations that occur after one decides to use legal 
institutions, scholars have eclipsed critical factors in the process of legal mobilization: 
ordinary people’s beliefs in the desirability, appropriateness, or even reasonableness—
thinkability—of appealing to legal institutions to solve their problems. To fully 
understand why even with the existence of codified socioeconomic rights and courts that 
are willing to hear claims on issues of access, some have chosen to not utilize legal 
strategies to secure access to basic goods and services, scholars must also assess how 
people make sense of the challenges of turning to courts. 
The subsequent chapters describe the various elements of thinkability that can 
impact the demand for law for socioeconomic rights problem-solving. Each chapter 
examines the various perceptions of the law, legal institutions, and problems of access to 
assess how people think about turning to courts for help. I show these perceptions not 
only deter people from wanting to pursue legal action, but also encourage people to 
pursue alternative strategies that do not guarantee success. Through these chapters I show 










EXPERIENCES AND PERCEPTIONS OF THE LAW AS ROADBLOCKS 
 
A. Introduction  
 
 When Paralympian Oscar Pistorius was initially sentenced to a meager six years 
in 2014 for the murder of his girlfriend Reeva Steenkamp, South Africans erupted in 
uproar. Pistorius' sentence was unusually lenient as murder in South Africa carries 
typically a 15-year minimum sentence, which can be lowered under mitigating 
circumstances (Cowell 2017). The ruling was also in stark contrast to South African 
kwaito artist's treatment, Molemo "Jub Jub" Maarohanye, a few years earlier (Dixon 
2015). Maarohanye and his friend Themba Tshabalala were originally sentenced to 25 
years in a Soweto Regional Court for the murder and attempted murder after racing on a 
public road while under the influence of cocaine and morphine in 2012. The accident 
resulted in the death of four schoolchildren, and two were left permanently brain-
damaged. Pistorius' early release after serving a sixth of his six-year sentence in 2015 
sparked further anger about what people saw as an unfair justice system. People took to 
social media to express their outrage. "This is how law works, get a good lawyer, u wont 
stay long in jail, get a whack lawyer, u gon' rot in jail, e.g., #OscarPistorius & #Jubjub," 
tweeted one user, Thando Mnguni (Dixon 2015). Another user wrote, "People don't really 
want jub jub out they just want to see Oscar back in jail nje (really)" (Dixon 2015).  
Since then, both Pistorius and Maarohanye have had their sentences adjusted. 
Maarohanye's original sentence was reduced to a 10 -year sentence minus time served 
(Mabuza 2016). In the Pistorius case, the prosecutor appealed his sentence asking for the 
prescribed 15-year sentence, which the Supreme Court of Appeal granted. Despite the 
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adjusted sentences, I found the difference between the men's original sentencing was still 
a lens through which ordinary Black South Africans perceived the legal system. In what 
was the third reference to the cases in my interviews in a month’s time, Marvelous, 24, a 
college graduate from Umlazi, stated:  
It [the law] can't be fair. Even in the Oscar Pistorius, you saw that, even in the 
"Jub Jub" case. I don't know if you know the "Jub Jub" case. "Jub Jub" is a kwaito 
artist. Apparently, him [sic] and his friend got high, and then they drove their 
Mini Coopers fast, you know, along the road that's not normally used at night, in 
certain areas, so you'd speed. Unfortunately, they hit like four students. One 
passed away. Three were injured. They got arrested for ten years for that. Oscar 
Pistorius shot his fiancé, cold blood. You saw the case. But because he had the 
means, the financial means, he never got arrested. Even when he went to jail, it 
was only for a few months, and then he was released. That's not fair. I cannot 
do[sic] a mistake under the influence of a substance and be in prison for ten years, 
and then you have someone committing cold-blooded murder, in his right state of 
mind, shooting someone he was in bed with saying he thought it was a 
burglar…And I find it very unfair. It's so sad because now I always try to think, 
what if Oscar was black. Would it be a different story? Let say he was not an 
athlete, or just a rich black businessman, or a rich black athlete? What would have 
been the situation? Is it money, or is it race? What's the problem? Eh but, that's a 
story for another day. That's why I say I don't trust umthetho (the law) (Umlazi 
67).   
 
Thabiso, 23, a University of Zululand student, similarly expressed why he didn't trust 
courts. He argued, "If I have money in South Africa, you can get away with everything, 
so that's why I don't trust the court. If you have money, you can even get away with 
murder" (Empangeni 37). When I asked how? He explained, "look at Oscar Pistorius. 
You know, money is power in South Africa" (Empangeni 37).   
 Although "Jub Jub" was on parole after serving four years and Oscar Pistorius 
was serving his new 15-year sentence at the time of these interviews, the differences in 
their original sentencing still cast doubt on the legal system's ability to administer justice 
fairly. Experienced or perceived unfairness with all sectors of the legal system has 
decreased public confidence and public trust in the legal system. Through my interviews, 
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I found that this mistrust discouraged some people's willingness to turn to the law for 
help, which influenced their thinkability of turning to courts for socioeconomic problems.  
This chapter describes the various sources of ordinary Black South Africans' mistrust in 
the legal system. In doing so, I examine ordinary Black South Africans' perceptions and 
experiences with the law and how they shape the way people think about the act of going 
to court for help. I argue that in addition to people's past engagement with the law, 
perceptions of ineffective lawyers, court corruption, and law enforcement have cast doubt 
in the legal system's ability to administer justice, which shapes how people think about 
turning to courts for justiciable service delivery problems. Ultimately, this chapter 
provides a snapshot of ordinary Black South Africans legal consciousness and its impact 
on the thinkability of legal mobilization for socioeconomic issues.  
B. Existing Literature on People’s Perceptions of the Legal System  
 
 The first roadblock a person must overcome in any legal system is thinking that 
justice through that legal system is possible. While much of the legal mobilization 
literature has been concerned with whether people can access justice systems because of 
resources and time, the consideration of whether a person can achieve a fair chance at 
justice is also essential, if not more important. As I have argued in Chapter 2, resource 
constraints and litigation's perceived expense can discourage people from believing that a 
legal remedy is obtainable. However, financial and institutional challenges to accessing 
the legal system can only become a hurdle once a person believes that the court is the 
right place to solve their problems. In South Africa, the usual challenges of accessing 
courts exist and are further "exacerbated by gross socioeconomic inequalities and the 
remoteness of law from most peoples' lives," according to Dugard (2006). However, I 
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found that another, more pervasive challenge exists, the growing mistrust of the legal 
system, which is largely influenced by people's perceptions and experiences with local 
police and government corruption. These perceptions and experiences discouraged my 
respondents from thinking about litigation as a problem-solving strategy for 
socioeconomic problems. Instead, they reported that they would generally opt for 
alternative non-legal strategies, which I discuss in Chapter 4. I also found this mistrust in 
the law is a critical element of ordinary Black South Africans' legal consciousness, what 
people do, say, and in my case, think about the law (Ewick and Silbey 1998, 46).  
 People's perception of the legal system is contextual and relational, intimately tied 
to people's interactions with legal actors (Hoffmann 2003; Young 2014). It is through 
these interactions that ordinary people judge the behaviors of legal actors. This informs 
their opinions on the law's fairness, utility, and legitimacy.1 When people believe the law 
is fair, they are more likely to comply with the law and see the law as a method of 
recourse. However, when people mistrust the law's fairness, they also question the legal 
system's usefulness and legitimacy. Public trust in courts, in particular, is contingent on a 
few factors. In their study of judicial trustworthiness in Africa, Boateng and Adjorlolo 
(2018) argue judicial trust is contingent on courts legitimacy as "strategically independent 
and nonpartisan institutions with the moral, authoritative, and legal mandate to 
adjudicate, render verdicts, and make (un)popular decisions in both civil and criminal 
proceedings" (4). Trust in courts is also dependent on whether people view judges' 
decisions as fair, just, and appropriate, as Marvelous and Thabiso's assessments of "Jub 
Jub" and Pistorius' sentencing shows.  
 
1 I rely on Sunshine and Tyler’s (2003) definition of legitimacy as “a property of an authority of institution 
that leads people to feel that that authority or institution is entitled to be deferred to and obeyed.”  
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 While this project investigates the ways, people think about the law and courts 
regarding solving constitutional problems, ordinary people's perceptions of legal 
institutions largely stem from their views of the criminal justice system––the sector of 
law they have the most exposure to. My interviewees' perception of the law is a 
composite of their views of the police, lawyers, and courts. As a result, people's view of 
courts' legitimacy is conditioned by their view of the police, lawyers, and to some extent, 
the state. This is consistent with the existing literature on legal legitimacy. Legal 
legitimacy research does not distinguish between people’s perceptions of the legitimacy 
of different parts of the legal system (Farrell, Pennington and Cronin 2013; Young 2014). 
Because people lump their perceptions of various legal authorities together, experience 
and even the suspicion of corruption in any part of the legal system shapes the way 
people see the law.  
Corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa is a long-standing problem with historical 
roots, some have argued (Le Vine 1975; Tignor 1993; Lodge 1998; van den Bersselaar 
and Decker 2011). Although there are differing opinions on the exact causes of 
corruption, scholars agree that "corruption is an institution in Africa with a long history" 
(Boateng and Adjorlolo 2018, 5). The literature has also located corruption in various 
parts of the state and everyday life in Africa. Blundo et al. (2006) find that corruption 
governed people's daily encounters with health and transportation services and the 
judicial system in West Africa. Others have found what Boateng and Adjorlolo (2018) 
call a "pervasive culture" of police corruption on the continent, which has generated 
mistrust and low confidence in the police (Sayed and Bruce 1998; Tankebe 2010; 
Debalkie and Snyman 2014; Jonck and Swanepoel 2016; Boateng 2016). In their study of 
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citizens' level of trust in courts in 33 African countries, Boateng and Adjorlolo (2018) 
find that "Africans have a greater probability of saying that they have no trust in the court 
system." The potential for mistrust in courts is linked to institutional corruption they find.   
The view that corruption exists permeates every part of life in South Africa and 
the suspicion that various government actors engage in corrupt practices is commonplace. 
Officials within the legal system are no exception. Since the early 1990s, scholars have 
investigated people's perceptions of the state of corruption in democratic South Africa 
(Bekker 1991; Lodge 1998). Early public opinion surveys reported that South Africans 
felt public officials engaged in corruption and were guilty of bribery (IDASA 1996).  
South Africans' view of state corruption has grown in part due to the Presidency of Jacob 
Zuma, who is facing a series of corruption charges, including racketeering, fraud, and 
money laundering. Zuma's presidency was mired with political scandals and gross acts of 
corruption, like the use of taxpayers' money for "security" upgrades to his private 
residence, including adding a R3.9 million swimming pool that was said to be used to 
fight fires. Outside of high-profile instances of corruption, dissatisfaction with local 
government further fuels the narrative that corruption is present in South Africa’s 
governance. While there is a body of literature that explores the state of corruption in 
South Africa more in-depth, this chapter's goal is not to assess South Africa's political 
corruption. Instead, my goal is to show how the proliferation and the suspicion of 
corruption at all levels of the state have shaped how ordinary people think about their 
chances of turning to the law for help. As Buscaglia (1999) notes, "corruption within the 
judiciary (e.g., paying a bribe to win a case) has a profound impact on the average 
citizen's perception of social equity" (3). My interviews provide further evidence of this 
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in South Africa. The perception of corruption in the legal system has impacted whether 
ordinary people believe they could have a fair chance at obtaining justice against those 
with money, powers of the occult, or more status and power.  
1. The Importance of Trust and Confidence in the Law  
 All institutions' legitimacy is dependent on citizens' trust and confidence (Baum 
1992; Caldeira 1991; Carp and Stidham 1991, 1993; Marshall 1989; Boateng and 
Adjorlolo, 2018; Benesh and Howell 2001). Without confidence, it is unlikely that people 
will comply with the institution's regulations and procedures, which can undermine the 
institution's performance. In an untrustworthy legal system, people will make attempts at 
"individualized justice in the form of political connections, bribery, taking the law into 
one's own hands, and other means to circumvent the system" (Baker 2009; Benesh and 
Howell 2001, 200). People will make these attempts because, one on hand, they doubt 
legal institutions' ability to be effective in carrying out their obligations. On the other 
hand, they believe the legal system is corruptible. Much of the literature on public trust 
and public confidence focus on the importance of these sentiments for citizens’ 
compliance with the law, while others have argued the role of confidence in the legal 
system for citizens' participation in the law. Roberts and Stalans (1997) argue that the 
lack of confidence discourages people's willingness to participate in the democratic 
aspects of the justice system. Dugard (2006) writes of South Africa, that the lack of 
confidence in the system may also reduce people's willingness to make claims to court. 
My findings expand on this line of research. The lack of trust and confidence in the legal 
system also reduces the thinkability of legal mobilization against justiciable problems. 
Pursuing a legal intervention becomes less thinkable when a person does not trust the 
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court's ability to decide their case fairly. Similarly, if a person believes that to win a case, 
they need to engage in practices they cannot access, like bribing, they will not feel 
confident enough to want to pursue a legal remedy.  
C. Perceptions and Experiences of the Law in South Africa  
 
In my interviews, people frequently reported that they were unwilling to go to 
court for the scenario problems because they did not trust the legal system to administer 
justice fairly. On the one hand, their mistrust in the legal system stems from past 
experiences, including their encounters with local police. On the other hand, ordinary 
people perceive the legal system's inner workings and the state in ways that suggest fair 
justice through South Africa's courts is unattainable. Out of the 110 Empangeni and 
Umlazi respondents, 54 had no exposure with going to court. My respondents with 
experience with going to court did so in a limited capacity (see Table 3.1). Most 
respondents who have gone to court went to support a friend or family member who was 
either a victim or a defendant facing criminal charges, like an assault.  
 
Experiences with courts Number of interviewees 
Assault 6 
Child Support 8 
Divorce 1 
Domestic Violence  2 
Traffic Violation 2 
Job Related Experience 2  
Witness/Testimony  3 
Land Inheritance 1 




Land Issue 2 
Property Damage 1 
To Support Someone 14  
To Observe 11 
Wrongful Arrest 4 
 
 
1. Role of bad experiences with the law  
 
 People who had positive experiences with the law are more trusting of the legal 
system and are more willing to go to court again. A person's positive experience includes 
receiving a favorable outcome and/or useful engagement with the police. Tamera, who 
was unemployed and mainly surviving on child support from her father after going to 
court, explained, "yah I do trust, cause if it wasn't for the court, we wouldn't be 
supported. Like I do have my own kids now, yes. I'm about to get married to somebody, 
but my father still pay [sic] for me. So, it’s a very big thanks to the court. They have 
helped us a lot" (Umlazi 65). Like Tamera, people's trust in courts is contingent on 
whether they believed the court handed down a decision in their favor. Conversely, 
people will lose confidence in the legal system when they disagree with a case's outcome, 
which they interpret as court failure.  
A "miscarriage of justice" or court failure can generate mistrust in courts. 
People’s perceptions of court failure are derived from what respondents felt was a 
negative experience with courts, like receiving an unfavorable outcome or experiencing 
unfair treatment during the court process. These perceptions further discourage the use of 
legal institutions as a means of recourse because they cast doubt on the legal system's 
ability to administer justice (e.g., help). Umlazi resident Nonhlanhla's story illustrates 
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this.  As we sat in the yard of her one-room house, Nonhlanhla, 35, gazed off to look at 
her daughters as they ran up and down the walkway when I asked her to elaborate on her 
experience with going to court. She replied, "it's a sensitive story," as she lowered her 
eyes. I asked if she would be more comfortable if I stopped audio recording. She agreed 
though she was still willing to share. She explained that her partner was falsely accused 
of raping a neighbor's child, a friend of her youngest daughter, who was five years old. 
The child spent a significant amount of time in the yard playing with Nonhlanhla's 
children. Nonhlanhla suspected the child's grandmother accused her partner of rape, 
instead of the child accusing the man of rape. Her partner was currently serving his 
sentence. Yet, the child still wanted to play with her daughters. I asked Nonhlanhla, 
"given this situation, would you ever go to court again if you had a problem?" She 
responded harshly, "it's just that when you're speaking of inkantolo (court), it raises a lot 
of things for me because I just recently got to find out that there is no justice in South 
Africa" (Umlazi 56). For Nonhlanhla, the court failed to provide justice for her partner, 
and thus, she expressed she would not choose a legal remedy to solve any problems, 
including the scenario problems which were unrelated to criminal justice. The court's 
unfavorable decision impacted how she saw courts as a possible way to solve the scenario 
problems since it did not solve what she interpreted as a problem, her partner's false 
arrest. Anger and disappointment fueled Nonhlanhla's ways of seeing the law and 
processed the act of going to court to solve problems.  
Feelings of fear and anger can further discourage a person from pursuing legal 
action to solve problems. As much as law is present in people's complicated lives, so are 
things like "love, fear, violence, friendship, cooperation, resistance, and politics" (Marshall 
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and Barclay, 2003, 619). For example, Zethu, 32, went to court for child maintenance (child 
support). When the judge sided with the father, she was furious. She stated, "it was the first 
time to be there, and after the results, I was angry, hurt and everything. I saw that the child 
is growing and I'm not working and the child is now demanding, and the father is roaming 
around the street and has everything that he wants to have" (Umlazi 69). When I asked her 
if she would go to court again, given this experience, she stated, "I don't like courts! I don't 
like courts. I don't like jails and everything. I'm scared of all these places and that part of 
life. It's hurting. I don't know if I would go to court again" (Umlazi 69). Zethu's 
disappointment with the court's decision in her first encounter with the law made her 
apprehensive about considering going to court again. 
 Some people's perceptions of the legal system are less about court decisions and 
case outcomes and more about the discrepancies between law on the books and law in 
practice, especially when it has implications for their everyday life. My interview with 
Zweli, a 40-year-old disabled father who was facing eviction, provides evidence of this. 
Zweli lived in a building in Durban built by a non-profit organization for disabled 
persons, specifically the blind. Until 1992 the building was managed by the organization. 
After, the government took over property management and eventually decided the 
building could be put to better use than housing unemployed residents with disabilities. 
When Zweli and his fellow residents visited their families in the rural areas during the 
Christmas holiday in 2016, they were told by the municipality not to come back. Zweli 
explained, "the first time they called us when we were visiting back home. They called us 
and told us not to come back to the premises" (LRC 88). When the residents returned in 
January 2017, the government came to the building and ordered them to leave. The 
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residents refused. The government then turned off the water and electricity connections to 
the building in an unsuccessful attempt to force the residents out. In February, the 
government returned with a court order of eviction and the police. The residents 
subsequently contacted their lawyers. Although the residents' case was pending at the 
time of my interview with Zweli, I did ask whether he trusts the courts and the law, given 
his experience so far. He stated the following:  
We do trust the I do not trust the law because here in South Africa, things don't go 
the way they are written down because even when something is so straight 
forward, and you know it, it is even clear to a little child. But they [government] 
have their own ways of turning and twisting the law. I can say that I do not trust 
the law, and I am waiting for whatever outcome. I don't trust it because of the 
situation I've been in…because there is no law in South Africa that allows this 
sort of action [an eviction] without the two parties having an agreement, and that 
is how this matter landed in court and went on. So when the power went off, we 
didn't know what was happening, only to find out that these people from the 
government went in and switched it off in their own way. They said that the 
cables are out in the open and they are a danger hazard, and this was all nonsense 
because there no cables running around in the open (LRC 88).  
  
Zweli's mistrust of the law stemmed from the government's attempt at an illegal eviction, 
which Zweli knew was against the law and his right to housing. The government's 
underhanded behavior influenced how Zweli perceived how the law works, mainly the 
government's persistent efforts to ignore legal provisions and protections for its citizens.  
 People also doubt the law's effectiveness in solving problems when the law has 
proved to be ineffective in the past. In response to whether she trusted the court to help if 
she had a problem, Nomvula, 67, stated, "I do, but sometimes they don't. Even if I trust 
them, sometimes they don't work. I've got an incident. Somebody came and steal [sic] my 
chairs here, five chairs. I went and reported it at the police station. Even now, they 
haven't done anything, and they haven't come. I even got the case number on my phone" 
(Umlazi 69). At the time of the interview, it had been eight months since she reported the 
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incident to the police. The police's failure to provide further assistance caused Nomvula 
to doubt the law's ability to provide a legal remedy to everyday problems with services.  
People who were not directly involved in court cases were also impacted by their 
experiences going to court. In a conversation with college students Malusi and Xolani, I 
found Malusi's experience going to court to support his friend, who was arrested during a 
student protest on campus, influenced whether he believed he could go to court for the 
shack eviction scenario. The men debated the following:  
Xolani: I can put [sic] him to court (laughs) 
 




Malusi: How? But I don't think you can win that fight. 
 
Xolani: I can. I have a right. If you take my home, where should I live? Which 
means the rights of South African citizens are being ignored. It's not apartheid 
now. We are free. 
 
Malusi: But I don't think so. Because, ngibuka la (I'm looking at this), those 
students who were fighting for our rights, right now they are going to jail. 
(Empangeni 18)  
 
When I later asked Malusi what he thought of courts and whether he trusted them given 
his experience, he explained, "Aye, it's not a good place. I saw people cry, and some of 
them were getting arrested for things they didn't do" (Empangeni 18). Malusi's 
experience observing his friend's experience made him resistant to the idea of going to 
court even in a dire situation like a shack eviction.  
2. Role of Money as Status  
 
While people's views of the legal system can stem from their first-hand 
experiences with the law, people without experiences going to court rely on their beliefs 
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and perceptions of the legal system to determine whether they trust the law and can use it 
to solve problems. People's perceptions about the legal system stem from what they have 
seen or heard about the police, lawyers, and courts. From my interviews, I learned that 
even those who had not had first-hand experiences with the legal system had developed a 
perspective that engaging with law entails some level of corruption in the form of bribes 
or the use of occult forces. These perspectives are enhanced by press reports on state 
corruption, views on high profile cases like "Jub Jub's" and Oscar Pistorius', and 
community gossip about local crime. In my interviews, when people explained why they 
did not trust the courts and the broader legal system, their mistrust was grounded in 
beliefs about inequality experienced by those who could not engage in corrupt practices, 
like using money to gain an advantage.  
 Access to money plays a central role in whether people believe they can legally 
mobilize against socioeconomic problems. As I outlined in Chapter 2, people consider 
their financial capabilities when they think about pursuing legal actions to solve 
problems. Primarily people evaluate whether they can afford a lawyer, court fees, and the 
time off from work to appear in court. However, a person's access to money is an 
indicator of their status, which people believe grants them an unfair advantage with the 
law. As Silvia, a 29-year-old shack dweller, explained that while she trusted the courts 
because of the work of Abahlali, she did not trust the law because "it doesn't do so much 
for us [poor people]. It favors those that can contribute more to the economy” (ABM 86). 
Or as Thlogi 27, expressed "with everything that always plays out [in court], it always 
seems like if you have money everything plays at your advantage" (Johannesburg 97). 
Sbu, 44 a primary school teacher, who was incarcerated for two months as a teenager for 
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stabbing his bully in the 11th grade, argued similarly: "ah what I found out in South 
Africa it depends on your status really. Some people will never go to jail, will never go to 
jail even against the compelling level of evidence they will never go to jail. I don't have 
total faith in the justice system" (Empangeni 6). Although Sbu acknowledged that his 
case was during the apartheid-era, he still believed those with money and status have an 
unfair advantage when engaging with the law.  
 Money and status are also tied to race. One reason people were in an uproar about 
what they perceived was unfair justice in their comparison between the "Jub Jub" and 
Oscar Pistorius cases is because people believe Pistorius received a better initial outcome 
because he was white. After all, he made more money as a white Olympic athlete and 
thus, had more status than the local Black rapper. My interview with Lungile, 24 college 
student, who had previously studied law, echoed this belief. She stated,  
I feel as if the system here creates an advantage to some and a very, very 
heartbreaking disadvantage for some. And mostly, it's not fair to Black people. 
Not racist or anything, but when I analyzed judgments, I always felt like in most 
issues, if you [sic] Black, you have an automatic fail. And if you [sic] white, there 
is scrutiny. There is reasoning behind it. It could be that we, most black people 
they don't have the funds to get a lawyer as good as the white person who will 
look for other forms of justification for them to walk free (Empangeni 40).  
 
I was curious whether she believed it was race or money, I asked Lungile if she felt the 
law works mostly for white people. She responded, "yes, it works mostly for white 
people, and it works mostly for people with money. So, if you have money, you know 








 Aside from allowing people to afford the costs of going to court and leveraging an 
advantage due to an elevated status, money also enables people to engage in bribery. My 
interviewees believed that bribery occurs in every sector of the legal system. As Baba 
Mthale, 52 expressed, "court exists by law. But I can't trust it with my all. Reasons being 
1. The lawyer can be bribed, 2. The investigator can be bribed, 3. The policeman 
definitely bribed, 4. The magistrate can be bribed, 5. The Judge can be bribed. So now I 
can't say I trust it will my all, no no no, I can't" (Umlazi 75). Across 110 interviews, there 
were 55 references to bribery in the justice system. Although none of the participants 
who cited bribery as a reason why they would not/could not go to court had any first-
hand experience with the legal system, they relied on community gossip, the culture of 
corruption in the government, and the release of a local criminal to support their claims of 
bribery within the legal system. People cited anecdotes of hearing about a friend, family 
member, or local criminal whose case was dismissed because the case files went missing 
or the court made what they interpreted as the wrong decision, which they attributed to 
the exchange of bribes. People then interpret these occurrences as a sign that their legal 
system can be bought or manipulated and, thus, is ineffective– at least for those who 
cannot engage in bribery. Bribery has become an accepted and almost normalized 
understanding of how the system works and what it takes to engage with legal institutions 
in South Africa. This understanding generates a mistrust of law for ordinary Black South 
Africans, which discourages the thinkability of using legal institutions to solve justiciable 
problems, as evidenced by the multiplicity of non-legal responses to my scenario 
questions. For example, after initially naming a non-legal strategy to solve a shack 
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eviction, I later asked a group of young women in Umlazi if they could take the 
municipality to court for help. The first woman, Nolwazi, stated, "You can, but it's not 
easy," while others shook their heads in agreement (Umlazi 72). When I asked why not, 
they explained:  
Nolwazi: Corruption! 
 
Manda: Lawyers!  
 
Simmy: They'll [the government] buy the police, they'll buy the judge, 
bribe yonke yinto nje (definitely everything) (Umlazi 72).  
 
The women doubted whether they could get help from the legal system with success 
because they suspected government would engage in bribing, making pursuing legal 
actions against the government difficult. Thembi, 40, a street vendor, stated something 
similar when I asked if she could go to court for the school infrastructure problem. She 
explained:  
Thembi: No, where we live, the court doesn't help.  
 
They can't help? 
Thembi: No, the police are corrupt. Even if you arrest someone, they will get out. 
The court doesn't help. You can't say you get help in that situation. It doesn't help 
with anything. Because a person gets arrested and they get there [at the court] and 
bribe, then they get out. It's something we see all the time happening. Someone who 
has a relation with the police may come, and because the police has a connection 
on the inside, they will be able to pass on this thing, you will bribe it [the court], 
and then they will split this money, so that's how you get out. It happens. Let's say 
you get arrested by a police officer, and you are the suspect. Then the court issues 
out a warrant of arrest for you. When they get you, it is time for the investigator to 
do his job. Then the investigator will take a bribe from you and lose all the evidence. 
The investigator has his own people, to the point that they all working together and 
even bribe the judge too. The judge ends up making the wrong decision because 
now they've been bribed anyway (Empangeni 44).  
 
Thembi's belief that those who are wrong can bribe their way through the legal process 
cast doubt on whether she could go to court to solve a problem with her child's right to 
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education. Thembi's belief about bribery in the legal system made her see the court as 
unhelpful because people can use bribes to circumvent the standard legal process where a 
legal remedy could be afforded justly. The derailing of the legal process rendered legal 
institutions ineffective in problem-solving for Thembi, especially since she could not 
engage in bribery. Valentia, 31, echoed a similar sentiment about the law's 
ineffectiveness due to bribes. When I asked Valentia if she trusted the courts after she 





Valentia: These people are bought. So, I don't trust. It [the law] works 
sometimes yes, sometimes no. It's there but can be broken (Empangeni 
33).  
 




It's too crooked. It's crooked. The law is too crooked. I'm telling you I've seen it. 
Being raised in the townships, you find policemen. The policemen are protectors 
of the law, but they take bribes left, right, and center. Before even marijuana was 
legalized in South Africa, I used to see all the time the cops will come, they take 
R50 bribes, and they buy cool drinks [soda] from the weed dealer. It's nothing. 
This guy (the weed dealer) makes 2k a week, but they'll just come every Friday, 
and he'll give them a R100. Even TRT (Tactical Response Team), it's the high 
squared of policemen, and they [sic] highly trained, but they would just get small 
bribes and go on like that. So that's the reason why police are no longer respected. 
Policemen are really, really no longer respected here in South Africa cause [sic] 
they are the ones who tarnished their credibility. Even when you [are] caught 
driving fast and given a fine, you just give them R50 and off just like that 
(Empangeni 37).  
 
People also believe that lawyers could be bribed. After Khonzphi, 56, and Sonto, 30, sang 
praises of the lawyers at SERI for their work in their eviction cases, I questioned what 
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they thought of lawyers before working with the organization. In response to "did you 
trust lawyers before working with SERI?" Sonto shared:  
Sonto: No...Cause [sic] I thought it's human nature. They are humans. There's this 
thing they [people] say, abantu bayawa'briber amalawyer (people bribe lawyers). 
So, if you don't have money... for me to go to a lawyer for assistance is something 
else. I won't get the help because I don't have money. But after knowing SERI, I 
got that hope back (IFC 92).  
 
4. Witchcraft  
 
 While some people like Thabiso and others attributed the lapses in South Africa's 
justice system to the use of bribes, a few people also attributed it to "witchcraft," that is, 
"forms of occult assault perpetrated by other persons, usually persons disguising their 
malicious motives while using secret means" (Ashforth 2005, 17).  The suspected use of 
witchcraft is an everyday feature that permeates various parts of ordinary people's lives 
on the continent (Douglas 1970; Geschiere 1997; Moore and Sanders 2001; Smith 2009). 
As Ashforth (2005) writes of South Africa, "everyday life in Soweto… is lived more in a 
mode of suspicion and fear of occult assault rather than open accusation and persecutions 
of witches" (12). In South Africa, for those who believe, witchcraft has real material 
consequences in the real world. Within the legal system witchcraft, like bribery, is 
suspected of being used to interrupt the legal process by making evidence disappear or 
causing significant delays in court proceedings. My first encounter with the alleged use of 
witchcraft, known locally in KwaZulu-Natal as muthi, was during my interview with 
Kwanele and Falisha, both 23 and students at the University of Zululand. Kwanele shared 
that she went to court in support of a mutual friend who's facing murder charges. The 
friend fatally stabbed an older woman during a fight at a party in 2015 when she was 17 
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years old. When I asked Kwanele if she knew what the outcome of the case was, she 
replied,  
Kwanele: She is still attending that case till [sic] today. The case kept on 
postponing up until today. Now she is 20. I think at her home they are using muthi 
and all that stuff so that she doesn't get charged.  
 
 Falisha: Yeah, witchcraft 
 
What are they using witchcraft for?  
 
Kwanele: To win the case.  
 
Do you think it's working? 
 
Kwanele: At times, cause it [the case] keeps postponing. They [sic] still 
postponing till now…  but when time goes on, I think she will be in jail in the 
future because you can't stab a person and live free and go around free.  
 
Falisha: Yah! the muthi will expire (Empangeni 34).  
 
While there are other possible factors that caused the case's postponement, like South 
Africa's overburdened justice system, the women believed their friend's family's use of 
witchcraft helped delay the case with success. The case delay is justice denied for the 
family of the woman who died. When I later asked the women if they trusted courts, they 
both let out a resounding "Cha !", no in isiZulu. When I asked why they explained:  
Falisha: Because you can bribe there. 
 
Kwanele: Mhm, you can bribe them. Or maybe the documents are gone. That's 
why they keep postponing. They use money to bribe their way out. 
  
Falisha: Or even muthi. Those that use muthi can make things disappear 
(Empangeni 34).  
 
Eskhaleni couple Vusumuzi, 42, and Rose 36, further confirmed the suspected use of 
witchcraft to interrupt the legal process. Both first stated they did trust the court. 
However, when I asked them if they believed the law was fair, they replied:  
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Vusumuzi: Yah! Sometimes it [the law] is fair, and sometimes it not, but it is fair. 
But there are some people… if you [sic] working there [at the court] I'm buying 
you. If other ones come, say she comes (pointing to his wife), she will fail because 
I bought you. 
  
Rose: No! umthetho [the law] is fair. It is the people who are enforcing the law 
that do their own thing. 
 
Vusumuzi: Yah! Sometimes I pay you, you [are] working there in inkantolo [the 
court]. If I can talk to you privately and give you the money when she come… 
 
Rose: (interjecting) They [the court] will remove some points that will be against 
me.  
 
Vusumuzi: You see. 
 
Does that happen a lot? 
 
Rose: It does.  
 
Vusumuzi: Yah (Empangeni 30).  
 
I questioned whether they believed it was just the results of bribes that information from 




Vusumuzi: Sometimes yes. For example, [if] I kill somebody, but when we go 
there at inkantolo (the court), you find that I use muthi, and when we get there, the 
case just disappears (Empangeni 30). 
 
The perceived use of witchcraft to gain an advantage in the legal system was less present 
in urban areas. After citing the prevalence of corruption within the legal system as 
reasons why they would not go to court for a shack eviction, Nolwazi and her friends 
suggested that the use of witchcraft was also another possible problem with going to 
court for help. They stated:  




Kwanda: And they'll make your case last for the whole year, till [sic] you finally 
give up. 
 
You mentioned that documents go missing; how?  
 
Manda: Yes, they go missing because someone pays to get them missing (Umlazi 
72). 
 
To assess whether the perception of the use of muthi to derail legal proceedings was 
prevalent across the province, I further asked the group if they believed muthi could make 
court documents disappear. They replied:  
Nolwazi: Yah, I also heard that. If you go to court, your case will be weak, and 
the other person [who uses muthi] will win the case. But I personally, I don't 
believe in those things. 
 
Nompilo: Like evidence goes missing, black magic type of vibes. 
 
Kwanda: I do believe in the spiritual world and stuff, but I don't think they have 
so much power in the physical world (Umlazi 72).  
 
Although there is some disagreement about whether people can use witchcraft to 
successfully interfere with the administration of justice, for those who do believe, people 
with powers of the occult can manipulate the legal system to their advantage just like 
those with money who can exchange bribes.   
5. Perceptions of Free Lawyers  
 
 Not having access to a good attorney cause also generated ambivalence about the 
thought of litigating for help with a socioeconomic problem. As I presented in Chapter 2, 
people believed if they could not afford a "good" lawyer, which is synonymous with an 
expensive lawyer, they could not win a case, especially one against the government. 
Many of my respondents believed someone experiencing these kinds of socioeconomic 
issues could not afford a lawyer, and therefore it would be difficult for them to pursue a 
legal intervention. After the twentieth interview, I noticed that no one mentioned the 
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possible use of free legal assistance to alleviate the challenge of affording a good lawyer. 
While I did not expect the average citizen to be familiar with legal advocacy 
organizations, I did expect people to reference the possible use of government-funded 
legal services since they are more widely available in the country and constitutionally 
mandated. Section 35 (3) of the South African constitution outlines the constitutional 
mandate for government-funded legal services known as Legal Aid South Africa 
(LASA). Although a bulk of the matters undertaken by LASA concern criminal cases and 
civil disputes, even less so, LASA has established an "impact litigation unit" to deal with 
public interest law cases, like those that concern the socioeconomic rights of the poor 
(McQuoid-Mason 2013). The unit also refers public interest law cases to legal advocacy 
organizations (McQuoid-Mason 2013). At present, LASA has 64 justice centers in urban 
areas and 64 satellite offices. Given the possibility of LASA to hear socioeconomic rights 
claims or at least enable access to a legal advocacy organization in practice, for ordinary 
people, LASA could serve as a first step in an attempt to seek justice for a socioeconomic 
problem – at least theoretically.  
Surprised by the absence of legal assistance to overcome the challenge of costs, I 
also began asking interviewees whether they could go to legal aid for help and whether 
they trusted it to help with socioeconomic problems. All of my participants could not 
fathom turning to legal aid for two reasons. Firstly, people believed that legal aid lawyers 
do not win cases. Some of this perception stems from what people have heard of others' 
experiences using legal aid. My interview with Abahlali members Bongiwe 39, and 
Nkululeko 66, provides evidence of this. After sharing disapproval about the denial and 
delay of services at government hospitals, including Bongiwe's experience with childbirth 
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the previous year,2 I asked if they thought they could take the Department of Health to 
court for help. After all, both Bongiwe and Nkululeko had successfully gone to court for 
shack evictions with the help of Abahlali. They replied:   
Nkululeko: No. The problem is for you to be able to take the Minister to court, 
you'd have to have an expensive lawyer for you to be able to match them [the 
government]. (Bongiwe nods in agreement)  
  
 What about legal aid? 
 
Bongiwe: They won't be able to help me. 
 
Nkululeko: They always lose cases.  
 
Bongiwe: ehhe ehhe!3 
 
Nkululeko: We hear people say that.  
 
Bongiwe: Yes, about legal aid (ABM 83). 
 
Others associate the broader government's corruption and inability to produce successful 
outcomes with the quality of legal aid's services because it is provided by the same 
government they perceive as corrupt and ineffective. As to why she would not use legal 
aid, Thobile 32, stated,  
You can take someone to court for raping you. But if they get an expensive 
lawyer and you get the government one, obviously for you that's a losing case, 
you won't win. They end up walking scot-free, and you pass them in the streets 
(Umlazi 71).  
 
Falisha and Kwanele expressed similar opinions about why they did not trust legal aid to 
help. They shared:  
Kwanele: These people are corrupt  
 
2 When she arrived at the local government hospital at 9 am in excruciating pain from contractions, 
Bongiwe was told she needed to wait in the lobby after nurse’s evaluation because she would only be ready 
to give birth at 6 pm. She was not given a room despite being in early stage of labor. As the hours went by 
Bongiwe’s pain increase so much so she said she felt paralyzed. Fellow patients had to alert the nursing 
staff of the Bongiwe’s condition. Bongiwe gave birth shortly after at 2pm instead.  





Falisha: Yah! they too corrupt. We can't trust them (Empangeni 34).  
 
The secondary reason people questioned turning to legal aid for help with suing 
the government for a service delivery problem concerned whether people could 
successfully use a government-funded institution to sue the government. For my 
interviewees, there was something unthinkable about this act. As to why he could not use 
legal aid, Thlogi 27, explained,  
Okay, this is how it is. It's like taking the government to court using government 
resources. I don't know. It just doesn't play out correct [sic] in my head.  Because 
obviously, first scenario, you said if I am poor right. So, obviously, when you go 
into court, you can't afford any representative, right? So who's going to represent 
you, state attorneys, right? Hence, I am saying, using government resources 
against the government… (sigh) I don't know how that will play out. I have never 
actually thought of that (Johannesburg 97).   
 
While Thlogi expressed apprehension about the thought of using legal aid, others 
expressed fear. Mthokozisi 23, and Mongisi 25 shared the following:   
Could you take the municipality to court?  
 
Mongisi: I have a right to that.  
 
Mthokozisi: Yes, you can.  
 
Mongisi: But now our fear is failure… 
 
Mthokozisi: (interjecting) Because taking the municipality to court could cost 
you. Depending on who you are, it will cost you very much.  
 
Mongisi: And secondly, you are challenging someone [the government] who is 
going to provide you with his lawyer…  
 
Mthokozisi: After you've lost your first case, you have to go there again. That will 
cost you money. It will cost you your time. So, we just complain. Gather our 
people, then march (e.g., protest) (Umlazi 63).  
 
For Mthokozisi and Mongisi, because legal aid is a government-funded institution, they 
believed their case against the government would not be successful and thus, not worth 
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the risk of the additional cost and time to try to pursue a legal remedy. My interview with 
Sfundo 30, along with Baba Mthale, who earlier stated he did not trust the legal system, 
provided similar evidence of the perceived risk of using legal aid. When I asked them if 
they trusted legal aid attorneys, they explained:  
Baba Mthale: Me, I trust him [a legal aid attorney], but in some cases, I do not 
trust him. Because if I am against the government, I am sure he will not stand up 
for me because he is already with the government.  
 
Sfundo: Uh... Maybe yes... Maybe no. Yes, because, maybe in the way they 
express the things that I would've expressed in court, maybe he or she would 
express it better than I. No, because, (sigh) it could be that somehow, someway in 
cases, where I could be against government or one of the government officials, 
maybe it would end up quite detrimental for me (Umlazi 75).  
 
Like Mthokozisi and Mongisi, Sfundo and Mthale doubted whether they would achieve 
justice with legal aid. For ordinary Black South Africans, there is something unthinkable 
and even risky about turning to legal aid for help with socioeconomic problems.  
D. Conclusion 
 
 This chapter described the diverse ways ordinary Black South Africans perceive 
and experience the legal system. My findings show that ordinary people mistrust various, 
and in some cases, all legal institutions. People's mistrust of legal institutions diminished 
their confidence in the legal system's ability to administer justice fairly and equally. 
Therefore, they doubt whether justice through courts is attainable. For others, legal 
remedies are only possible if you have money, status and can engage in the exchange of 
bribes, and, to a lesser extent, witchcraft. These findings challenge the literature on the 
role of trust in people's willingness to make claims through courts. Scholars have argued 
that formal legal institutions maintain functional legitimacy in the eyes of ordinary 
people, which still encourages the use of legal strategies, "despite repeated evidence of 
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law's failure to live up to its ideals" (Hull 2016). However, I found people's beliefs that 
the law and its institutions are ineffective in solving problems are grounded in their view 
that the law does not work or works in ways they cannot access. For ordinary Black 
South Africans, negative experiences with the law and the perceived use of unethical 
practices are "evidence of the law's failure to live up to its ideals," (Hull 2016). 
According to my interviews, people doubted the South African legal system's ability to 
work for them to solve problems because they believed the law worked in ways they 
deemed unjust.  
As I have shown in this chapter, when people think that the law does not work or 
works in ways they cannot access (like using bribes or occult powers), the possibility of 
mobilizing everyday service delivery problems through courts is diminished. While 
courts can solve issues of access to basic services when other branches of government are 
unable or unwilling, the possibilities, and more importantly, the thinkability of legal 
mobilization, is weakened by how people perceive and experience how the law works in 
their respective contexts. If people believe that justice is unattainable or at the very least 
difficult to achieve in a corrupt system, how else might ordinary people choose to solve 
socioeconomic problems? The next chapter answers this question by documenting the 
various ways people first think about solving service delivery problems. Unlike litigation, 
these solutions seemed more attainable to them, and in some instances, more appropriate 
to solve socioeconomic problems. As a result, people believe these alternatives are more 














In South Africa, where ordinary people have successfully used courts to secure 
access to basic services, one would expect "litigation" to be a common strategy for people 
to access such services. However, as the last two chapters illustrate, suing the government 
for services is often an unthinkable act due to the cost, the lengthiness of the process, and 
the perceived corruption at various levels of the legal system. Although going to court 
seems unthinkable, ordinary Black South Africans are not left with nothing.  Instead they 
can conceive of multiple non-legal ways to solve their problems with basic services. 
Ordinary Black South Africans perceive these alternatives as faster, less risky, and in 
some cases, more likely to achieve their desired ends – gaining access. Thus, these 
strategies are more feasible and, therefore, more thinkable ways to solve the issue of 
access. This chapter addresses the question: when people experience an problem that 
could form the basis for legal action, what strategies have they pursued instead? In 
answering this question, I describe the types of strategies people are willing to employ, 
which reflects how they understand their problems and who they think is responsible for 
solving them. My findings expand on the legal mobilization literature by identifying how 







B. From a Dispute Pyramid to a Dispute Tree 
The assessment of citizens’ access to justice and legal needs has long been of 
interest to scholars and legal practitioners (Genn 1999, Zeman 1982). Since the 1980s, 
sociolegal scholars have relied on the “dispute pyramid” metaphor to understand citizen’s 
paths to dispute resolution. The metaphor presents formal legal dispute resolution as a 
linear process in which only a small proportion of perceived injuries actually proceed to 
litigation (Miller & Sarat 1980). The pyramid outlines how unperceived injurious 
experiences (un-PIEs) transform into perceived injurious experiences (PIEs) worth laying 
claims to, which can later become disputes. The dispute pyramid metaphor is credited for 
“revolutionizing” how scholars understood legal problems and disputes as they began 
seeing disputes as social constructs instead of objects in the world (Albiston et al. 2014). 
The dispute pyramid has since been adapted into the "dispute pagoda," and the "dispute 
tree," all of which reveal that there are more potential grievances than there are legal 
disputes (Michelson 2007; Albiston et al. 2014).  
Un-PIEs make it to court through a process of naming, blaming, and claiming 
(Felstiner et al. 1980). At the base of the dispute pyramid, the injured names an 
experience as injurious. When such injury becomes a grievance, an individual is 
“blaming” someone for the injury. At this level, only some people will hold another 
responsible for the perceived injurious experiences. When the person with the grievance 
expresses it to the person or entity believed to be responsible and asks for a remedy, they 
are laying a claim (Felstiner et al. 1980, 635). An even smaller number of people will 
confront the responsible party to lay a claim asking for a remedy. When the responsible 
party rejects the claim, it then can become a legal dispute. Rejection can take many 
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forms. Aside from an outright refusal, a delay that the claimant interprets as resistance is 
a form of rejection. The responsible party offering a "compromised solution," where 
claimants receive a partial remedy for their grievances, is also a rejection (Felstiner et al. 
1980, 636). Even fewer people mobilize their claims through courts. Many claims are 
either abandoned or resolved through other means. This framework birthed a new field of 
research that studied the factors that affect whether a dispute progressed through the 
levels of the pyramid (Bumiller 1987, 1988; Ewick & Silbey 1998; Morgan 1999; Quinn 
2000; Albiston 2005, 2010; Morrill et al. 2010). 
 Although the metaphor has been influential, it is an inadequate depiction of the 
broad ways people actually think about resolving justiciable problems. The dispute 
pyramid describes a process where litigation is the end goal, and thus the only remedy. 
However, critics of the legal path to disputes argue that many problems can and often are 
solved by non-legal strategies (Zeman 1982; Sandefur 2019). Not all problems are seen 
as justiciable by ordinary people. In the South African case, not all problems with 
services are seen as grievances. Moreover, just because a problem is justiciable does not 
mean legal solutions are the only thinkable option for solving the problem. Similarly, a 
person’s ability to litigate because their issues have standing in court does not necessarily 
generate an interest in suing for a remedy. More importantly, with adjudication at the top 
of the pyramid, the metaphor assumes that for ordinary people, litigation is always a 
thinkable way to obtain "justice."   
Traditionally, when we think about justice, we think about "legal justice," one 
administered by courts that require the help of legal services. This is especially true when 
the problems we seek to resolve concern legally codified rights. Because of their legal 
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implications, a fundamental assumption with rights-based problems is that because the 
law grants a right, that the law is the only place to solve a violation of that right.  In this 
chapter, I argue that this is not always the case. Such assumptions obscure the possibility 
of alternative ways people can and do think about problem-solving, which are sometimes 
just as successful, if not more so, than laying a legal claim. Litigation is not always 
necessary nor, in some cases, sufficient for obtaining just solutions to justice problems. 
Instead of a dispute pyramid, I build on the dispute tree metaphor, which argues 
that people have many branches (legal and non-legal ways) to address grievances. This 
metaphor depicts a nonlinear process to dispute resolution. The dispute tree framework 
argues that people have multiple ways to solve the same problem and may employ them 
simultaneously (Albiston et al. 2014). People may also start with a single solution to a 
problem and later branch off to another strategy they find more effective or more 
accessible. The logic behind the dispute pyramid is correct in that people's decision-
making about their grievances is shaped by how they categorized the injurious experience 
and whom they believe is responsible. However, while naming, blaming, and claiming 
can lead to a legal dispute, it can also lead people to pursue the “myriad disputing 
channels outside of courts” (Albiston et al. 2014, 105). 
Consistent with the dispute tree metaphor, I show that with regards to service 
provision problems, ordinary Black South Africans name, and blame in ways that lead 
them away from the courtroom. Instead, they initially turn to alternative forms of rights-
based problem solving, which do not take the form of a formal legal dispute. This is 
partly due to which level of government, if any, they assign blame to and what they 
believe is the right and most effective way to lay claims to the government. With my 
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research, to call the lack of access a problem is to name. Naming the lack of access as a 
problem is to acknowledge that such conditions are harmful and unacceptable. People 
assigning the responsibility to the government, specific state entities, and state actors, like 
the local councillor, is blaming. People claim their right to access services by stating they 
would directly approach the state, report the issue to other responsible people in the chain 
of command, and protest.1  
People’s ability to conceive of multiple solutions to their problems is due to the 
various ways they process these problems (e.g., how they name and blame). The 
transformation that problems undergo, which allows naming, blaming, and claiming to 
occur, is subjective, reactive, and fluid. This fluidity stems from people’s changing 
feelings about their problems, the solutions available, and the anticipated response from 
the state. The meanings people ascribe to their problems, and the available solutions are 
not stagnant. For example, people may initially interpret an injurious experience as a 
matter of misfortune and later interpret it as a grievance that may warrant legal 
intervention or political action. 
Similarly, a person may see their injurious experience as a grievance, but not 
claim a resolution because of how they feel about the solutions available to them as time 
goes on. Because feelings and interpretations change repeatedly, people are constantly 
defining and redefining their perceptions of their experiences and the nature of their 
grievances. This instability allows people to think of and pursue multiple strategies to 
solve their problems simultaneously. People will also redefine their grievances and alter 
their perceptions of strategies available in response to various people's communication 
 
1 By "chain of command," I refer to the presumed hierarchy of people participants stated they must consult 
when trying to solve problems.   
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and expectations, including opponents, authority figures, companions, and intimates 
(Felstiner et al. 1980, 638). Feelings towards people's objectives also change as new 
information becomes available to them. Before considering filing a claim in court, in 
other words, there is a constant reinterpretation of the problem, who is responsible, and 
the best ways to solve it.  
With socioeconomic rights problems, there is another element that further 
contributes to this fluidity. Problems with accessing services straddle the lines of the 
personal and the political. Before the codification of socioeconomic rights, not having 
access to services was often seen as a personal problem, one that was a consequence of 
being Black and poor under apartheid. Challenges with basic services in South Africa are 
everyday problems that the country's largely Black poor have experienced over several 
generations. The conditions these problems create are all some Black people have ever 
known. In some sense, these problems are commonplace happenings in Black lives. 
It was not until the anti-apartheid struggle that the right to services became an 
achievable entitlement, one that must be provided by the state regardless of race. The 
mobilization efforts of township activists, unions, and apartheid-era civic organizations 
like the Soweto Civic Association, fused Black people's material realities with political 
meaning. They stressed the connection between Black people’s material struggles and 
apartheid, “conscientizing” Black communities with a new way of seeing their problems, 
one that incorporated a discourse about rights (Zuern 2011). Since the codification of 
socioeconomic rights and the on-going activism by legal advocacy organizations, 
problems with services now also have legal meaning. Therefore, for ordinary people, 
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these problems' interpretations can range from a mere inconvenience or a problem they 
have encountered all their lives, to an injurious experience worthy of laying a legal claim.  
This blurred space further complicates whether the harm caused is blameworthy. 
When people determine that the problem has injured them, they must determine if the 
injuries are self-inflicted or caused by someone else. While providing services is the 
state's constitutional duty, people also understand that they are responsible for their own 
well-being. For example, one respondent argued, "as a citizen of the country… if I fail to 
do something for myself [that means] someone needs to put a hand in that. If my family 
fails to do so, [that means] the government should put its hand in that” (Empangeni 7). 
The result of the flexible nature of socioeconomic problems is that ordinary people have 
various ways of seeing problems of access and who is responsible, which impacts the 
strategies they think they can and would employ. In the following sections, I detail how 
the ordinary Black South Africans I interviewed name the issue of access to services, the 
various people or entities they blame, which impacts the many ways they believed they 
would and could claim their socioeconomic right to services.2 Unlike in the dispute tree 
framework where people pursue alternative disputing channels with success, my 
respondents reported a series of alternatives that lead to unsuccessful outcomes. The set 
of choices poor South Africans face when they do not consider approaching the courts 
often results in them being further entangled with an unresponsive state leaving them at a 
dead end.  
 
2 The questions were asked in two forms to elicit interlocutors' understandings of the possibility of remedy 
and the actual ways they would go about solving problems. In English, "could" is the past tense of "can," 
which indicates possibility, what action is possible to do. "Would" is the past tense of "will" used to express 
a desire or inclination. In isiZulu, while "I could" (benginga-) and “I would” (bengizo-) take different 




C. How Do People Name the Problem of Access?  
 
1. Is it a problem?  
 
To assess how ordinary Black South Africans name, blame, and lay claims in 
responses to socioeconomic problems, I relied on five hypothetical scenarios based on 
constitutional rights issues that people have litigated and made claims to with civil 
society organizations' help (shack evictions, dilapidated school infrastructure, public 
hospitals refusing to treat sick persons due to the lack of resources, water, and electricity 
disconnection or lack of formal connections). To uncover how people interpret the degree 
to which they might handle a problem on their own outside of the law, I first asked 
respondents if the issue in the scenario was a problem. A majority of the participants 
agreed that each scenario was a problem. Because problems of access are poor people’s 
problems, ones experienced by the economically disadvantaged, I found consensus on 
whether each scenario was a problem among respondents in the same economic position. 
For example, all shack dwellers in Durban and informal settlers in Johannesburg reported 
every issue of access as a problem. There was more variation in economic status among 
the participants in Umlazi and Empangeni which explains the slight disagreement about 
whether the issues were a problem. Although all the residents in both Umlazi and 
Empangeni saw the lack of electricity as a problem, there were slight differences among 
the 72 participants in Empangeni and its surrounding areas and the 39 participants in 









Umlazi  35 35 36 39 
Empangeni  53 68 65 64 
 
Although these differences are small across participants, the reasons why some 
people did not see the issue as a problem is important in thinking about the broader 
context in which these problems occur. My interviews reveal that people are unlikely to 
call an issue of access a problem if they believed they could live adequately without 
formal access to the socioeconomic good. As much as the issue of access to basic 
services is about rights and justice, it is also about one's immediate circumstances and 
expectations. Because people focus on their immediate circumstances, they also make 
judgments about what is “good enough” service provision. This judgment is informed by 
past experiences and what is readily available in their area, shaping what people expect of 
government services.  For example, all the residents of Umlazi named not having access 
to tap water a problem because Umlazi is an urban area without access to a natural clean 
water source to enable other ways to access water. In the more rural areas around 
Empangeni, having access to the river meant the issue was not a problem because there is 
an alternative means of access. One respondent stated, "yeah, it's a problem to those who 
are living in towns, but in rural areas we normally understand because there are rivers 
when the [tapped] water is not available" (Empangeni 7). While tapped water is 
preferred, just having water is enough for some people, no matter how one accesses it. 






The people who did not think children going to a school with poor infrastructure 
was a problem held a similar perspective. One respondent who never went to school 
stated, "they [children] should continue to learn there, because we have seen other places 
where kids learn under a tree because they have no school. They should continue learning 
because the only thing they are there for is to be educated and get knowledge" 
(Empangeni 25). For this 52-year-old grandmother, the lack of proper infrastructure is not 
a problem because the goal is for her kids to be educated no matter the condition, 
something she did not get a chance to do. As long as a school is available, that is enough.  
 People also judge what counts as adequate service provision by what results from 
the quality of service they can access. People may find that the lack of access is not a 
problem because what they do have access to achieves its intended goal. For example, 
some respondents did not see their child going to a government school with poor 
infrastructure as a problem because they believe government schools can still provide 
quality education. In an interview in Umlazi with Mthokozisi and Mongisi, two men in 
their early twenties who went to government schools, Mthokozisi explained:  
No, there’s no problem. What I can say is government schools, it is not like they 
do not have that education which is rich. There are teachers there, and the 
province [sic] government do supply money to be given to municipalities to 
satisfy the resources of the government schools. But there’s some corruption…but 
in government schools I can tell you this, 100 percent sure, most of many doctors, 
or many wealthy kids come from government schools. Because government 
school, it is rich when it comes to building a kid (Umlazi 63).  
 
I was surprised by his answer because there is ongoing and very public mobilization to 
address school infrastructure problems by civil society organizations, parents, and even 
students. Yearly, there are countless reports of parents and students protesting public 
school conditions. The recent increase in child deaths by drowning in pit latrines at 
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schools has led civil society organizations like Equal Education and Section 27 to 
spearhead campaigns against the school infrastructure problem in South Africa. In 
addition, as an urban area that receives more services from the government, I suspected 
people in urban areas would expect more from government services, but that does not 
seem to be the case, at least not all the time and not among the people I interviewed. 
Confused by his response and looking for further explanation, I asked whether their 
parents complained about their school's conditions at the time they went to school. They 
explained: 
Mthokozisi: No, they knew. It was just that, whatever you get, just take it because 
they knew that education is a right, not the resources, but education. 
 
Mongisi: (interjecting) Resources are just a bonus on top of the education. Let me 
just put it like this, during apartheid, there was a right to education, but their 
[parents] education was restricted and limited in some certain ways, they didn’t 
do this and that. So, they didn’t have rights to education. We do. (Umlazi 63)  
  
For people like Mongisi and Mthokozisi, government schools still educate people enough 
to be successful. Because today's school infrastructure challenges do not pose a problem 
to the child's chances of succeeding, unlike during apartheid, the lack of proper 
infrastructure in schools is not seen as a problem by some. 
2. What kind of problem is it?  
 
For those participants who did report an issue as a problem, I intentionally did not 
ask what kind of problem they thought it was (e.g., legal, personal, or political). This 
allowed participants to frame the problem as they understood it. I found the issues 
described in the scenarios were problems for participants not because they were seen as 
blatant rights violations, but because they were seen as problems of inequality and 
unfairness in how black people, particularly the poor, experienced service delivery. 
 99 
 
None of my participants referred to the issues as a problem with their rights. 
Moreover, this is not because participants do not know what rights are. In fact, across 
education levels and age, ordinary Black South Africans have a general sense of having 
access to socioeconomic goods being a right. Participants cited the constitution, the end 
of apartheid, and the necessity of socioeconomic goods in their lives as to why having 
shelter, water, electricity, going to school, and receiving treatment from a hospital were 
rights. However, for ordinary people, the problem with accessing services was less about 
their rights being violated and more about what results from the rights violation––unequal 
conditions. Service delivery problems are only experienced by the poor, further 
exacerbating the country's inequality.  
While activists and post-apartheid civil society organizations mobilize issues of 
access as human rights violations, this framing is not fully embedded in the Black 
communities in KwaZulu-Natal. There is a disconnect between people knowing that they 
have the right to access services and them thinking service delivery problems are 
violations of their rights. This disconnect has two sources. Black South Africans 
acknowledge that experiencing poor service delivery, as described in my scenarios, is the 
result of the inequality created by apartheid and further facilitated by the post-apartheid 
state. Unlike countries where the entire population experiences poor service delivery due 
to the state's incapacity, service delivery challenges are mainly experienced by the 
country's predominately black poor in South Africa. When my participants talked about 
their service provision experiences, they recognize it is the product of either being black, 
poor, living in a rural area, or a combination of all three. They relied on comparisons 
between the conditions of people who had access/better access to services and themselves 
 100 
 
to explain why the issue was a problem. In doing so, my respondents framed the issue of 
access as a problem of inequality and not just rights. For example, Sihle, a primary school 
teacher at a formerly all-white private school in Empangeni, stated: 
Yeah, it’s [water] a right but same, same thing. There are some people who have 
never known a running tap. I have taught up north. I will say next the 
Mozambican boarder where there [sic] were absolutely no running water. If you 
were teaching technology there you are talking about taps and everything, they 
can only imagine what a tap is. They know of…we call it a waterkan or water 
truck that comes periodically to give water. There is this bad tendency by our 
government. I don’t know if it’s by default or by design, the citizens that are in 
deep rural areas are neglected. But they are peasants who generate food for the 
rest of us but they are neglected. But you come to town you find schools like this; 
you never find a school like this in a rural area. This is as best as it can be… but 
there [rural area] you have schools with pit toilets, no electricity, no running 
water, squashed classes and then you are expected to teach there and the child is 
expected to excel in as much as a child who lives in the suburbs, it’s sad it’s sad. 
(Empangeni 6B).  
 
How he sees the issue of access is grounded in his experiences teaching in areas where 
students had different degrees of access to services. For Sihle the poor service delivery in 
rural areas was a problem because children in rural areas are expected to thrive, just as 
well as children in urban areas, without the means to do so. Although he acknowledges 
that having access to water is a right, the problem with the quality of access in rural areas 
was a problem because it was one way rural residents are treated unfairly by the state. 
The second source of the disconnect between access to services being a right and 
poor service delivery being a rights violation is due to ordinary Black South African's 
doubt in legal institutions. As I argued in the last chapter, perceived political corruption at 
various levels of government in South Africa casts doubt on the efficacy of rights and the 
law. This is why some respondents stated, "they say we have rights, but we don't" when I 
asked whether citizens have rights in South Africa. It also may explain why, when 
discussing corruption, people would say "this is South Africa" as if corrupt practices are a 
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characteristic of the country's political reality. To conceive of an issue as a rights 
violation when it comes to services, one must believe that rights to services have meaning 
and that relying on legal framing is effective.  
Legal frames become even more influential if there is some congruence between 
the law's ideology and how people perceive their social reality. In the U.S., people have 
faith in the political efficacy of law as a principle of government because much of 
American politics is dictated by "rules and of the rights and obligations inherent in rules" 
(Scheingold 1974, 13).  As a result, Americans expect that the political order functions in 
ways that are consistent with the patterns of rights and obligations as laid out in the 
Constitution. In turn, ordinary people view social problems in terms of the 
responsibilities and entitlements established under the law. But if the state’s practices run 
counter to the constitution and the political elite behave as if they are above the law as 
my interviewees described South Africa, the law loses its credibility as a useful frame to 
talk about problems despite their legal nature. Thus, while the lack of services and poor 
service provision are clear rights violations, everyday service delivery problems do not 
regularly translate as such for ordinary Black South Africans.   
However, this does not mean that rights and the law are completely meaningless 
for ordinary people. Although none of my participants articulated the problems as a 
problem with rights, their assessment of inequality with services is grounded in their 
understanding that they are entitled to access each of these services and their expectation 
of the right to be treated equally. This understanding dates back to the anti-apartheid 
struggle. The struggle against apartheid was not solely a struggle against white minority 
rule. It was also a struggle against the material conditions created by apartheid’s racist 
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policies. Apartheid policies systematically removed the Black population from various 
development schemes set to improve social conditions. This left Black people without 
formal access to services or severely inadequate access. Consequently, the struggle 
against apartheid was also a struggle for a better quality of life made possible by equal 
access to quality basic services.  Evidence of these sentiments is reflected in the “freedom 
demands” collected in townships by 50,000 ANC volunteers in 1955 which became the 
Freedom Charter. The Charter’s tenets laid foundation for the Bill of Rights. It reads:  
All people shall have the right to live where they choose, to be decently housed, 
and to bring up their families in comfort and security;  
Unused housing space to be made available to the people;  
Rent and prices shall be lowered, food plentiful and no one shall go hungry;  
A preventive health scheme shall be run by the state;  
Free medical care and hospitalisation shall be provided for all, with special care 
for mothers and young children;  
Slums shall be demolished, and new suburbs built where all have transport, roads, 
lighting, playing fields, creches and social centres;  
The aged, the orphans, the disabled and the sick shall be cared for by the state;  
Rest, leisure and recreation shall be the right of all;  
Fenced locations and ghettoes shall be abolished, and laws which break up 
families shall be repealed (Congress of the People 1955). 
 
These demands were made in light of Black people's material conditions compared to the 
conditions of the White minority. The blatant unequal treatment gave rise to the idea that 
everyone is entitled to services. South Africa's current issue with services is less about a 
racist government formally denying access on the basis of race and more about persistent 
class inequality in how services are delivered.  
As I have described in this section, people draw on various knowledge bases 
when deciding whether an experience is injurious enough to be labeled a problem. In 
South Africa, these bases include comparisons between experiences under apartheid and 
the present, information and assumptions about what the law guarantees, and perceptions 
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of what is needed to live well. Although the disparity among participants' responses is 
small, they reveal an important observation about how Black South Africans interpret the 
lack of access. While access to housing, healthcare, water, and education are rights, and 
the denial of access to these services is technically a violation, it is not always seen as 
such. What is determined as acceptable "access" varies from person to person and 
circumstance to circumstance. 
How people interpret a socioeconomic challenge is a roadblock to accessing 
services through courts. If a person does not name an experience as a problem, there is no 
desire to lay a claim. And therefore, there is no reason to think that they would approach 
the courts. In sum, people who fail to name an experience in ways that require legal 
intervention do not enter the road to a legal dispute.  
3. Is it blameworthy? If so, who is at fault?  
 
Although the majority of the participants viewed the access problem in each 
scenario as a problem, there are differences in who/what they believed is to blame for the 
lack of access. In South Africa, people blame various causes for service delivery 
problems. The variation is the result of the differences in who people assign 
responsibility and fault for their problems to. Blaming entails people assigning 
responsibility and fault to the people and process that they believe caused the injurious 
experience. Responsibility and fault have different meanings. Some people may blame 
the state for the lack of service provision because it is the state's responsibility to provide 
services. Even though it is the state's duty to provide basic services, people do not always 
perceive their everyday challenges accessing services as the government's fault. People 
only assign fault to the state when people believe the state has directly acted in ways to 
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deny access to services. For example, shack evictions are the government's fault for 
informal settlers because the state orders the evictions denying their right to housing. 
With other service delivery problems, ordinary Black South Africans assign blame to 
multiple factors contributing to the state's challenges with service provision, absolving 
the state from fault. 
Problems with services are common in countries with developing economies. As 
such, there are multiple sources for each problem other than the state. For some people, 
these problems are a consequence of being poor in South Africa or in a specific region of 
the country. And thus, people blame themselves for living in areas where the problems 
occur. In other instances, people blame lower-level state employees who aid in delivering 
services like healthcare professionals and administrative staff in schools. People may 
simultaneously blame themselves, specific state employees, and the general government. 
People may also shift blame from themselves to the state as their perception of the 
problem changes. Without assigning fault to the state, people cannot conceive of laying a 
claim to the state to solve their problems. 
To capture the various people or entities who are to blame, my scenario examples 
include different roles played by the state. The shack eviction scenario places the state 
directly as the responsible party. In other scenarios, the state is not obviously present at 
all. The school infrastructure and government hospital scenarios only suggest that the 
government is responsible because they are state-run. With both of these scenarios, 
people believe other actors are responsible because their actions contribute to the 
challenging conditions. For example, with the government hospital scenario, participants 
reported that sometimes the nurses or staff steal the needed supplies. Others report the 
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hospital staff are just too lazy to provide services, and that is why it appears the hospital 
does not have enough resources to treat the people. Philani, a primary school teacher, 
explained: 
You know what the problem is, you find that sometimes the nurses are lazy, to 
even go look for the medicine. So, if maybe you ask for the superior, they’ll see 
this person knows their rights, they’ll treat you better. But some other people will 
just go home, come back tomorrow, and still there’s no medication, then go and 
come back some other time. In a long run you might find that that person died 
(Empangeni 31A).  
 
With government schools, people shared stories of what they saw as their principals 
mismanaging funds or stealing supplies, which gives the appearance that the government 
is not providing the school with resources. Philani further argued, "I think it goes back to 
how they do their supplies. You find that maybe the government will give 250 desks, but 
we only see 100 desks, we don't know what happens to the rest of the 150. The principal 
keeps quiet about that" (Empangeni 31A). Thlogi, a driver, shared his experience in high 
school, 
I know my principal was stealing bruh! You know those big printers you see in 
offices… Every time they would go missing and they would buy a new one. 
Every time they would claim it was criminals who broke into the school over the 
weekend to steal the stuff, but we had a caretaker [security guard] at the school. 
And the only person who would be around was the principal. Three years later I 
heard that the principal actually owned an internet café (Johannesburg 99). 
 
Although Thlogi had no actual proof that his principal was skimming off supplies to 
support his side business, his suspicion was enough to assign blame to the principal for 
the lack of resources at his school instead of the government. In both scenarios, to the 
respondents, the government did provide resources, but suspected misconduct by the 
clinic staff and the principal’s pilfering caused the lack of resources. This suspicion is not 
unwarranted. Every year there are news reports of missing government allocated funds or 
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equipment. In 2019, a report of a “missing” 220 million rand (approximately 12.9 million 
USD) for drought relief for farmers in KwaZulu-Natal hit the newsstands. The national 
government gave the money to the provincial government in 2015 after the province was 
declared a disaster area due to the drought (Makhaye et al. 2019). The provincial officials 
in charge of the funds stated it was not clear where the money went. The KwaZulu-Natal 
Agricultural Union representative reported that none of the province's farmers received 
the funds. As of today, an investigation is still being conducted to locate the missing 
funds. In the recent pandemic, large quantities of personal protective equipment (PPE) to 
prepare for schools' reopening "disappeared" in Umlazi, Pinetown, and Zululand (Singh 
2020). The PPE, worth millions in rands, disappeared while en route to department 
offices and schools in these areas. Two days later the PPE mysteriously reappeared, with 
no indication of who could be held accountable for the disappearance. It is these 
occurrences that shape people's perception of when services are promised, but not 
delivered.   
Other people do directly blame the state for school infrastructure problems. In 
explaining why he would write a letter to the Department of Education, Ntokozo, a mine 
worker, argued:  
Because the only people who can resolve this matter is them, because most of the 
schools here in South Africa if they are lacking facilities it’s because of the 
department, most of the time. Maybe they are not providing in time. Maybe some 
of the schools don’t have sponsors2 and government is being negligent to them 
(Empangeni 2).   
 
For people like Ntokozo, the problem of school infrastructure is a product of 
government’s negligence. For other people they acknowledge the state is responsible for 
 
2 Sponsors refer to local businesses and large corporations who may help support a school financially by 
making monetary donations or education material donations.  
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providing services, however they do not assign blame to the state for services not being 
delivered. Instead these respondents assign blame to other structural forces that cause 
service delivery problems. When I asked if having shelter was a right, Judith a train 
driver for Transnet explained,  
Ilungelo (a right), yes, the government is trying. I will say they are really trying. 
Shame! they are trying to provide houses for everybody, but yeah, it’s not that…I 
am not in the percentage that say the government has failed the people, I am the 
percentage that says the government has tried. It is just that there is a lot of 
corruption happening around everywhere, everywhere in our lives (Empangeni 5).  
 
For Judith, the government does try to provide housing, but there is corruption within 
process of service provision, which is to blame for the government’s failure to deliver 
housing. Challenges with the South African economy, like the unstable currency, also 
removes the blame from the state directly. While explaining why the government hospital 
example was not a problem, Sibo, a security guard at private school argued:  
Ah the country needs money to service and to survive. The rand of South Africa is 
not 
constant; it has ups and downs. So, if the government says I don’t have money to 
afford that hospital they are going to get help from, ah I can’t force him 
[government] to help even though he [government] doesn’t have help (Empangeni 
7). 
 
Andiswa, a nurse from Umlazi who worked in the private sector articulated a similar 




It [hospital example] would be a problem, but now as our economy is going 
downhill. I won’t blame them [the hospital staff]. Because being in a hospital in the 
private sector, seeing what I’ve seen, they [government] is not to blame. They can’t 
do anything about it. It starts in the head [top] first, then it goes to [hospitals]. So, 
if the hospital staff is not provided with enough resources, they can’t do anything 
about it. So, I wouldn’t be angry at them the hospital staff (Umlazi 76).  
 
The growing number of people in need of government assistance further poses a 
challenge to the government's ability to provide everyone services. Therefore, people do 
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not blame the government. Lucky, a head of department at a high school, explained 
"everyone has a right to shelter, but the government is failing to give everyone shelters 
due to the number of the population. But they are trying because they are building people 
RDP houses, but they are still not sufficient” (Empangeni 27).  Signs of improvement in 
socioeconomic conditions also absolves the state from blame. Phumzile a high school 
teacher, argued of the school infrastructure example: 
We are still work-in-progress as South Africans, we come a long way. We know 
they are trying. They give free stationary to the students. The things we are 
lacking are the things we can improvise as teachers, not to wait for the 
government. Because we can see in social media how much the government is 
trying. We teach with the hope that one day he will come to our schools 
(Empangeni 29).  
 
These examples show that while people acknowledge that the state is responsible 
for providing services, they do not always interpret the challenges with service provision 
as the government’s fault. To fully blame someone for the problem, one must find that 
the responsible person is at fault. However, people view the problems with services as 
dynamic, and thus multiple things can cause the lack of access. As I have illustrated in 
this section, some people do not blame the government directly because they believe 
there are other contributing factors to challenges with services. Although they recognize 
the state's duty to provide services, they also assign fault to the country's economy and 
other actors' misconduct. 
The multiple ways of seeing who is at fault for poor service delivery does prevent 
some people from deciding to make claims to the state for services. Disputable 
grievances are made against a particular person or entity. When people do not assign 
blame to a particular person they do not have a grievance against someone. As Felstiner 
et al. (1980) writes, “a grievance must be distinguished from a complaint against no one 
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in particular (about the weather, or by perhaps inflation)” (635). Without a grievance 
against someone, claims making in its many forms is unthinkable. Litigation as a means 
of access is even more unthinkable because there is no one a person could directly take to 
court for the issue if they do not blame someone directly. Evidence of this is found in the 
strategies people who did not assign blame to a particular person stated they would 
employ to solve the problem.  
People who did not blame a particular person stated they would either do nothing 
or rely on self-help strategies. Philani, who faced problems with book shortages at his 
school, stated “I make copies or write on the board. Sometimes you find that they don’t 
even have enough papers, or ink, or even electricity, so we just ask from neighboring 
schools” (Empangeni 31A). In the same interview Philani’s colleague Vusi stated “what I 
did was, I took my money and bought books, since the government says it doesn’t have 
money” (Empangeni 31B). Judith, who blamed corruption for the state’s failure in 
providing houses, stated she would just go home to her mother and start over if she was 
ever evicted from her shack. Andiswa, who said she could not blame the hospital because 
the resource problem is a product of South Africa’s troubled economy, stated “there is 
nothing I can do” in response to the hospital example (Umlazi 76). When I asked her if 
she could complain to anyone, she replied, “I can’t complain to anyone. I heard it 
happens at other clinics and government hospitals. They can’t help me. They won’t” 
(Umlazi 76). Phumzile, the high school teacher, said she would just change schools if her 
kids went to school with failing infrastructure. She argued “it is my responsibility to 
provide for my kids” (Empangeni 29). Because these participants did not assign blame to 
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a particular person, they did not think they could mobilize legally for their issues of 
access.  
While some people exit the road to a dispute when they don't assign blame to a 
particular person for their grievances, others may find that they can still make claims 
because they are entitled to the services regardless of whether they see the state at fault or 
not. While Lucky identified the growing number of people who need houses as the source 
of the problem with housing, he also stated that he would take the municipality to court if 
he was evicted from his shack and was not given alternative housing. Lucky explained, “I 
can take them to court because I have a right to stay somewhere" (Empangeni 27). People 
like Lucky, who do not entirely blame the government for service delivery problems, still 
believe they can lay claims to services because they have a right to services that the 
government is responsible providing. In the next section, I outline how those who named 
the issue of access as a problem stated they could and would address the problem. I argue 
that while these alternative strategies are more thinkable than going to court, they are 
equally as risky, and in some cases, just as expensive as going to court, with little 
promise of enabling access to services. 
D. Alternative Paths to Access 
 
If going to court is risky, complicated, and unthinkable, how else can citizens 
claim their socioeconomic rights and address the problem of access? The types of 
strategies participants reported fall into four categories: 1) self-help; 2) confronting the 
state through the media; 3) appealing to the state; and 4) contentious action. Self-help 
describes things people can buy to have access to the goods the service was supposed to 
provide. It also describes alternative forms of accessing the good, like collecting water 
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from the river when there is no tapped water. These actions are not a form of claiming. 
Claiming requires that there is someone to express the lack of access to. However, self-
help eschews the state and any person people might find responsible for the problem. I 
treat confronting the state through the media, appealing to the state, and contentious 
action as forms of claiming because people express their grievances to responsible 
parties, including non-state actors like principals and clinic managers. Participants often 
named multiple strategies across these categories. People may employ a self-help strategy 
to address the immediate problem of access, appeal to the state to draw attention to the 
problem, and later protest if the state is unresponsive to their initial appeal. 
1. Self-Help Strategies  
People reported a range of self-help solutions to address the problems in each 
scenario. These respondents thought these solutions were easier and quicker than going to 
court or approaching the state to solve their problems. They also assumed responsibility 
for their service provision needs. "Self-help" participants were formally employed and 
had friends and family networks they believed they could rely on. Instead of challenging 
shack evictions in court, participants listed securing alternative accommodation with 
family, friends or in the community like using the community hall, a shared space for 
community meetings. Others stated they would just rebuild the shack in a new location. 
With the school infrastructure and government hospital problem, people assigned 
responsibility to themselves to secure access. Many participants thought parents should 
buy the materials missing from their child's school and ban together to fix the school's 
infrastructure. In accessing health services, people indicated that they would go to a 
private doctor if they could afford it, buy medicine from the local pharmacy, buy other 
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materials for home remedies, and ask family and friends for assistance. In rural areas, 
people stated they would seek help from a traditional doctor, whose services are cheaper 
than a private doctor and just as effective. For water access, many participants said they 
would collect water from an alternative water source, the river or the waterkan, municipal 
water trucks ordered by the municipality to deliver water. For electricity, people noted 
they would use firewood or paraffin stoves for cooking. Candles or LED bulbs would be 
used as an alternative light source. Respondents also stated they would purchase bread 
and polony, a deli meat product usually made from pork similar to boloney if they could 
not cook because they lacked electricity.  
Given South Africa's history of legalized racial discrimination, it is not surprising 
that people said they would solve issues themselves (or with communal help) instead of 
turning to the state. As the apartheid state steadily removed Black South Africans from its 
purview, the Black population turned inward creating their own networks to address their 
problems. In his assessment of civic associations during this period, Lodge (2003) asserts 
"Black South Africans tended to organize their lives outside of the state rather than 
around it, and much associational life tended to compensate for the state's inattentiveness 
to their needs rather than seek control of public resources" (205). Township residents 
began participating in local civic organizations in an attempt to address their basic 
material concerns. For many, these organizations were the only place where they could 
participate in finding solutions to their everyday problems (Zuern 2011, 47). Similar 
community organizing occurred in rural areas. 
Like studies on the role of relational distance in disputes with neighbors, I find 
people’s pursuit of self-help solutions is correlated to their relationships with those they 
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blame, in this case the state (Black 1984; Merry 1990; Greenhouse et al.1994; Yngvesson 
1994; Hendley 2011).  In South Africa, Black people’s use of self-help stems from their 
strained relationship with the state due to various experiences with the state’s 
unresponsiveness. Although, a non-racialized democracy was supposed to allow for more 
engagement with the state, the post-apartheid state’s negligence stubbornly persists. This 
continues to discourage some people from looking to the state to solve service delivery 
problems. In other instances, the state is not only negligent, but is the direct facilitator of 
the poor’s problems with services. Therefore, for some people turning to the state is not 
an effective way to deal with poor service provision. Unlike in Hendley’s work, which 
finds that Russians will choose self-help solutions if they had good relationships with 
fellow neighbors in roof leak disputes, self-help in South Africa should be understood as 
avoidance of the state. South Africans pursue self-help to avoid engaging with the state 
which is often time consuming and ineffective. This is the advantage of self-help 
solutions. 
Self-help strategies provide relief that is immediate. These strategies do not 
require adherence to procedural rules and therefore allow for a timely resolution. In 
addition, these strategies allow people to evade having to deal with the government's 
unresponsiveness. Appealing to the state and contentious action may attract the state's 
attention, but there is no guarantee that such actions will force the state to address the 
problem at all, let alone immediately. Past experiences with South African bureaucracy 
also make self-help solutions preferable. South Africa's public administration is slow, 
unwieldly and wholly inefficient. If a person has the means to bypass relying on the state, 
they will choose to access the basic good that the service was supposed to provide with 
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their own resources. For example, Thando, a working mother of two children stated, 
"Yah! It is a problem, but we accept that… because I need my children to continue with 
school, that is why if they say there isn't something, I will buy it myself because of my 
kids" (Empangeni 43). When I asked her if she would complain to the government about 
this she replied: "No! I don't think so because I think it is a long process to do that, so to 
make this thing short I will just buy it and let my kids continue" (Empangeni 43).  
Aside from self-help solutions being a quicker response, people also see 
themselves as responsible for solving the problem, at least partially. Some ordinary 
people believe they must take on the responsibility of getting access for themselves 
especially if they have the means to do so because the state has failed. This line of 
thinking was common in response to the school infrastructure scenario. Mandla, a college 
student explained:  
The only solution for my kid is to change the school because that's the fastest and 
peaceful way of doing it. If I go to the other parents to talk about it, I mean 
everyone knows this, it's in the news that the government needs to do all these 
things. These problems are known, yet they [government] not doing anything to 
solve them. So, the best thing to do is to change the school (Empangeni 32).  
When the government falls short, some people believe it is the parents' job to fill in the 
gap within their capacity. Another respondent argued similarly, "that's why in high 
schools and even primary schools, they provide parents to play their role. That's why 
there's something you call a school governing body (SGB). Parents must be represented 
there, they must evaluate the school, and must report and pressure with the government or 
the school to provide certain resources" (Umlazi 63). People acknowledge and accept the 
need to take on some role in securing access to services when the state is unreliable.  
If people have a multiplicity of easy and seemingly effective ways they could 
address their access problems, why should they appeal to the state and pursue legal 
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action, especially given the risk that the previous chapter details? Although the self-help 
strategies address the immediate problem of not having the service, they are not easily 
implementable for everyone. For example, while a shack dweller leaving to stay with 
relatives may get shelter, it does not address the property lost in the eviction, nor is it a 
solution that is always available. Some informal settlers leave their families in rural areas 
to look for employment in an urban area. Returning home would mean giving up access 
to employment opportunities and settling in poverty. Others leave home because they 
faced a contentious family situation where returning is not an option. With school 
infrastructure, while parents contributing to the school does bring some resources to the 
school, not every parent can consistently support a school while their child is enrolled. In 
addition, these solutions do not address the consistent underspending of state resources. 
Complaining to hospital management may allow the sick person to voice their opinion 
about the lack of service, however, this does not guarantee that the person will get treated 
after talking to the manager, especially if a lack of resources is the problem. Furthermore, 
not everyone can afford to buy medicine to cope with their present illness, especially if 
they have not been formally diagnosed. Using alternative sources of electricity and water 
does enable people to access these resources, however, such access requires that people 
have money to purchase the alternative sources, like candles, battery powered LED 
portable lights, and/or live proximate to the source, like a river or borehole.  
More importantly, self-help strategies do not address the broader issue of equality. 
These solutions address an individual experience with the lack of access. People's ability 
to pursue self-help strategies can further exacerbate inequality. If a person can afford 
other forms of access when faced with a problem with services, they will be able improve 
 116 
 
their material conditions while millions of others cannot. The challenges with service 
provision are experienced across the country. As such they require a larger and more 
comprehensive solution to address the issue of inequality of service provision. Still, self-
help solutions' efficiency and practicality make them more thinkable and doable for 
ordinary people, especially when other solutions like appealing to the state or legal 
mobilization seem unthinkable.  
2. Confronting the State through the Media  
While not a "solution" in the traditional sense, some respondents said they would 
report the problem to the media because as one respondent stated, "the media always 
helps" (Empangeni 12). In South Africa, the media has been integral in highlighting 
various forms state failure. News agencies like Ground Up report problems vulnerable 
communities face like shack evictions, water disconnection, and the lack of sanitation. 
Investigative journalism in more mainstream media outlets like the Daily Maverick track 
suspected cases of corruption. Investigative journalism not only exposes individual cases 
of maladministration, but also systemic failures (Malila 2019). The 2020 arrests of eight 
suspects connected with R2.7 billion theft at VBS Mutual Bank resulted from the 
country's investigative journalism. The bank held the savings of disadvantaged 
communities and funds of poor local municipalities. When the bank went bankrupt, 
journalists followed the story. Their investigation exposed various private corporations 
and political elites linked to the looting of funds, including the Economic Freedom 
Fighters' party leader Julius Malema (Van Wyk 2019). The media's ability to tackle 
powerful elites allows people to perceive the media as an effective and useable strategy 
for solving everyday problems with sociopolitical implications. 
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Exposing problems with services can draw attention from the government. 
Although social accountability may not be people's exact goal, it is a result of confronting 
the state through the media. The work of journalists on the everyday problems with 
service provision formally documents and makes public the state's failure. Every report 
makes service delivery problems visible in the public sphere. And because the state has a 
vested interest in maintaining a good reputation, they may respond to the public outcry 
for services. Simphiwe's turn to the media in response to her school's infrastructure 
problem is a prime example of the media's effectiveness of going to the media as a 
strategy.  
In her first year of teaching in 2011, Simphiwe taught at a government primary 
school in Mtubatuba, approximately 60 km north of Empangeni. When she arrived at the 
start of the school year in January, she was told she did not have a classroom. She 
explained this was a "strategy" used by the principal to earn better pay. The more 
children enrolled in a school, the more money the principal earned. Every single day for 
two of the hottest months of year, Simphiwe instructed her students to get the desks from 
the school's library and place them in whatever shade was available before noon. When 
the sun came up the class would look for the biggest tree with shade and move their desks 
to that tree. As the shade moved so did their desks. Noon, Simphiwe described, "was the 
worst because then there's no shade. You know the sun would really be beaming down on 
us. I would wear a sun hat" (Empangeni 6A). The students held their books over their 
heads to block the sun. Simphiwe relied on a portable chalk board and one textbook per 
subject to teach 40 seventh graders in their final year at the school. The school was 
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located near the Umfolozi Sugar Mill and the buzzing and cranking of the sugarcane 
tractors' daily passing disrupted her teaching.  
"I was fed up of having to watch young children sweat in the morning start their 
day dripping wet, like for me it was unheard of," Simphiwe said, to explain why she 
chose to contact the local newspaper in response to the problem. A reporter came to the 
school, took pictures of the conditions, and interviewed Simphiwe. In the article, he 
wrote "look at what this Department of Education is doing. Our children have no 
classes." she recalled. Simphiwe's turn to the media yielded positive results. She was later 
given a mobile classroom, a narrow rectangular structure that resembles a shipping 
container. Although it was cramped and Simphiwe couldn't control the temperature inside 
during the scorching heat or cold winter months, her students were no longer learning 
outside. Simphiwe chose to expose the issue to the media to draw attention to the unequal 
treatment her students received and the state's negligence in failing to provide enough 
classrooms to meet the school's needs.  
Although exposing the state through the media may encourage the state to fulfill 
its duties to avoid a bad reputation, it also involves risks. State actors may choose to 
retaliate against claimants for turning to the media. When BopaSetjhaba Primary School's 
School Governing Body (SGB) turned to the media, the state responded punitively. The 
school had shared buildings with Lembethe Primary School since its creation in 1992. 
The SGB began engaging with the Department of Education for the construction of a new 
school building. The department proposed building plans and budgeted R600,000 
(approximately 35,000 USD) for the project. Construction was scheduled to commence in 
March 2003. Shortly after the plan was signed, the department unilaterally decided to 
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delay construction until 2004. This meant the school would not be completed and ready 
for use until 2-3 years later. The SGB wrote a letter to the Papi Kganare, the provincial 
governing body for education at the time.  
There was no explanation for the delay. To appeal the department's decision the 
SGB wrote letters to the Office of the State President, the National Department of 
Education, the Office of the Public Protector, the Education Rights Project at the 
University of Witwatersrand, and the National Human Rights Commission. They also 
turned to the media. A brief article was written about the matter in the Sowetan a local 
newspaper. According to Brown and Wilson (2013), "the article – rather than, it seems, 
any possible intervention by the Human Rights Commission – stirred an immediate 
response within the department" (94). Upon the article's release, the department ordered 
the Department of Public Works to stop the new school's planning and building. The 
school's principal later received notice of the department's decision to close the 
BopaSetjhaba Primary School for good without engaging with the SGB. The department 
even went as far as suspending the principal and the functions of the SGB. The two had 
no choice but to seek a remedy from the courts.  
BopaSetjhaba's story illustrates that the media's documentation of the state 
behaving badly does not always encourage state actors to provide services. Instead, using 
the media might result in aggressive and harmful disciplinary actions from the state, 
where people are punished for making a claim. In this sense, turning to the media, while 





3. Appealing to the State 
 
 When I realized that people mainly named self-help strategies first, I began 
inquiring whether people thought they could/would complain to the government 
(generally) or to the specific government department responsible. There are various ways 
people stated they could appeal to the state to address the problems. People stated they 
would write letters to government offices and contact the offices directly. Some reported 
they would approach the local councillor, the elected official who represents 
their local community (the ward). Councillors have considerable discretion over service 
delivery in their ward and they are the closest government actor to the people. In Umlazi, 
participants stated they would attend the community-wide meetings with a community 
coordinator who would then relay their concerns to the local councillor.  
People will appeal to the councillors or other respective government offices when 
they assign fault and/or responsibility to the state. As one interviewee who assigned 
blame to the government asserted “the government has to do something about it, because 
it’s their negligence. As a taxpayer, as a citizen, we have all the right to get assistance and 
medication” (Empangeni 12A). Samuel, a professor in education, who assigned 
responsibility, but not blame, to the state, said he would go to the Department of 
Education because “it is their basic duty” (Empangeni 26).  
 However, not everyone appeals to state with the purpose of laying a claim. In 
South Africa, appealing to the state is also about following protocol. Ordinary South 
Africans have developed a shared understanding of the “right way” to engage with the 
state. This understanding stems from experiences dealing with the bureaucracy and 
various state offices, like the local councillor and entails following a clear chain of 
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command. Aside from the risks of going to court which often makes litigation 
unthinkable, suing the government as a first strategy is also unthinkable because it does 
not follow this internalized procedure. Procedure is taken to mean the chain of command 
in how people are expected to engage with the state. In South Africa, people believe they 
must start at the bottom, usually with the local councillor when trying to get help from 
the government. For example, explaining why she could not take the municipality to 
court for not having tapped water in the rural areas of Eshowe, Silindle stated, “for that I 
don’t think I can take them because there is a procedure. We have a councillor to tell 
them our problems and after the councillor there is someone in charge higher than the 
councillor. So, I think if you go to them it will be okay, not just to take them straight to 
the court (Empangeni 43). This understanding is not unique to South Africa. Globally, 
litigation is seen as a last resort.  
Compliance with procedure is also reinforced by civil society organizations who 
aid people with everyday problem solving for services. In an interview with members of 
Abahlali BaseMjondolo (ABM) in response to the hospital scenario, Mpumi explains 
“there are levels to it [problem solving], after the nurse there is the doctor and after the 
doctor there is someone above them and so on.”  I asked her why she thought she had to 
start at the bottom. Zondo, a fellow member replied:  
That’s what they [ABM] teach us, to follow the protocol. That’s what they call it, 
to follow the protocol. They teach us the correct way of doing things, they teach 
us to do things the right way–to follow the protocol. So, if let’s say I’m going to 
school and I’m not happy with something in my class, I have to talk to the 
teacher, if the teacher doesn’t listen, then HOD [head of department], if they don’t 
listen then I go to the principal. And then if they don’t listen to my story, I have to 




I then asked whether this step by step process was a regular occurrence in South Africa. 
The interviewees later replied, “yes when it comes to government. It is a must that it is 
step by step.  But when it comes to lower people, we have to force the government 
without passing the lower level because if we talk to them [higher ups in government] 
they say we have to wait” (ABM 78). She believed that the poor must force the 
government by either protesting or going to court, but not without following the chain of 
command first. When their problems are not addressed by these actors, only then can they 
pursue other strategies like mobilizing through courts.  
Approaching the municipal government as a first step is also outside of perceived 
proper procedure for some people. Philile indicated she could only go to the councillor’s 
office and not to the municipality to address the problem. She explained she could not go 
to the municipality because “the problem is when you go to the municipality, they will 
ask you where you are from, who’s in charge of the area, and ask why you skipped them 
[the local councillor] and came directly to them [the municipality]” (Empangeni 23).  
This also explains why people do not approach responsible government 
departments and instead approach other actors in the chain of the command. Because 
problems with school infrastructure and government hospitals have multiple people 
involve in providing services, there are many responsible parties that my respondents 
believed they must appeal to first. One respondent shared, “we have a Department of 
Education here, but ah you can’t just go and complain. You have to talk to the principal 
first” (Umlazi 55). Educators facing challenging work environments due to poor school 
infrastructure and the lack of resources are also expected to follow a lengthy process 
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which often leads to nowhere. A Head of Department (HOD) at a school in Khandisa 
stated:  
Everything we do, we have to follow the protocol. As HOD, I have to report to 
my senior manager, the Deputy principal or even the principal. They are supposed 
to take the matter further to the Chief Education Manager Inspectors. Then it 
depends on the matter. Sometimes they will attend to the matter and sometimes 
they won’t. If you do report it and it did [sic] not result in how you see fit, you 
can report it to the union.  
 
I was surprised by his suggestion of turning to the union, especially after hearing from a 
teacher at his school just moments earlier that the unions are unresponsive to teachers’ 
challenges at times. The teacher’s struggles with the union were not unique. Esikhawini 
teachers Philani and Vusi shared of their experiences with teachers’ unions:  
Philani: We normally talk about it to the unions that are representing the teachers, 
National Teachers Union (NATU) or South African Democratic Teachers Union 
SADTU, because they are the middlemen between the teachers and the 
government. 
 
Vusi: But they are failing to do what we ask. 
 




Philani: They tell us they are engaging [with the government], or that the 
government doesn’t have money (Empangeni 31) 
 
While following procedure is considered the “right way”, it is often an ineffective 
way to solve problems. I encountered this problem first-hand during my time in Umlazi. I 
wanted to interview the ward councillor for the area I was conducting interviews. I 
arrived at the councillor’s office one hot afternoon with my research assistant, Nhlaka 
who lived in the ward. We waited in line to speak to the councillor. After about 20 
minutes we were greeted by a short middle age woman in a bright yellow ANC shirt. She 
invited us into her office. Nhlaka introduced us and my research as he had done in 
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interviews with his neighbors to establish a level of trust. I hoped this would also work in 
my meeting with the councillor. I was wrong. After the introductions, she looked at 
Nhlaka and looked at me with a stern expression. She interlocked her fingers and leaned 
forward against her desk speaking in isiZulu so I would not understand:  
You can’t just show up here unannounced. You should have called first and asked 
for a meeting. I am a very busy person. You also need to ask for my permission 
first before interviewing people in my ward (with heavy emphasis on the word 
my). You are not allowed to go around interviewing people without me knowing. 
 
I immediately apologized and said that I did not know those were the rules. She later 
informed me that she was unavailable for an interview and her office would be close for 
festive, the Christmas holiday period. I left her office confused. I had assumed that 
because this office was a community office, I should be able to drop in to request to 
speak to the councillor or to make an appointment. Perhaps I should have called. Even so, 
why would I need her permission first to speak to people in their private homes if they 
welcomed me? This seemed especially strange because I had already conducted 
interviews with 71 people in Empangeni and the first 15 took place in her ward. I had 
encountered no resistance from residents. But for whatever reason, according to her I 
violated proper procedure, an unwritten code of conduct grounded in the respect she 
believed she deserved due to her position as the elected local authority of that ward– a set 
of procedures that I, as an outsider, was unfamiliar with, but that my respondents had 
been identifying all along.   
When I decided to interview the councillors in other townships near Durban that 
had Abahlali branches, I followed the “procedure” outlined by the Umlazi councillor. I 
spent two weeks calling seven councillors to no avail. Five of the councillors did not 
answer my calls. One of them said they would call me back and never did. Another 
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instructed me to first get permission from the municipal head of councillors. She said 
“no, I cannot talk to you, you must go down to city hall and speak to the head of 
councillors. He will tell you what you need to know.” I went to eThekwini City Hall later 
that week. I filled out the necessary forms and was told I would be contacted. I did not 
receive a call back and did not interview any other councillors in the Durban area.  
Even participants who are a part of the chain of command reported challenges 
with going to the government, which made them apprehensive about turning to the state 
for help. Lucky shared the struggles with his high school when we discussed the school 
infrastructure scenario. He said: 
That’s my school you’re talking about. The school is lacking a lot of resources. In 
fact, I said to the teachers when I got there 8 years ago, since 1994 the school is 
only getting worse because of lack of resources. The school has no laboratory, no 
library, no computer center, and there’s no admin block. Everything is falling 
apart. The department is not providing us with resources (Empangeni 27).  
 
After other respondents stated they would report the issue to an HOD as a part of 
following protocol, I was curious what Lucky has done to address the problem in his 
school given his position as an HOD. I was surprised when he stated he asked local 
businesses to sponsor the school, but all they did was make promises. I further asked if he 
had gone to the Department of Education about this. He replied:  
We’ve been there. The Department of Education has a list of schools to be 
renovated, I remember when I got [to the school] we were number 3. They gave 
us these prefabs [prefabricated classrooms] with the hope that they [are] going to 
renovate the school. It’s been now more than 10 years, and those shack classes are 
falling apart. We’ve tried even the people who are in the higher positions in the 
departments. They’ve only promised and have done nothing to help (Empangeni 
27). 
 
Ordinary people assume HODs, like principals have more power and thus would be more 
helpful in addressing challenges with schools. However, as Lucky reveals, people within 
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the chain of command also face the same government unresponsiveness as parents and 
teachers.  
A citizen’s present and in some cases past relationship with the state also dictates 
whether they view appealing to the government as a feasible and successful way to secure 
access. People may be hesitant about confronting more powerful state entities directly 
because this style of approaching the state to voice concerns, especially as an individual, 
is a relatively new practice in South Africa. For Black South Africans the apartheid state 
was inaccessible. There were few, if any, state means for Black people to complain about 
socioeconomic problems. One woman in Umlazi alluded to this when explaining why she 
could not complain to the Department of Education which was conveniently located next 
to the councillor’s office only ten minutes walking distance from her house. She stated 
“Ah I don’t know, I just... It is not that simple, it is not. We are not used going to the 
department people, we’re not used to going there (Umlazi 55). The apartheid legacy still 
penetrates citizen-state relations which influences whether people feel confident in 
approaching the state with their problems.  
Complaining to the state is also not feasible because of fear of retaliation and 
skepticism about state’s responsiveness. One group of women detailed this problem in a 
group interview:  
Nolwazi: I would but it will just be a waste of time, because you complain, and 
nothing happens.  
 
Simi: You just basically become a nuisance.  
 
Nompilo: Bathi nanguke loyomama. (They’ll be saying, this mother again.) 
 




Mandi: Because black people don’t want to be complained to. They’ll probably 
abuse your child afterwards.  
 
Nolwazi: Yes, they’ll abuse your child…They’ll make sure your child does not 
pass or everything bad is going to happen to your child.    
  
Would you complain to the department as well?  
  
Nolwazi: Yes, we would, cause we have to, but… 
 
Kwanda: (interjecting) You don’t trust the system?  
 
Nolwazi: To be honest, I don’t. 
 
Nompilo: Yeah! Cause they put these written complaints and suggestion boxes, 
even at the clinics they have them, but you don’t know if they really do read them. 
 
Simi: They probably take them out like trash (Umlazi 72).  
 
The women’s perception of how they think state would respond to their complaints made 
them apprehensive about complaining to the state as a way to solve the problem with 
school infrastructure. While some of them recognized the importance of reporting the 
issues to the state, they also have a way of seeing the state that creates a roadblock to 
appealing to the state when trying to solve problems. The women’s perception of the state 
is in part due to how they view their local councillor. When I later asked if they trusted 
their councillors, they all let out a resounding “no”.  
The behavior of local councillors has considerable influence on how ordinary 
people understand their relationship with the state, as it is the only government entity 
within their reach. Chapter 7 of the constitution established the local government system 
which was supposed to increase state responsiveness to service delivery issues all to 
improve the standard of living for local communities (Reddy 2018). Theoretically, the 
local government is supposed to be the primary channel for responding to the basic local 
needs. However, since 1994, local governments have been characterized by their lack of 
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ethical conduct and by municipal functionaries who people often view as unresponsive, 
dismissive, and outright corrupt (Mle 2015; Picard and Mogale 2015; Siddle and Koelble 
2012). Since the majority of municipalities fail to carry out their basic functions, local 
communities are rapidly losing confidence in the local government system. This is 
especially true in the KwaZulu-Natal province where corruption within the local 
government is rampant.3 The 2018 KwaZulu-Natal Citizen Satisfaction Survey (CSS) 
reports 46.3% of citizens were outright dissatisfied with the performance of their local 
municipality. Black citizens were more dissatisfied than citizens of other races (Coloured, 
Indian/Asian, and Whites). Even though most municipalities in the province are almost 
exclusively Black, Black citizens experience more problems with municipal services and 
unresponsive local government. Citizens’ dissatisfaction with local government was 
reflected in my interviews with regard to people’s trust in councillors to solve service 
delivery problems.  
My participants had varying levels of trust in councillors due to the varying levels 
of responsiveness they experienced from their councillor. Empangeni residents generally 
saw their councillors positively because they either rarely experienced service delivery 
problems or did get help from their councillor when needed. Residents from more rural 
areas outside of Empangeni had less trust in their councillors as they received few 
services from the municipal government given their location. When asked about trust in 
their councillor, most respondents in the surrounding areas of Durban and Johannesburg 
either laughed or shot me a look of disapproval when I asked about their councillor. In 
 
3 In 2019, 62 KZN councillors were implicated in a R208 million (approx. 12 million USD) tender fraud 
(Harper 2019). During the recent pandemic, communities throughout the province accused government 
officials, including ward councilors, of corruption in the distribution of emergency food parcels meant for 
poor residents affected by Covid-19 (Nxumalo and Magubane 2020).  
 129 
 
particular, Umlazi residents and shack dwellers in other townships outside of Durban 
viewed the councillor negatively due to their councillors’ poor performance in either 
delivering services or responding to residents’ complaints about community issues like 
crime. 
Citizens’ experiences with councillors reflected why some of my participants said 
they would approach their councillors and while others would not (see Table 4.2). For 
example, when I asked if he could report the issue to his councilor, Mandla stated, “if I’m 
bored enough, I can go talk to the councilor”. Curious as to why he associated talking to 
the councillor with boredom, I asked why. He explained, “from the past experience of 
course. If I have to talk to the ward councilor I would, but I won’t expect much. Though 
sometimes talking to them does work, because sometimes they do deliver, but it just 
politics. For me, I don’t like politicians because they come and make promises they do 
not keep” (Empangeni 32). Mandla’s view of the state is characteristic of many Black 
South African’s relationship with the state, a relationship where state actors purport their 
willingness to respond to citizens needs and citizens vote with that in mind only to be 
disappointed. With this view of the state it makes sense why so few people would 


















However, what citizens take as an unresponsive councillor may actually be a councillor 
who is virtually powerless. Although councillors have discretion over service delivery, 
some service issues are outside of the local government’s power, like those concerning 
education and healthcare facilities. Also, if a service delivery problem needs finances to 
address it, there are more state actors involved in the process.  
An Esikhawini ward councillor explained the fragmented process of addressing 
his community’s needs. Upon hearing the community’s requests, if the issue needs 
finances, like most service provision problems do, the municipality decides whether they 
can fund that particular request. Municipal budget constraints pose a big problem in that 
upon further investigation the municipality may decide that the request from one ward is 
fundable while a request from another is not. As a consequence, people from one ward 
may see their councillor as “unresponsive”, while people in another ward may see their 
councillor as helpful. “That’s why councillors must be proactive in championing the issue 
for their ward since the budget is not enough” the councillor stated.  
Another problem is the community may request things that are not within the 
power of the municipality. He stated: 
Service Delivery Problem Empangeni 
(out of 72 
respondents)  
Umlazi  
(out of 39 
respondents) 
Shack eviction 13 12 
School infrastructure  17 9 
Resource strained 
Government Hospital  
3 3 
Access to tap water  23 n/a 






People think we have power over everything, but we don’t. You’ll find that 
communities might request something that does not rest at the discretion of the 
municipality, like for an example they would say in our area there are no clinics, 
that does not rest with the municipality, but with the provincial government in 
terms of the Health Department itself. But that does not mean we have to say “no, 
that’s not part of us.” We have to take it forward [to the municipality] so that the 
municipality can also take it forward.  
 
Curious as to why, as a councillor, he would still go to the municipality if the 
municipality didn’t have discretion over the issue, I then asked if he could go to the 
provincial departments himself to advocate for his community. He explained “it is 
important to include the municipality, as part of procedure. It’s important to include them 
as part of formal communication and passing through them. So I can’t call the MEC and 
say hey, come and do this. But if it’s coming from the Mayor, it can be done. The MEC 
can listen to the Mayor.” According to this councillor, the residents’ negative view of 
their councillor would be unwarranted if the councillor did relay their request to the 
municipality, but the municipality and the provincial failed to respond.  
This councillor also attributed citizens’ negative perception of councillors to 
residents 
 
expecting too much from them, but also the belief that the position is often coveted by 
people who solely want to benefit from the tender system.4 
That’s one of the challenges whereby people expect us to be everything... you’re a 
social worker (laughs), sometimes you’re a policeman etc. Someone would ask 
for something else, which they know that we are not a part of. But they expect 
you to perform at the same time because we are the councillors. For example, 
people think we got access to tenders or can give people jobs. And when we 
explain they think we are lying and are just giving them to our friends. Then they 
decide they want to become a councillor to have access to the tenders. They run, 
get the position and realize they don’t have those perks and then don’t want to 
work.   
 
 
4 Tenders are government contracts which can be granted to individuals to conduct business in support of 
public works projects, like trash collection.  
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When people realize they are unable to manipulate the government tender system to their 
benefit as a councillor, they become unresponsive to their constituents’ needs according 
to this councillor.  
Although appealing to non-legal state actors to address problems with services is 
thinkable, for some of my participants it is not a feasible or successful way to solve 
problems. While some people may turn to the state because they recognize the state’s 
duty to provide services or “it is the right way” to solve problems, others have ways of 
seeing the state that discourage them turning to the state for help. This perception of the 
state is largely informed by their experiences with a habitually unresponsive state. 
Methods of appealing to the state often lead people into the constant cycle of state 
unresponsiveness–the very source of present-day service delivery problems in South 
Africa. As my interviews show, even people in positions with more power than ordinary 
citizens face challenges getting through to more powerful state actors when it comes to 
service delivery. When formal engagement with the state is out of reach and self-help 
solutions are unfeasible, protest is another way ordinary Black South Africans have tried 
to gain access to services.  
4. Protest 
 
 In the “protest capital of the world,” which South Africa is sometimes referred to 
as, protests are so common that it is sometimes called the country’s 12th official language 
(Brown 2015, 13; Twigg 2018). Protest is credited for ending apartheid and bringing 
democracy and rights. As such it has proven itself as a successful means for ordinary 
citizens to get what they want from the government. Protest in South Africa takes many 
forms. They are characterized by peaceful organized marches, mass meetings, toyi-toyi 
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(the rhythmic stomping dance and harmonious singing of songs of struggle), road 
blockades with boulders, and violent acts of burning tires and property damage. There are 
thousands of protests in South Africa every year. Of the thousands of protests, hundreds 
are for services. According to Civic Protest Barometer (CPB), which tracks protests 
directed at municipalities across South Africa, more than half of the country’s protests in 
2017 were for service delivery grievances (Civic Protest Barometer 2018). When people 
dismiss the notion that the source of their problems are general misfortune and instead 
frame their grievances as problems with government, this opens the door for rights-
claiming, especially in the form of protests. 
Protest’s disruptive power makes it the next best option for ordinary people, when 
formal communication with government fails or is difficult.7 During my interviews, 
people explained protest’s communicative utility when I asked what would they do if the 
councillor or government department failed to respond to their formal complaints. One 
respondent explained “We strike! that is how we solve issues here in South Africa. That’s 
how it worked back in the days, so people feel like that’s how it must work in nowadays. 
Because submitting a memorandum, will be like, it’ll fall onto deaf ears basically” 
(Umlazi 61). When I asked why, he responded “because the poor have no authority, 
unlike the rich” (Umlazi 61). Protests allow people to mobilize their problems when other 
methods of appealing to the state are rendered infeasible or ineffective because of their 
class status.  
My interviewees also explained protests can help citizens overcome the challenge 





a group. Collective action, even when it is just to complain, is seen as more effective than 
complaining alone. While participants stated they would not address the state alone, they 
did believe they could confront the state as a community because the issues with services 
affect the community and not just the individual. In addition, the validity of one’s claims 
increases with support from other members of the community which in turn increases 
protest’s effectiveness. Nhlanla detailed, “you have to go through the Department of 
Housing and tell them your story. But I don’t think they can help you if you go alone, you 
have to go as a community and complain” (Empangeni 12A). He further explained “If 
you go alone, they won’t even listen to you, they’ll think you’re an opportunist.” His 
friend also participating in the interview responded “there are a lot of opportunists here, 
some of them are looking for the land, and just want the land, and then you find them 
renting the house” (Empangeni 12C), alluding to the on-going corruption in accessing an 
RDP house.  
 Protest’s effectiveness as a problem-solving strategy may also depend on the style 
or form it takes. According to CPB, after 2013 90% of protests have involved some type 
of violence, including assault, looting, destruction of property, and even death (Civic 
Protest Barometer 2018). Property damage as a form of protest has become a common 
occurrence in South Africa, with people setting fires to property owned by the entity 
responsible for their grievances. Judith, the train driver, recalled how one day at work she 
found the train tracks that ran between Mtubatuba and Hluhluwe burned. The residents 
were protesting because Transnet did not hire people from the community and instead 




Burning the lines was their way of wanting attention from Transnet and 
government and then they can say their troubles. They want their rights to be 
noted that is why they have to protest so the government can check, ayibo! 
5what’s happening here? And they [government] go here to see what’s the 
problem, then they [community members] will say we don’t have a police station, 
we don’t have a clinic, we don’t have this we don’t have that, that’s all their rights 
that why they want those things (Empangeni 5).  
Because peaceful protests may not allow ordinary people to be heard, protest by fire, 
while destructive, causes enough alarm for the government to at least listen to the 
ordinary people’s concerns, according to my interviews. Responding to the shack 
eviction scenario, Nhlahla stated “if the government doesn't build us houses first [before 
carrying out the eviction], as you know here in South Africa the only solution is to burn 
something. If you burn something, the government will react" (Empangeni 12A). There is 
disagreement on this mode of protest’s effectiveness in achieving one’s aims. For some 
people such damage actually derails progress by forcing an already resource-constrained 
state to bear the cost of rebuilding the property destroyed. However, for some people a 
peaceful strike may not be enough. In the same interview, Nhlahla and his friend 
Khethelo debated this point:  
Khethelo: Okay, uhm... I’m not trying to be rude, but us black people complain a 
lot, sometimes we have to because the government doesn’t listen, but sometimes 
we use that ‘black’ card that we have a right to this... people would strike maybe 
for free education, it’s their right to strike. There’s a formal strike, then there’s an 
informal strike, now when they vandalizing, that’s not being responsible. You 
have a right to strike, but you have to be responsible. 
 
Nhlahla: But that’s the only way the government will hear us... 
 
Khethelo: You see! (gesturing to Nhlahla)   
 
Nhlahla: Yes! because the only people that strike peacefully and the government 
hears them, are white people. Try a peaceful strike as a Black person and see what 
will happen (Empangeni 12).  
 




Despite the familiarity and assumed effectiveness as a problem-solving strategy, 
protest is a risky strategy that is not always easy nor effective. The riskiness of protest as 
a strategy explains why few of my participants said they would protest in response to the 
scenario problems. Across all the scenarios only five out of the 39 participants in Umlazi 
said they would strike to solve the problem. In Empangeni, thirteen people stated they 
would strike in response to the scenarios.  
Protest is a high-risk strategy for several reasons. On one hand, protests do not 
always deliver a meaningful response from the government. Many protests do not result 
in the delivery of services. For example, as we sat in her dim cold one-room cinderblock 
shelter Mama Zandile, a sixty-year-old caregiver for her two granddaughters, reported 
she participated in a protest for electricity years ago, but the municipality never delivered. 
She said, “they still say it is in process” (Empangeni 51).  
On the other hand, protesters are often met with various violent forms of 
retaliation from the state. The post-apartheid state has grown intolerant of protests 
especially ones that draw attention to the ANC’s failure in governing the “new” South 
Africa. According to Ballard (2005), the ANC has historically been intolerant of dissent. 
He argues, protests are regarded “as impertinent, not showing sufficient respect for the 
government which believes, somewhat paternalistically, it has a mandate from the 
majority of the population to proceed the way it feels best” (89). Moreover, movements 
that mobilize poverty issues target the ANC’s shift to neoliberalism, which are a threat to 
the vested interests of the ruling elite (Bond 2004, 27). Consequently, they have resorted 
to repressive tactics to discourage mass protest, and in some cases criminally punish 
those who choose to mobilize. For example, the state has denied some applications for 
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protests. The state has also relied on the more egregious tactic of using lethal force to 
quash mass protests. South African Police Service is known for its use of rubber bullets, 
stun guns, and water cannons on protesters. In 2011, SAPS killed 33-year-old Andries 
Tatane during a service delivery protest in the Free State province. When Tatane along 
with 4,000 other protesters marched to the Setsoto Municipal Offices, they were met by 
the police with water cannons to disperse the crowd. In an attempt to block the water 
cannon vehicle, Tatane was first beaten by five officers and later fatally shot in the chest. 
A year later, 34 mine workers were killed and at least 78 were injured in a protest at the 
Marikana mine. 
On July 16, 2020, SAPS used riot shields and stun grenades to disperse a group of 
community health workers in the Eastern Cape. The group mostly comprised of women 
over 50 was targeted for attempting to occupy the Department of Health’s head office 
overnight. Community health workers had been petitioning for permanent employment 
where they would be provided with a livable wage and safer work equipment since 2002. 
Prior to protesting, the group met with the superintendent-general on July 6th, where he 
said he would respond to their request within seven days, but did not.  The police used 
rubber bullets and stun grenades to shoot at the group. SAPS also used riot shields to 
push them out of the area.  
These stories exemplify the challenges ordinary people experience when trying to 
appeal to the non-legal entities of the state as a way to solve problems. When people 
identify injurious experience as a problem and blame the government, or when they try to 
claim a remedy from the state using formal complaints or protests, the state either does 
not respond or responds punitively. In both situations, people are left without a remedy 
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and pushed further away from getting access to services. According to the disputing 
literature the state’s unresponsiveness in granting people a remedy is the beginning of a 
legal claim, however for many ordinary Black South Africans this is where the 
mobilization of claims for services stops.  
E. The Fluidity of Thinkability  
 
Though many people first named a non-legal strategy that they would employ to 
solve their problem, when I raised the possibility many then added that they would go to 
court.  New information about available strategies can push people to rethink and to 
consider alternatives to their repertoires of thinkable behavior.  Respondents in 
Empangeni mentioned litigation as a first response 17 times out of a possible 360 times 
(72 interviews, 5 issue areas).6 After my probing, respondents agreed they could and 
would go to court 77 times. In Umlazi, litigation as a first response happened 10 times 
out of a possible 195 times (39 interviews, 5 issue areas). Litigation as a strategy was 
then listed 43 times after my probing on the issue. In interviews conducted with members 
of Abahlali and clients of the Durban’s Legal Resource Centre litigation was listed only 
ten times out of the 96 possible times (24 interviews, 4 issue areas).7 After my probing, 
however, all 24 respondents agreed they could and would go to court for each problem.  
New information from one’s peers can also change the way people name, blame 
and attempt to claim solutions to problems with service provision. People with shared 
experiences can shed light on new ways to address them. The responses from group 
 
6 Going to court, contacting lawyers, or reporting the issue to the Department of Justice were all coded as 
“litigation.”  
7 These respondents were not asked the shack eviction scenario question because they already had 
experience going to court for the right to housing. 
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interviews demonstrates this shift. For example, as two students from University of 
Zululand discussed the hospital scenario:  
Xolani: The problem is, right now I’m sick. It’ll depend whether they have a 
shortage of medication, or a shortage of staff, or things like that. On the shortage 
of medication, I’ll write a letter and put it in the complaint box. 
 
Malusi: Who reads those letters? 
 
Xolani: The management. Remember what happened last year December, the 
hospital management that was taken to court? The management was taken to court 
because of their recklessness when it comes to moving isiguli (patients). 
Bamuvisa abantu ababe (They were moving people who are) insane from one 
ward to another because it was packed, and most staff on that day had taken leave. 
The management wasn’t aware that there was a shortage of staff and rooms for 
patients. The management then wrote a letter to the Department of Health 
notifying them that there is a space issue. The management had to move patients 
to other buildings without inspecting the building, whether it’s in a good 
condition for patients. All the patients kept there passed on. They were not taken 
care of.  
 
(referring to Malusi) He said he would write a letter for the suggestion box, what 
would you do?  
 
Malusi: I’d do the same thing.  
 
Malusi first doubted the effectiveness of writing a letter in response to the issue. It was 
not until Xolani shared information about this event where the hospital management 
advocated on behalf of the patients that Malusi started to believe that writing a letter 
might lead to some result. As people process the nature of the injurious experience and 
who is to blame, the solutions available go from unthinkable to thinkable and vice versa. 
It is through this processing that people see court as a thinkable or unthinkable way to 
solve problems.  
F. Conclusion  
 
 In this chapter I argued that regardless of formal declarations of rights and 
available legal solutions for addressing rights-based problems, people regularly make 
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their own determinations about what experiences are problems, who is to blame, and the 
possible paths to a solution. Although pursing a legal dispute allows a claimant to hold 
the government accountable for failing to act, that is not always the primary objective, at 
least not initially. People mobilize their claims of access to address their immediate 
needs. Whether solutions become thinkable or not depends on whether people perceive 
the solution as useful and the right way to address the immediate lack of access, in light 
of the risks. How one decides the usefulness of a strategy further depends on their past 
experience with the strategy and a person’s understanding of how best to get through to 
the state.  
Legal mobilization further loses its thinkability as a problem-solving strategy 
when people believe they have less risky, more feasible, and effective ways to solve their 
problems of access. And while none of these strategies are without challenges, litigation 
and other political tactics should be seen as a part of a coordinated strategy, as opposed to 
isolated routes to problem solving. As I have demonstrated here, the pursuit of non-legal 
alternatives can still be filled with roadblocks. Self-help solutions often require that the 
injured person has the resources to purchase the necessary items to facilitate access to the 
service. Although, South Africa’s political system allows for formal and informal forms 
of claims-making, citizens’ ability to successfully lay claims to the state is complicated 
by their perception of the state’s persistent unresponsiveness and its punitive response. 
As a result, people are left with few actual avenues to solve the problems with basic 
services when trying to mobilize outside of the law.  
Ultimately, the power of litigation lies in its ability to compel the government and 
its officials to act. Courts are the only institution that can force the hand of an 
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unresponsive state, specifically when their behavior is a violation of the law. This is how 
ordinary people can get around the persistent pattern of government unresponsiveness 
that leads to poor service delivery.  
In fact, being taken to court is sometimes the only reason state officials carry out their 
duties to deliver basic services.  
One recent example demonstrates the power of litigation. In July 2020, The North 
Gauteng High Court ordered the Minister of Basic Education Angie Motshekga to 
reinstate the National School Nutrition Programme (NSNP). When schools closed in 
March due to Covid-19, the program was suspended forcing millions of school children 
into hunger as many of them relied on school provided meals as their main access to 
food. With the fear of a nationwide hunger crisis looming, education activists, SGBs, 
parents and students pleaded with the government to reinstate the program. The Minister 
responded in late May saying her department would only re-open school for seventh and 
twelfth graders. In practice this meant that in some schools only 10-15% of children 
would be fed and nearly a quarter of the already-budgeted R7.6 billion for the program 
would be unspent all while millions of children went hungry (Broughton 2020). After a 
lawsuit in North Gauteng High Court on behalf of parents, children, and SGBs, the Court 
handed down a decision declaring that the Minister and the MECs were in breach of their 
constitutional and statutory duties and ordered them to restart the program.8 Motshekga 
was also ordered to report to the Court every fifteen days to document the steps she has 
taken to provide food to all qualifying students without delay (Pikoli 2020).  
 
8 “MECs” are members of the Executive Council of a province is the cabinet of the 




Of course, litigation is not without its own perceived risks, as described in the 
previous chapter.  However, this story demonstrates that courts can help ordinary people 
confront the very problem that causes the lack of access – government officials failing to 
act. In the next chapter, I show that in spite of negative perceptions of the law litigation 
can become thinkable with the help of new information. I use the experience of informal 
settlers to demonstrate civic organizations’ role in increasing the thinkability and 






























 “I was in my room washing. Then they threw me outside" Bulelani Qholani 
describes his traumatic eviction by the city of Cape Town. The 28-year-old was dragged 
out of his shack naked during one of the city's anti-land invasion procedures on July 1, 
2020.1 He was in the middle of a bath when the officers arrived. He requested to see a 
court order of eviction and asked the officers to wait until he finished bathing. An officer 
entered his home. Bulelani was shortly thrown out and his shack was destroyed. While 
there is some controversy among news reporters, everyday people, and state officials 
about whether Bulelani was really taking a bath or whether his nudity was a "new 
strategy" of informal settlers to avoid evictions, the problem was that the city performed 
what constituted an illegal eviction once again. A court order issued by the Cape Town 
High Court prevented the city from destroying the 49 structures in the Empolweni site, 
where Bulelani lived. In addition to the court order, Section 26 of the Constitution states 
that no one may be evicted from their home without a court order made after considering 
all the circumstances, a clause which South African courts have applied to informal 
settlements like shack dwellings.2 
Given this persistent and dangerous targeting by law enforcement and neglect by 
elected officials, one would not expect informal settlers to turn to the law for help with 
 
1 Anti-land invasions procedures are used by municipalities to evict informal settlers. The original purpose 
of these evictions was to prevent people from occupying land. Instead, law enforcement agencies which 
make up land invasion units evict dwellers who have occupied areas for years.  
2 Constitutional Court decisions like Government of the Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom and others 
(2000) and Port Elizabeth Muncipality v. Various Occupiers (2005), and others established the precedent 
that informal settlers are entitled to Section 26 provisions.  
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evictions. This is especially true in a context where ordinary people mistrust legal 
institutions and question their ability to fairly administer justice, as I detailed in Chapter 
Three, and yet they do. Out of my 146 interviewees, informal settlers were the most 
inclined to turn to courts for the scenario problems without my prompting, even for the 
problems that they did not have first-hand experience suing for like failing school 
infrastructure and resource shortages at public hospitals. In addition, informal settlers 
were more likely to confront the responsible state officials about the scenario problems 
instead of turning to self-help, unlike the participants from Empangeni and Umlazi, who 
had more resources and were more formally educated. This was surprising especially 
because during my preliminary interviews in 2015, when I asked participants who they 
felt did not have rights in South Africa, many responded the poor, in part because they 
believed the poor were unaware of what their rights were. This led me to question the 
following: How does one come to think of suing the government after experiencing 
consistent degrading forms of violence by the state? How do citizens come to see their 
everyday challenges created by the state and enforced by the law as legible rights issues 
worthy of legal intervention? Or more simply, when and how does legal mobilization 
become thinkable in the South African context?  
In answering these questions, I argue litigation can become thinkable with the 
help of new information that redefines the problem of the lack access to services, outlines 
the available legal solutions people can take, and establishes trust in the law to achieve a 
favorable outcome. New information can be provided by anyone has I noted in the last 
chapter. However, through my interviews with informal settlers I learned that it is the 
work of legal advocacy organizations (LAOs), rights organizations, and grassroots 
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movements, that helps empower marginalized groups to challenge the state and facilitate 
trust in the legal system making legal mobilization a thinkable strategy when problems 
strike.3 This conclusion is drawn from my interviews with informal settlers—twenty 
members of shack dwellers’ movement, Abahlali BaseMjondolo in Durban and ten 
members of Johannesburg’s Inner City Federation—who have sued for the right to 
housing, and in some cases, water and electricity.  
 
B. The Role of New Information and Civil Society for the Thinkability  
 
Scholars have long shown the importance of organized support for legal 
mobilization (Tushnet 1987; Epstein and Kobylka 1992; Klarman 1996; Epp 1998, and 
many others). Charles Epp (1998) famously argued that rights advocacy organizations 
provide what he calls "the support structure" for litigation. According to Epp (1998), 
these organizations make litigation possible by providing the material resources 
necessary to support rights-advocacy litigation. My argument in this chapter builds on 
this research but goes further. Specifically, I argue that South Africa's "support structure" 
organizations not only make litigation possible in terms of logistical feasibility, but also 
thinkable in the first place for everyday citizens. As I have argued in the previous 
chapters, there are various factors that discourage ordinary people from thinking about 
using legal intervention for socioeconomic problems, like their perception of the 
problems and overall mistrust of the legal system. In addition to providing marginalized 
groups with practical knowledge about rights and the legal process, advocacy 
organizations help reshape people’s perceptions of the problems of access and the legal 
system, making litigation for socioeconomic problems more thinkable to ordinary people.  
 
3 With the exception of the police.  
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For grievances about socioeconomic problems to transform into legal disputes, 
potential claimants must know and believe they are entitled to the service, that the state is 
obligated to provide the service or, at the very least, not impede access to the service, and 
that they can pursue legal action if the state neglects its duty. In Chapter Four I showed 
that the perceptions people have of socioeconomic problems and the available solutions 
push people further away from thinking litigation is possible at least at first. I also 
demonstrated that such perceptions are fluid, in that people do adjust their perceptions 
over time and in light of new information. This finding is consistent with the literature on 
disputes and rights claiming (Felstiner et al. 1980; Miller & Sarat 1980). The dispute 
literature notes that people will redefine their grievances and alter their perceptions of 
strategies available in response to various people's communication and expectations, 
including opponents, authority figures, companions, and intimates (Felstiner et al. 1980, 
638). In the South African context, I find it is through this communication with advocacy 
organizations and activists that challenges with services transform into rights violations 
for ordinary people.  
 While all 146 interviewees agreed that the socioeconomic services in the 
scenarios were rights, there was a disparity regarding whether people believed they could 
mobilize the law to solve the rights problems. Those who were members and had 
connections to advocacy organizations had a better sense of their ability to go to court for 
socioeconomic issues than those who were not. This is primarily due to the rights 
education and the successful legal mobilization by these groups. In the South African 
case, organizations are essentially what Felstiner et al. (1980) call "the agents of 
transformation." Apartheid-era civic organizations like the Soweto Civic Association, 
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which conscientized Black communities about the rights-based nature of their everyday 
material challenges. Similarly, post-apartheid rights advocates like human rights lawyers 
and activist groups help people understand their everyday challenges with services and 
what solutions are available to solve them. In South Africa, these organizations help 
reframe everyday challenges with service delivery from a matter of circumstance or a 
consequence of being poor and Black to a constitutional rights violation. Through this 
reframing, I found marginalized groups are more equipped to make socioeconomic rights 
claims and are more empowered to do so in ways they were not before. This reframing 
helps ordinary people incorporate legal mobilization as a part of their existing tactical 
repertoires in the struggle against issues of access to services. 
C. South Africa’s Support Structure Organizations  
 
 South Africa is the home of nineteen legal advocacy organizations, several non-
litigating civil society organizations, and grassroots movements that champion the right 
to access basic services. To understand the role that they play in making litigation 
thinkable for socioeconomic problems, I interviewed lawyers and advocacy personnel 
from Socio-Economic Rights Institute of South Africa (SERI), Centre for Applied Legal 
Studies (CALS), Black Sash, Pro-Bono, Section 27, and the Legal Resource Centre 
(LRC). I also interviewed members from two grassroots organizations Abahlali 
baseMjondolo (isiZulu for “those that reside in shacks”) and the Inner-City Federation 
(ICF). SERI was founded in 2009 by Jackie Dugard and Stuart Wilson. The 
Johannesburg based organization supports the poor with their issues of access through 
 148 
 
research, advocacy and litigation.4 SERI operates with the understanding that 
socioeconomic rights are “political tools for accountability, mobilization, and 
empowerment” (Brickhill 2018, 31). SERI has supported legal mobilization for access to 
basic services enshrined in Section 27 of the Constitution, housing, including the 
protection against evictions. With their research and rights advocacy work, SERI has also 
published resource guides on housing and sanitation laws, government policies, and case 
law that serve as useful tools to NGOs and grassroots community-based organizations.  
 CALS was founded in 1978 by John Dugard. It is also based in Johannesburg at 
the University of the Witwatersrand. The organization’s founding was the birth of public 
interest litigation in South Africa. During apartheid, attorneys at CALS actively worked 
to challenge apartheid policies on security, policing, education, and labor law (Brickhill 
2018). Since then, CALS’ research, advocacy and litigation efforts focus on five key 
overlapping areas: basic services, business and human rights, environmental justice, 
gender, and the rule of law. Like CALS, the LRC has a long history of public interest 
litigation. The firm was founded in 1979 by Felicia and Sydney Kentridge, Geoff 
Budlender, and Arthur Chaskalson, the first President of the Constitutional Court. As 
South Africa’s largest public interest law firm, the LRC has the widest national reach of 
any legal advocacy organization. The firm has offices in Johannesburg, Cape Town, 
Durban, and Grahamstown, and satellite offices in more rural areas in Limpopo, 
KwaZulu-Natal, Mpumalanga, and the Eastern Cape. Since its founding, the LRC has 
worked on a wide variety of issues. Its work now mainly focuses on constitutional rights 
covering civil, political, and socioeconomic rights violations.  
 
4 Despite its Johannesburg location, SERI is active throughout the country by relying on its network to 
expand their reach.  
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 Section 27 grew out of the AIDS Law Project and was established in 2010 by co-
founders Mark Heywood, Adila Hassim, and Jonathan Berger. Given its origins in AIDS 
activism, Section 27is a leader in legal mobilization for the right to health and against 
socioeconomic challenges that determine health outcomes. As such, the organization 
helps people litigate primarily on the right to access healthcare services in the public and 
private sector, food, water, social security, and the right to education. With the right to 
education, Section 27 has been integral to mobilizing against school infrastructure 
problems like lack of formal sanitation, inadequate textbook supplies and prescribed 
learning materials for disabled children. Despite being located in Johannesburg, Section 
27 has worked on issues of access in Limpopo and the Eastern Cape provinces with the 
help of their field researchers.  
 Unlike SERI, CALS, the LRC, and Section 27 whose legal advocacy work mainly 
concerns constitutional rights issues, ProBono’s work focuses on facilitating access to 
justice to the marginalized poor. Founded in 2006 by Odette Geldenhuys, ProBono 
bridged South Africa’s private legal sector and the public interest legal needs of the poor. 
With ProBono’s help marginalized groups can secure general legal assistance and 
representation for strategic impact litigation. In terms of reach, ProBono has offices in 
Johannesburg, Cape Town, and Durban and has volunteer lawyers from over 100 private 
firms in the country.  
  Black Sash was established in 1955 by six middle class white women, Jean 
Sinclair, Ruth Foley, Elizabeth McLaren, Tertia Pybus, Jean Bosazza, and Helen 
Newton-Thompson, who mobilized against various apartheid-era injustices like the 
erosions of civil liberties and racial segregation. The organization remained active in its 
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mission to secure justice and equality into the post-apartheid period. Black Sash engaged 
in development of the new Constitution as well as in the debates about the nature of 
transition and the shape of the new democratic South Africa. Since then, Black Sash has 
evolved from being member-based organization to an NGO which advocates for the 
social protection of the most vulnerable groups in South Africa, women and children. 
They provide right-based information, education, and training on the right to social 
security and social assistance. Black Sash hosts community workshops to educate social 
welfare recipients about their rights. While Black Sash is not a legal advocacy 
organization, the organization has engaged in public interest litigation concerning social 
welfare grant administration. The organization also offers legal assistance through its 
help hotline.  
Abahlali baseMjondolo (Abahlali) is the largest group of informal settlers that 
advocate against the landlessness and homelessness perpetrated by severe state 
negligence.5 Their mission is to improve informal settlers' lives by challenging evictions 
and service delivery gaps to the marginalized poor. The organization has over 55,000 
members spanning across five out of the nine provinces, Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal, 
Eastern Cape, Western Cape, and Mpumalanga. Abahlali was formed out of the 
frustrations over the gross negligence on the part of the city of Durban by a group of 
shack dwellers from Kennedy Road informal settlement. Originally, Durban informal 
settlements were run by slumlords or self-appointed indunas, traditional authorities that 
held control over the residents (Dugard et al. 2015). In 2001, the residents of the Kennedy 
 
5 It should be noted that despite Abahlali’s work in human right activism, the movement is resistant to 
being called a “rights-based organization” or a “human rights organization” as such labels obscure the very 




Road informal settlement decided to replace the induna with an elected Kennedy Road 
Development Committee. This committee was the beginning of Abahlali, which was 
officially formed in 2005 in response to the state’s false promises of land and formal 
housing. Under the Durban municipality’s Slums Clearance Project, residents of some 
informal settlements, like Kennedy Road, were supposed to be provided with formal 
houses. When the residents learned that the city sold the land that it had promised for the 
housing scheme to a local property developer for the building of a brick factory, 
approximately 750 community residents took their anger to the streets. This was the 
beginning of the movement and the residents’ lives as grassroots activists.  
Since that day, the movement has evolved from relying on mass protest to also 
engaging in legal mobilization, using the law and rights-claiming as strategic tools to 
advance their struggle for housing and services. Their reliance on rights discourse Dugard 
et al. (2015, 29) note, serves as “a primary frame-of reference in constructing [Abahlali’s] 
identity, organizing the movement, and shaping its struggles”. Abahlali engages in rights 
advocacy work by holding rights-based workshops for informal settlers. Upon joining 
Abahlali, members are informed about what their rights are as they relate to housing.6 
They learn about the constitutional protections against evictions and what to do when 
approached by the municipality's land invasion unit and the police. The movement's 
growth is primarily the result of word of mouth spreading information from one informal 
settlement to another. All of my interviewees learned of Abahlali from an existing 
member from another informal settlement. As the movement gained more recognition, its 
 
6 Members pay a small annual membership fee upon joining.  
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leaders have done rights advocacy through South Africa's major broadcasting outlets and 
print media.  
Like Abahlali, Inner City Federation (ICF) relies on media outreach to reach poor 
communities in Johannesburg. ICF advocates for housing rights and challenges unlawful 
evictions and water and electricity cut-offs of poor residents in Johannesburg. The 
organization represents over 2,000 inner-city residents from more than 40 dilapidated 
buildings in Johannesburg's inner city, As the first self-organized group of low-income 
residents, the organization was founded in 2015 by a group of low-income inner-city 
residents that were represented by lawyers at SERI. The group formed the ICF with the 
aim of addressing housing issues that affected the poor who lived in Johannesburg’s 
abandoned buildings. Its members are made up of low-income tenants and unlawful 
occupiers, who have either been forcibly evicted or live under the constant threat of 
eviction. Although the ICF was initiated by SERI’s clients, the organization is open to all 
tenants and unlawful occupiers. The organization works to support inner-city residents 
through several mechanisms. The group helps tenants develop collaborative problem-
solving strategies for dealing with internal building disputes. The ICF also serves as a 
platform for knowledge sharing on the right to housing and basic services. ICF relies on 
its connections to a number of partners in their struggle for housing in the inner-city. 
Throughout the years, the ICF has built relationships with NGOs, community-based 
organizations, journalists, public interest lawyers, and other activist organizations like 
Abahlali. Through its partnership with SERI, ICF also facilitates access to legal resources 
for those facing legal challenges with service delivery. Both the ICF and Abahlali serve 
as critical resources for rights education, especially for the marginalized poor.  
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D. South Africa’s Housing Terrain  
 
The post-apartheid government has made considerable gains on the issue of 
housing since the end of apartheid. Despite South Africa’s impressive delivery of more 
than 3 million houses since 1994, the number of informal settlements has increased more 
than nine-fold in the two decades since the state’s housing program’s inception. Today, 
there are more than 2,000 informal settlements. According to conservative estimates in 
2011, between 1.1 and 1.4 million households, or between 2.9 and 3.6 million people 
lived in informal settlements in South Africa (SERI 2018). However, given the 
continuing movement into cities, the fluidity of residence in these areas, and the rise of 
migrants from other African states, the current number is likely to be significantly higher. 
The challenges that hinder the universal enjoyment of the right to adequate housing stem 
from how the progressive legal framework concerning housing has been implemented in 
practice. The implementation of the right to adequate housing, has been plagued by poor 
planning, a failure to adequately monitor the implementation of government policies, and 
a lack of political will.  
Apartheid’s legacy of land appropriation coupled with the demands of mass 
urbanization created a housing terrain primed for the evictions marginalized groups 
experience today. Apartheid's housing policies sought to control urban settlement along 
racial lines. The government moved to restrict Blacks to separate urban locations and to 
exclude them from cities altogether, leaving little urban housing stock available for the 
Black population. There were two types of policies that governed urban housing during 
apartheid, “influx control policies” and “housing structure policies” (Parnell 1998). Influx 
control policies limited where Black people could live across the country, while housing 
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structure policies determined what types of housing structures were appropriate for urban 
dwellings. Early examples of these policies include the Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 
1923, 1934 Slums Clearance Act, and the Group Areas Act of 1950. The Urban Areas 
Act classified urban Blacks as “temporary sojourners,” only allowed in urban spaces in 
the service of the white population. The act allowed local authorities to set aside land for 
urban Black workers. It was an attempt to prevent the emergence of settlements on the 
outskirts of urban areas as cities industrialized. By design, the Act was an instrument of 
controlling the influx of the Black population into urban areas as the land was only 
granted to people who were employed. Those who were described as “idle” or “habitually 
unemployed” were forced out. The Langa Township, outside of Cape Town, was the first 
to be established under the Urban Areas Act.  
While the act brought drastic changes to the presence of Blacks in urban areas, it 
did little to stop the growth of slums. As South African cities industrialized employment 
opportunities increased encouraging mass migration from rural homelands to buzzing city 
centers. The Black population in Johannesburg alone rose from 105,000 in 1915 to 
approximately 240,805 by the start of World War II (Parnell 2003). This influx 
exacerbated the already existing housing shortage for the working class. Instead, people 
relied on slum dwellings in the urban periphery for housing. Objections to slums were 
numerous, ranging from the proximity of Blacks to white areas, concerns about health 
and safety, labor productivity, and political instability (Parnell 2003). The Slums 
Clearance Act of 1934 was a legislative response to these concerns. The act enabled 
municipalities to forcibly remove people from areas they considered slums.  
 155 
 
The Group Areas Act of 1950 solidified the state’s mission of racial segregation. 
The act permitted the government to establish separate residential areas based on race. 
People were prohibited from owning property and living in areas designated to another 
racial group. The same families who were evicted from the inner-city during the 1930s 
were once again forcibly removed from burgeoning Black communities in areas like 
District Six in Cape Town, Sophiatown in Johannesburg, and Cato Manor in Durban, 
when these areas were claimed for white residents. They were moved to segregated 
townships, like Soweto in Johannesburg and KwaMashu in KwaZulu-Natal, located on 
the peripheries of urban areas. Although townships did provide people with some security 
from the constant state harassment over housing, not everyone who moved to the 
townships was guaranteed a place of urban residence. It is in this housing landscape that 
many had to rely on informal housing as an alternative.  
To right decades of forced removals and confinement to economically 
unproductive areas, the constitutional drafters enshrined the right to adequate housing. 
Section 26 of the Constitution states “everyone has the right to access adequate housing”. 
The provision also establishes the state’s duty to take reasonable measures within its 
available resources to realize this right. In addition to guaranteeing the right to housing, 
the Constitution also safeguards against arbitrary evictions. Section 26, Clause 3 
establishes a negative duty on the state, in that no legislation can be drafted that permits 
arbitrary evictions. Furthermore, the state cannot legally evict or demolish homes without 
a court order. To give effect to Section 26, the first democratic parliament enacted the 
Prevent of Illegal Evictions and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act of 1998 (“The PIE 
Act”). The act further required that a court consider all relevant circumstances before 
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ordering an eviction, repealing the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act of 1951 which 
gave landowners the right to evict unlawful occupiers regardless of their circumstances. 
This new provision granted courts discretion on whether to refuse to enforce an owner’s 
common law right to property in cases where protecting the owner’s rights would not be 
just and equitable for the unlawful occupiers (Wilson 2009). The provisions in the 
Constitution and the PIE Act directly challenged the common law notion of the right to 
property. Under these new laws, a landowner’s exclusive right to property was not 
absolute, especially when their property is inhabited by vulnerable groups like the 
disabled, the elderly, and households headed by women and children. The Constitutional 
Court’s judgements on evictions in cases like Government of the Republic of South Africa 
v. Grootboom and others (2000) (Grootboom) and Port Elizabeth Municipality v. Various 
Occupiers (2004) (PE Municipality) further cemented the limitation of landowner’s 
exclusive right to property in light of occupiers’ right to housing.  
In 1998, the residents of Wallacedene, an informal settlement, occupied private 
land intended for low-cost housing in an act of anger and desperation. The residents who 
resided in shacks consisted of 390 adults and 510 children, including the plaintiff named 
in the case Irene Grootboom. The landowners, a Cape Town-based development 
company obtained an eviction order and sent bulldozers to demolish their homes leaving 
them homeless and landless. The residents took refuge in a nearby sports field, where the 
lacked access to basic sanitation and electricity. The group filed an urgent application in 
the Cape High Court after the municipality’s refusal to provide the community with 
temporary shelter. The High Court ordered the state to provide temporary shelter under 
Section 28 of the Constitution, which outlines children’s right to shelter. The state 
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appealed to the Constitutional Court. On appeal, the Constitutional Court found that the 
state had no obligation to provide housing on demand to those without formal housing. 
However, the Court did reaffirm the community’s right to housing and the state’s 
obligation in realizing the right to housing. The Court argued the state was obligated to 
adopt and implement a reasonable housing policy that would ensure access to adequate 
housing over time. The decision was followed by changes in housing policy in South 
Africa. In 2004, the state adopted Chapter 12 of the National Housing Code, which 
provided emergency housing assistance to those who are evicted or threatened with 
eviction from land or unsafe buildings (Wilson 2009). The policy enabled municipalities 
to apply for funding from their provincial governments to create emergency housing 
program.  
While Grootboom (2000) established the right to housing for those living in 
informal settlements and the justiciability of shack evictions, it was PE Municipality, 
where the Court launched limitations on other courts in ordering evictions. The case was 
brought in response to a petition to remove 68 shack dwellers who occupied privately 
owned land in the Lorrain suburb in the Eastern Cape province. The petition was signed 
by 1,600 suburban residents. The Port Elizabeth Municipality sought an eviction order. 
When the occupiers successfully appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeals, the 
municipality decided to approach the Constitutional Court arguing it had no obligation to 
provide alternative accommodation when seeking an eviction. In a unanimous decision, 
the Court evoked the language of the PIE Act declaring that no one may be evicted from 
their home or have their home demolished without a court order made after all the 
relevant circumstances are considered. Thus, eviction orders that would lead to 
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homelessness were declared unconstitutional, especially for occupiers who are relatively 
settled on the land they occupy. The Constitution, the PIE Act, and high court decisions 
have done what Wilson (2009) calls “creating a tie” between property rights and housing 
rights of illegal occupiers, shifting private landowners’ previously entitled exclusive right 
to property (282). This tie has led to an increase in legal challenges against evictions in 
response to the growth of land and housing occupations in urban areas.  
1. The Cycle of Evictions  
 
Shack evictions experienced in Durban today have historical roots. Informal 
settlements in Durban were first constructed following people’s loss of land after the 
destruction of the Zulu Kingdom by the English in 1884 (Pithouse 2008). Similarly, to 
post-apartheid municipalities’ approach to informal settlements, colonial authorities 
sought to remove these settlements in an effort to reduce crime and protect the health and 
safety of those areas to maintain property values (Maasdorp and Humphreys 1975). The 
states’ reliance on influx control, slum clearance, and racial segregation policies further 
increased the removal of informal settlements. Although the end of apartheid 
significantly extended access to housing, services, and employment opportunities by 
removing racially discriminatory policies, access is still conditioned on apartheid’s 
spatial geography. The majority of the Black population remain in townships and peri-
rural areas on the outskirts of white suburbs with limited or poor access to basic services 
and economic advancement opportunities.  
With growing competition for access to economically viable neighborhoods in 
South Africa’s urban cities and the state’s mission to combat urban crime, local 
municipalities, the government structure closest to the people, have been integral in the 
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illegal demolition of shacks. Municipalities are faced with two conflicting demands. On 
one end, municipalities have a vested interest in redeveloping South Africa’s cities to 
provide a safe space primed for foreign investments to boost the country’s struggling 
economy.  On the other hand, the state has a constitutional duty to provide access to 
adequate housing with constrained means to do so. People hoping to capitalize on the 
opportunities from urban redevelopment but who have limited resources turn to informal 
settlements for housing. For municipalities, informal settlements conflict with its mission 
to build "world-class" cities. These settlements are often in the way of municipalities’ 
plans to bring development to an area, whether it is the building of roads or new housing 
schemes for more affluent residents. As the South African economy declines, 
municipalities have prioritized city development plans over their duty to provide housing. 
This is unsurprising given apartheid’s legacy of valorizing urban development and 
private property ownership at the expense of the urban poor’s need for housing. Just like 
apartheid's forced removal policies, municipalities today use evictions as a means to 
systematically remove South Africa's primarily Black urban poor away from urban 
centers and opportunities. 
 The perpetrators of shack evictions include members of the South African police 
services, the municipal police force, and private security companies. The evictions are 
spearheaded by municipalities’ Anti- Land Invasion Units (AIU) which have the 
authority to remove people and stop people from building on vacant land owned by the 
municipality. Once the municipality orders an eviction, the unit is in charge of destroying 
the informal settlement. My interviewees stated that sometimes these evictions are 
ordered without the municipality obtaining a court order first, which makes it an illegal 
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eviction, according to Section 26 of the constitution. These evictions are always violent 
with entire structures and personal property demolished. Materials used to build the 
structures, if they are in good condition and deemed useful, are usually taken by the unit. 
If one attempts to fight back during the eviction, the state administers lethal force. My 
respondents reported having been shot at, shoved, and beaten while being evicted. In one 
instance a woman suffered a miscarriage as a result of being shoved to the ground. The 
people most affected by shack evictions are women and child-headed households, 
including households headed by young adult children whose parents may have passed on 
or live in another area for work.  
 In some cases, the evictions take a more insidious form (see Figure 1). Instead of 
being evicted just from their home, people are evicted a second time from a transit camp, 
which they were placed in while waiting for a government-built house as a part of the 
state’s RDP program.7 In these cases, people are forcibly removed or heavily encouraged 
to leave the informal settlement which is usually built on well-located land to temporary 
housing in transit camps on the periphery. Relocation to the transit camp is often done to 
make way for infrastructure and housing development projects which the community are 
told they will benefit from. However, one of three things actually ends up happening: 1) 
the housing scheme is never built; 2) the space is used to make room for a highway or an 
 
7 The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) was created by the Mandela Administration. 
The ANC’s chief aim in developing the program was to address the socioeconomic problems caused by its 
predecessors, per its new constitutional obligation. The housing program would replace informal 
settlements with low-cost housing for families whose sole provider is either unemployed or whose 
household collectively earn less than R3500 (approximately USD 250) per month. The government would 
rely on tax revenues to finance the program. Half of the houses were built as “rental stock”, which meant 
people had to pay rent to the government. The other half was for the indigent, who could not afford to pay 
rent. Between 1994 and the start of 2001 over 1.1 million cheap houses eligible for government subsidies 
were built, accommodating 5 million of the estimated 12.5 million South Africans without proper housing 
at the time (Parnell 1998). 
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infrastructure project the settlers cannot take advantage of, or 3) the housing scheme is 
built, but someone else is given the house. And with nowhere else to go, the evicted often 
go to another settlement and rebuild their homes with the daily risk of being evicted 
again. According to this cycle, shack dwellers will experience an eviction more than once 
in a given year. Some of my respondents stated that they had been evicted more than 10 
times in as little as two years. 
 For communities in Johannesburg’s inner-city buildings, evictions take a different 
form despite sharing the same intended purpose. The city’s urban decline between the 
1970s and 1980s was the result of white flight from the inner-city to northern suburbs. 
White residents fled the city in response to the increased presence of Coloured, Indians, 
and Black South Africans from the outskirts as influx control policies were lifted (SERI 
2018). The migrations left many of Johannesburg’s inner-city buildings vacant to later be 
occupied by Black, Coloured, and Indian households. Initially, these households were 
able to pay the high rents. However, the rise in rent and challenges with employment in 
the 1980s and early 1990s resulted in the non-payment of rents and utilities. 
Subsequently, many landlords and/or their property management companies abandoned 
the buildings leaving them unmanaged and unmaintained. The city responded to the non-
payment for utilities by cutting the residents’ access to utility services like water, 
sanitation, and trash removal. Like informal settlements, the buildings become sites of 
urban blight (SERI 2018). In an attempt to regenerate the inner-city, the government 
sought initiatives that focused on prompting property investment into the city. These 
programs encouraged commercial property developers to take over ownership of the 
buildings and redevelop them as rental properties with higher rents (SERI 2018, 5). 
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Consequently, since the early 2000s, thousands of inner-city building communities have 
been forcibly evicted by the state and private developers. Like shack dwellers, the 
building communities have resisted these evictions through mass protest as well as 
litigation, which has given rise to a number of landmark housing decisions like Occupiers 
of 51 Olivia Road and others v. City of Johannesburg (2008) and City of Johannesburg v. 
Blue Moonlight (2012). Despite informal settlers’ resistance to evictions and the courts’ 
protection of informal housing, housing for informal settlers remains the most contested 
and frequently litigated socioeconomic right in South Africa. This ongoing contestation is 
due in part to people’s perception of informal settlers and informal housing in light of 
South Africa’s current housing landscape.  
E. The Role of Perceptions of Informal Housing 
 
1. The Criminalization of Land Occupation 
 
Although the Constitution provides for protection against arbitrary evictions and 
the courts established legal precedents protecting informal settlers, among ordinary 
people, specifically non-informal settlers, there is still some debate about whether 
informal settlements are valid homes worthy of legal protection and housing rights-
claims. The source of this debate is people’s varying perceptions of the appropriateness 
of informal settlements as a home and the perceptions of the residents of informal 
housing communities. Because of this debate, litigation for an eviction from informal 
housing is not an automatically thinkable way to solve this problem according to my 
interviews. In this section I rely on my participants’ responses to the shack eviction 
scenario to argue that people’s perceptions about the nature of informal housing and the 
state’s criminalization of informal settlers’ attempts to secure their right to housing has 
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rendered litigation for evictions unthinkable for both non-informal settlers and informal 
settlers, at least initially.  
 Almost everyone I interviewed who did not live in informal housing did not 
consider litigation as a solution to the shack eviction scenario.8 Even when prompted to 
consider it as a strategy, very few respondents entertained the idea that litigation was a 
possible solution due to their perception of shack dwellers. It is very possible that 
litigation as a strategy was unthinkable for these participants because they do not face the 
immediate threat of a shack eviction, and thus such problems are just not relevant to 
them. After all, all of these respondents resided in a formal house and did not experience 
the level of economic insecurity experienced by informal settlers. However, further 
investigation into their responses reveals something else. Many of the non-informal 
settlers I interviewed held some level of prejudice about shack dwellings and shack 
dwellers. Because of this prejudice people questioned and even denounced the use of 
shacks as a home or as a permanent place of residence. As a consequence, for these 
respondents a shack eviction was not a problem and litigation was an unjustified response 
to an eviction. To state it differently, people believe shack evictions did not warrant legal 
intervention.  
 For example, Peter, 26, a music teacher at a private school, explained, "no 
personally [I would not go to court]. It's probably not worth it. Because you're just 
fighting to stay in a shack. I don't believe shacks are a permanent place of residence" 
(Empangeni 11). The suspected impermanence of shack dwellings rendered litigation 
 
8 Out of the 72 Empangeni residents, only six stated they would pursue legal action for the eviction 
scenario before being prompted to consider it as a strategy. In Umlazi, only eight out of the 39 participants 
said they would go to court. 
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undesirable for people like Peter, who lived in a formal home. Why spend money and 
time going to court to protect something that is deemed temporary?  In addition to the 
perception that shacks are temporary, people also did not think they were a “proper” 
home. Several respondents stated that a shack eviction would not a problem if they were 
given a “proper” place to stay as an alternative, implying that a shack is an improper form 
of housing and such removal is justified.  
For these respondents, litigation was also unjustified because non-informal 
settlers believed that most shack dwellers built shacks in places deemed “inappropriate.” 
Many of the interviewees in Empangeni and Umlazi complained about shack dwellers 
building in "the wrong place." By wrong place, they referred to land that the municipality 
had earmarked for an infrastructure project like a road expansion or an RDP housing 
scheme. Under these circumstances, an eviction was justified and litigation seemed 
unwarranted, as the informal settler is at fault for building in the “wrong place.” As 
Lucky, the head of the department at a high school in Empangeni, explains:  
It's a 2-way fault. You find people occupying a place because it's vacant. They 
don't try to find out whether they are allowed to build a shack in that open space. 
Maybe the government has reserved that space for development. So, the best thing 
for the government to do is make sure people don't build in spaces reserved for 
development. But there's a problem in our country. People are trying to invade 
open spaces because of this land claim, which is a challenge for the government 
(Empangeni 27).9 
 
Nokanda, 41 a primary school teacher shared similarly, “yeah, those things [shack 
evictions] they do happen. So, it depends where is your shack built. Obviously, if it is 
built in the demarcated area that belongs to the municipality, then obviously you will be 
 
9 By “this land claim,” Lucky is referring a 2018 motion in parliament launched by the Economic Freedom 
Fighters Party to change the Constitution to allow for the expropriation of land without compensation 
which received some support from the ruling party. Some people have taken the initiative as a an indicator 
of their automatic right to access land.   
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told to vacate, yes. When I asked her whether it was a problem to be told to vacate she 
replied, “no it’s not a problem.” For Lucky and many others, shack dwellers not having 
legal rights to the land shacks are built on justifies a shack eviction and therefore there is 
no need to go to court. The question of land ownership was a common theme in my 
Empangeni interviews. All of the respondents conditioned their responses to the shack 
eviction scenario based on whether they owned the land the shack was built on. If they 
owned the land and thus built in the "right place," they would go to court. If they did not 
own the land, they opted for a self-help solution like moving and rebuilding the shack 
elsewhere or doing nothing. For these respondents, in the scenario the rights of the 
landowner, including the municipality’s, trumped the right to housing.  
2. Prejudice of Informal Settlers 
 
In addition to seeing shack dwellers’ land occupation as illegal, or at the very 
least “improper,” non-informal settlers also held concerns about who shack dwellers are 
which also made them believe litigation for a shack eviction was justified. Some people 
believed those who resided in shacks were either foreigners or South African youth who 
did bad things and had to leave "home" and, as a consequence, live in a shack. Black 
South Africans refer to “home” as one of two places. “Home” can be the place where 
one’s parents or grandparents reside. Even adults who have left their parents' home and 
live elsewhere still refer to that house as "home." People also refer to their ancestral home 
in the village where urban families moved from as home or in isiZulu ekhaya. And 
because of this understanding of home, my participants in Empangeni argued that 
everyone who is South African must have a proper “home” in one of these two places. 
For example, in response to her statement that a shack eviction was not a problem, I then 
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asked Nokanda the following, “But what if you don’t have any land? If you don’t have 
land, where can you build the shack?” She replied:  
I for one don’t believe that there is anyone who does not have a land, especially 
when you are born in this country. Where were you born? The question will be 
where are you from, if you don’t have a land? Because I for one I was born in at 
Kwa-Dlangezwa.10 So, if I was born there, my father was born there, my 
grandfather was born there. So, I must have a plot of land that belongs to my 
father. So, if you are native in this land/country you should have your forefathers 
land unless somebody came and took it from you by force.  
 
While it is true that everyone native to South Africa should have a plot of land that 
belongs to their ancestors, one’s ability to access and lay claims to that land remains a 
challenge given the country’s history of forced removals and land expropriation. While 
Nokanda was able to locate her ancestral lands, she failed to recognize the acute 
difficulties that most face when trying access land. Sibu, 35, explained something similar 
noting that those without a home living in shacks, in particularly the youth, were there as 
an unfortunate consequence of bad behavior. He stated:  
You've got delinquents that stay in shacks because they don't want to listen at 
home. I'm sure you see when these people do toyi-toyi's. Ask yourself, haven't 
you seen how young they are? They are in their 20s. What are they doing not at 
home? What are they doing in the shacks? Where is your mom? Where is your 
dad? Where is your original home? Government needs to address all those things 
because I believe government has built so many houses. My good lord the 
government has built so many houses, but people keep mushrooming everywhere 
and demanding houses (Empangeni 4).  
 
While Sibu is right in that some young adults who left their homes as an act of rebellion 
reside in informal housing, many informal settlers are fathers, mothers, and the elderly, 
who left rural and less economically developed areas with the hopes of securing 
employment opportunities. Many others turned to informal housing because they could 
not afford to pay rent in their homes anymore.  
 
10 A neighboring rural town to Empangeni.  
 167 
 
While many of these perceptions held by non-informal settlers stem from their 
lack of first-hand experience with housing insecurity, their responses are indicators that 
people with formal homes question the basic legality of shacks. Whether a shack is a 
legal house and whether it is built in the "right" place influences whether going to court 
for a shack eviction is an appropriate action. This questioning about whether living in a 
shack is legally protected is in part due to people’s prejudiced perceptions about what 
constitutes an appropriate home and who informal settlers are. The questioning is also 
due to the absence of informal settlements from the Constitution. These respondents did 
believe to have shelter was a right in the Constitution, however, when discussing the 
shack eviction scenario, they did not attribute that right to informal housing. The South 
African Constitution makes no reference to the various types of informal housing that 
existed at the time of its drafting. Instead, it vaguely lists protections for "adequate 
housing" and "home," with no indication of whether such protections included informal 
structures or not. It was not until landmark decisions like Grootboom (2000) that the right 
to adequate housing included codified protections for informal settlers, where rights 
claims to housing no longer applied exclusively to those who had legal ownership of the 
land or property.  
Although South Africa's legal community and activists are aware of the 
protections for informal settlers, as my interviews with non-informal settlers reveal, such 
awareness has not transcended to ordinary people. My interviews with informal settlers 
further confirmed that they too lacked the knowledge about the available protections 
against evictions prior to being involved with their respective organization. However, it 
was not just that these respondents were uninformed of legal protections available against 
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evictions. They were often misinformed by key state agents. The local police and 
councillors facilitate the misinformation about the legal status of shack dwellings that is 
coated in prejudice, similar to the perceptions held by the non-informal settlers I 
interviewed. Because of the state’s treatment of informal settlers, people perceive 
informal housing and land occupation as illegal. For example, the shack dwellers I 
interviewed reported that local councillors refused to offer help after they were evicted 
because they saw shack dwellers as illegal land invaders, especially in Durban, where 
many shack dwellers are migrants from other provinces. Much of this framing stem from 
prejudices based on ethnicity and socioeconomic class held by Durban state actors who 
are primarily Zulu. Trudie, a pro bono lawyer who helps SERI with eviction cases in 
Durban explained the following:   
There's a misconception of people who are living in informal settlements, and it is 
a prejudice of people who aren't living in informal settlements. It's prejudice 
towards them [informal settlers]. And it's also largely community-based. That's 
another thing that we also find here in KZN. Is that a lot of people who are living 
in informal settlements are not Zulu. They not from KZN, originally. They might 
be living in KZN for 12, 15 years, or more, but they are not originally from KZN. 
They are not Zulu. And there's that aspect that comes into play. For example, in a 
recent matter where my clients were evicted from the transit camp, in Umlazi. 
That was just a little fiasco by the municipality purposefully playing into the Zulu 
crowd in Umlazi. Essentially, they will basically say, cause most of the people 
evicted were not Zulu; they were from the Eastern Cape area. They were saying 
these "Mpondo people" get rid of them, which is essentially a prejudice of sorts. 
You also have people living in the informal settlements who are young and who 
are there because they've lost everything, and they are drug addicts... so you get 
that prejudice. It's a complicated issue... so it's a lot of prejudice. People are 
treated completely unfairly, just because of the fact that they’re living in the 
informal settlement. Particularly more so if they are not Zulu (L6). 
 
Thapelo, the general secretary of Abahlali, explained a similar notion as it pertains to the 
perceptions held by the middle class. He explained:  
If you go to Cato Crest or Cato Manor for that matter, you will see that the middle 
class don't see that they are equal to those people [shack dwellers] that are living 
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there. To them [the middle class], those [shack dwellers] are thugs, those are 
criminals, and those are people who are supposed to be kept in those transit camp 
or something like that. But funny enough, when we occupied Cato Manor, people 
built shacks, and the middle class had a problem... we won the fight. Now people 
started building not shacks but proper houses now with bricks. The middle class 
has a problem because if these people are building with bricks it means they will 
be permanent here (laughs). They'll say [middle class] "we thought the 
government will relocate them somewhere else because we do not need them 
here." I think it's a matter of, if you're poor, this is how you should live [in a 
shack]… There's still an issue of race and class. People think that shacks belong 
to Black people, now they feel they [informal settlers] don't have a right to live in 
cities (ABM 88).  
 
The prejudiced understandings of shack dwellers have shaped how the state has engaged 
with informal settlers. In addition to refusing to help shack dwellers, councillors also rely 
on the local police to further reinforce the frame that shacks are illegal. When I asked 
Mpumi 27, a shack dweller, what her community did prior to joining Abahlali she shared, 
"we [were] always going to the councillor. We [were] always going to the police station 
to report what they've done, but they thought we are thieves who want to occupy the land 
(ABM 78B). When I asked Zondo 39, a shack dweller, what his community did in 
response to their first eviction, he explained:11  
Whoever we tried to complain to would complain back at us and ask us why are 
we trying to take that land away because that land belongs to the government. The 
councillor would say, "okay, you are telling us that your shacks are being broken 
down, and you are being evicted from that place, so that means you are part of the 
people who are causing all that chaos there. You’re part of the people that are 
always getting evicted and blocking the road, so we have to call the police for 
you." We go to the councillor, he calls the police. We go to the police station they 
say "oh you here now, all we need to do is arrest you now, since we don't have to 
chase you" (ABM 78A).  
 
Nomzamo, 46, stated similarly of her first eviction:  
We didn't think of the court, but we went to the police station. The station 
commander told us that you are the ones who are supposed to be arrested because 
you are there in that place unlawfully. So, there's nothing I can do for you. 
 
11 By first evictions, I am referring to their evictions prior to joining Abahlali.  
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Instead, you are the ones who are supposed to be arrested, that's what the station 
commander said to us (ABM 79).  
 
Similar to the non-informal settlers I interviewed, the police and councillors' prejudiced 
treatment of shack dwellers made going to court unthinkable for them during their first 
eviction. Those who had experienced evictions explained that when they tried to access 
the law through the police and the government through the local councillor, they were 
turned away and told their land occupation were illegal. Neither the police nor the 
councillors acknowledged the residents’ right to housing. For shack dwellers, it was not 
just the cost or the lengthiness of litigation that prevented them from pursuing litigation 
like the pioneering literature on legal mobilization suggests. Instead, it was also how they 
had come to see shack dwellings and their evictions that made litigation unthinkable.  
 
F. Impact of LAOs and Grassroots Movements on Thinkability  
  
 Through their rights education and advocacy work LAOs Abahlali and ICF have 
been integral to reframing people’s perceptions about informal settlements. It is through 
this reframing that litigation became thinkable for the informal settlers I interviewed. For 
the twenty shack dwellers I interviewed litigation was an unthinkable strategy during 
their first eviction prior to joining the organization. They did not think they could go to 
court because they did not know they could and because they had been told that their land 
occupation was illegal by the police and councillors since they did not own the land the 
shack was built on. To assess shack dwellers' thinkability of litigation for an eviction, I 
asked these participants whether they thought of going to court during their first eviction 
and what they thought when Abahlali informed them that litigation was not only possible, 
but justified. Bongiwe, 60 explained, "before we didn't know what to do, we didn't know 
we can take them to court" (ABM 82). In an exchange with Philile, 33, she stated:  
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You know for us coming here [to Abahlali] we did not have any hope. I don't 
wanna [sic] lie. The matter of going to court is something we got here [at 
Abahlali], because we never knew we even had the right to go to court so we 
could be put back into our houses. But when we got here, we were told that we 
could go to court and we would be able to get a court order and get back into the 
houses. On the real, we only came here because we wanted help so that we could 
have a place to stay (ABM 81).  
 
Like Philile explained, going to court for a shack eviction only became thinkable once 
they joined Abahlali which is where her community was informed about the legal status 
of shack dwellings and the legal protections available.  
In addition to providing information that helped reframe informal settlements, 
these organizations increase the thinkability of litigation to solve problems by increasing 
trust in courts. As I have argued in Chapter 3, mistrust in the law and the legal system has 
discouraged Black South Africans from turning to the law. Trust in the legal system can 
be improved once people have gone to court and experienced what they feel is a just 
outcome. Siyabonga at first had little hope that he would receive a positive outcome for 
his eviction case with the help of SERI because the community had previously lost the 
case without the help of SERI.12 He explained upon meeting SERI: 
I was having a little hope. Not much because when we hear and when we look on 
the news how judges treat people who don't know the law, we thought maybe 
even SERI would treat us like this. Long ago before the judgement [we received 
with SERI] we were saying mxm! the city won't give us the place [alternative 
accommodation] that's a joke, but when we went through the constitution and they 
[SERI] teach us about our rights, we said okay it is a constitutional duty that it has 
to be done by the city, that means that this thing is a reality (ICF 97).  
 
Siyabonga's trust in the legal system improved upon his engagement with SERI and his 
case's positive outcome. Like Siyabonga, all of the respondents stated they would go to 
court again for a problem because of their connections to the organizations and the 
 
12 Evictions cases from informal housing are usually brought against the entire community that is being 
evicted from the land instead of individual residents.  
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positive outcome they yielded. The majority of these respondents also stated that they 
trusted the court because of the protection they received from the court especially when 
compared to their hostile engagement with local councillors and law enforcement 
officers.  
In response to the question, do you trust the courts, Mpumi exclaimed, "too 
much!, it's the only place we feel safe" (ABM 78). Philile explained, "I do trust the court 
because I am still in my house even now they [the municipality's land invasion unit] do 
not even come close to it anymore" (ABM 81). Themba 66, stated similarly he trusted the 
courts because "I've got a guarantee. Because it's so many cases, in so many things that 
happened. Whenever they [the court] took over, you get the answer. That's why even the 
municipality doesn't want Abahlali" (ABM 83).  
Of course, this trust is not absolute. Even with the help of Abahlali and protective 
orders from courts, the threat of future evictions is still present for shack dwellers. Some 
shack dwellers do get evicted even after receiving an interdict order stopping evictions 
from the court. Because these interviewees’ trust lay in case results, the frequency of post 
interdict evictions caused some shack dwellers to question the strength of the court's 
decisions against the Durban municipality's actions. Silvia 29, who had not gone to court 
for an eviction herself, but joined Abahlali for future protection expressed:  
I think maybe on cases that Abahlali have won, I'd say yah I do trust [the court]. 
It's just that sometimes we win cases, but then when we go back to our place's 
things fall back into that first phase where people are being evicted! Whatever 
that was said in court doesn't really apply (ABM 86).  
 
From Silvia, we also learn that ordinary people's trust in courts is conditioned not only on 
whether they received a fair chance at justice, as I noted in Chapter 3, but also on whether 
other sectors of the state implement their decisions.  
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G. Thinkability is not transferable  
 
 Although the thinkability of litigating for housing problems increased with the 
help of these organizations, informal settlers connections with the organizations and 
experiences going to court did not make going to court for other socioeconomic problems 
in the scenarios thinkable. Out of the 130 possible times, the informal settlers could have 
listed litigation as a viable strategy to solve the other scenario problems participants only 
named litigation nine times without my prompting.13 Only one shack dweller named 
turning to the law to solve the other scenario questions out of the twenty interviewed. In 
response to the dilapidated school infrastructure scenario Norah 51, stated "as poor 
people our only hope lies on umthetho [the law], so that's the only place we can get help. 
As members of Abahlali baseMjondolo, we would have to come together with our leaders 
and explain the matter to them, and they will be able to take on the matter with the law" 
(ABM 80). However, when prompted the majority of the informal settlers agreed they 
would go to court for the other scenario problems. Only four respondents stated they 
would not go to court even after my prompting. Mpumi said she would not go to court for 
the school infrastructure problem because "there are so many primary schools,” and her 
daughter would have an alternative. This was a response similar to ones I received from 
Empangeni and Umlazi residents. As I noted in Chapter 4, having an alternative form of 
access to the services can render going to court an unnecessary course of action, 
especially given the perceived risks I outlined in Chapter 3. With the poorly resourced 
government hospital scenario, inner-city dwellers Dena, 58, and Daniel, 33 stated:   
 
13 130 represents the following:  20 shack dwellers + four scenarios = 80 possible times, 10 inner-city 
dwellers + five scenarios = 50 possible times. I did not ask shack dwellers the shack eviction scenario 
question because they experienced evictions firsthand.  
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Daniel: I can't face the Minister of Health. You know, in South Africa if you have 
money, and I don't have money, I don't have weight more than you. So, if I take 
you to court, I can't win, my case will just vanish. 
Dena: (nodding in agreement) Like water in sand (IF91).  
 
Despite having both gone to court successfully for housing problems and having had 
access to legal help through SERI, Daniel and Dena doubted their ability to sue the 
government because they lacked resources, which they felt would facilitate a better 
chance at obtaining justice.  This is similar to the perception that people who did not have 
experience going to court also held as I described in Chapter 3. Shack dwellers Eslina and 
Themba expressed similarly: 
Eslina: It’s two sided. Firstly, it's difficult because if you're like me, I have no 
idea where the department is situated. Secondly, maybe I might take them to court 
since I have Baba Zikode (President of Abahlali). He can tell me where to go or 
maybe give me a plan on how to get to the right building.  
 
Themba: It's a problem. For you to be able to take the Minister to court, you'd 
have to have an expensive lawyer for you to be able to match them (ABM 83).  
 
From these responses, it appears that the perceptions of the roadblocks to litigation for 
socioeconomic rights in South Africa’s current political landscape still impacts whether 
people think they can litigate successfully. Litigation for housing, water and electricity is 
more thinkable for these participants because they either have first-hand experience with 
going to court for these issues or received further knowledge about their rights from their 
respective networks. Thus, one’s perception of their lack of knowledge of the possibility 
of litigating for other basic service problems and resources still play critical factors in 
whether people think they can litigate.  
H. Conclusion 
 
  Informal settlers' exposure, albeit limited, to litigation for socioeconomic 
challenges has increased their awareness of their capabilities as rights bearers and the 
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state's constitutional obligation. Their ability to challenge their everyday problems with 
services in court has reshaped the scope of their problems, shifting the meanings behind 
their grievances. But, as I have outlined in this chapter, such transformation remains 
limited. While the informal settlers' thinkability of litigation for the right to adequate 
housing was made possible by LAOs and the work of grassroots activist groups, there is 
still a gap about the extent to which they can litigate to address other socioeconomic 
challenges that they are also affected by. As the wheels of justice turn slowly in South 
Africa, so does the "transformation of outlook" from "I want.” to “I am entitled to" and, I 
can sue if I don't get it (Gauri and Brinks 2008; Pitkin 1981; Tussman 1960). However, if 
you ask South African human rights lawyers, ordinary South Africans' “litigiousness” for 
socioeconomic rights is on the rise. I asked Sipho to speak on the budding phenomenon 
and the force behind it. He stated:  
Actually, it is a zygote, and it's something that we've picked up. Political 
competitors have actually complained that aye!, we are so litigious, we might as 
well become a "judocracy," that was the new term, a nation that is ruled by your 
chief justices. So yes, from our side as activists, or paralegals, community-based 
paralegals, we see this highly litigious nature that's on the rise as a good thing. 
Firstly, it inspires the realization of rights. When more and more people who hear 
about it, they want to know why people are going in there? What happens in the 
court institutions? Cause that's when people start opening up and saying, "oh, I 
also have this problem. Can I take this to court?" Once there's a realization of 
rights and access to court because our Constitution in simplicity it speaks of 
inherent access to all court in South Africa, and that cannot be questionable, or 
that cannot be a bar, you understand.  
 
If it is something that is a zygote, that is something that is coming, who do you 
think is fueling it?  
 
Sipho: So I would say that civil society is fueling it, and the fact that it's fueling it, 
it's a good thing because sometimes you'd hear statements such as, oh civil society 
is a threat to government. It's actually sad for a politician even say that because 
without civil society, no one would say anything, no one would say with a much 
louder voice to say this is this. So, yes, we are fueling it, and it is inevitable, 
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unfortunately. So, we are glad that, actually, the litigiousness of our nation is on 
the rise, meaning that access to justice is a possibility (L3).  
 
The several lawyers I interviewed echoed a similar sentiment that through more 
awareness in part due to LAOs and grassroots organizations' advocacy work, legal 
mobilization for socioeconomic rights in South Africa is possible. As the oft-repeated 
























In this dissertation, I have argued that ordinary Black South Africans have various 
perceptions about the law, problems with basic services, and the state, impacting how 
they think about legal mobilization for socioeconomic problems. In Chapter 2, I showed 
that the limits to legal mobilization as argued by the literature are present in South Africa. 
I also noted that ordinary Black South Africans do have perceptions about the cost and 
time of litigation which act as roadblocks in legal mobilization. In Chapter 3, I argued 
that people’s understandings of how the law works in South Africa have generated 
mistrust in the legal system. People’s distrust of the legal system has cast doubt on the 
legal system’s ability to administer justice fairly. In Chapter 4, I showed the ways that 
people interpret the problems of access to services and who is to blame for such problems 
impacts what they think of as the best way to solve these problems and get through to the 
state. These perceptions lead people further away from legal mobilization and towards a 
series of non-legal strategies that do not guarantee success. People’s perceptions stem 
from their past experiences with the law, their historical and everyday encounters with 
service delivery problems, and their understanding of the post-apartheid government. In 
South Africa, these are the roadblocks that people face when they think about going to 
court for socioeconomic problems, despite its accessible legal infrastructure to support 
legal mobilization. In Chapter 5, I argued that people’s perceptions can be altered with 
the help of legal advocacy organizations and grassroots movements. These groups help 
reframe socioeconomic challenges from mere everyday problems to constitutional rights 
violations and establish citizens’ trust in the law to protect their rights.  
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By investigating the ways people make sense of legal institutions in light of their 
problems, and whether such meanings affect their willingness to use these institutions as 
problem-solving strategies, this project makes a key intervention in the study of the limits 
of legal mobilization. Scholars of judicial impact and legal mobilization have long 
debated the role and impact of courts in facilitating change, resulting in two viewpoints 
seeing courts as either “dynamic” or “constrained” (Rosenberg 1991). This literature has 
outlined the various legal and institutional limits courts face when people mobilize the 
law for social change (Hamilton 1788; Horowitz 1977; Rosenberg 1991; Vanberg 2001). 
Scholars of socioeconomic rights litigation specifically outline additional constraints 
faced by marginalized groups trying to mobilize the law for services (Dugard 2006; 
Odinkalu 2008; Lehman 2008; Langford 2008; Ferraz 2011). Consistent with this line of 
argument, other scholars argue that appeals to the law are ideologically biased towards 
preserving the status quo, and thus, legal mobilization is an ineffective way to achieve 
real social change (Scheingold 1974; Gabel and Kennedy 1984). Some scholars have 
taken a more nuanced stance and find that while there are limitations in using legal 
strategies, they can lead to positive indirect outcomes (McCann 1994). Others find that 
courts are dynamic only when there are conditions that support rights-based litigation 
(Epp 1998; Whittington 2005). 
The challenges this body of literature covers include enforcement and 
implementation issues that judiciaries face and issues people have getting cases onto 
courts’ dockets. Despite this depth of knowledge, much of this scholarship only captures 
a fragment of the legal mobilization process and the potential challenges. The existing 
scholarship does not pay adequate attention to how potential claimants perceive and 
 179 
 
experience the various obstacles they think exist in approaching the law. Judges and legal 
practitioners indeed face various roadblocks in aiding in people’s attempts to legally 
mobilize. However, scholars’ treatment of these challenges assumes that these roadblocks 
are objectively given and thus are the only roadblocks to legal mobilization. My study on 
how people interpret the law and justiciable problems and how such meaning affects their 
choice to legally mobilize argues otherwise.  The evidence I provided in the previous 
chapters shows that despite South Africa’s progressive constitution, legal advocates, and 
active courts, their impact on legal mobilization to advance socioeconomic change is 
complicated by people’s perceptions of the challenges in turning to these institutions. It is 
how people perceive and experience the challenges of going to court for socioeconomic 
problems in South Africa’s particular legal, social, and political context that act as 
roadblocks to legal mobilization, not the limitations scholars have claimed affect courts 
given the nature of the judicial branch. My concept of thinkability shows that it is the 
ways people make sense of the roadblocks to legal mobilization in their particular context 
that discourages them from turning to the law. For my participants, it was not the 
institutional problems scholars have so heavily debated that hindered them from thinking 
about turning to the law for the problems I presented in my hypothetical scenarios. 
Instead, it was people’s way of seeing themselves, the law, the state, socioeconomic 
problems, and how these intersect that led them to think legal mobilization was an 
undesirable, infeasible, and even inappropriate course of action—in other words, it was 
unthinkable.  
This meaning-centered approach to investigating why people do not want to 
approach the courts takes seriously people’s subjective experiences and thoughts about 
 180 
 
the law. This project was premised on the assumption that the law and its related 
institutions are socially constructed in that they do not exist in a vacuum. Instead, they 
exist in diverse societies with different linguistic, cultural, and historical backgrounds. 
Also, these institutions are expected to be utilized by people of various cultures, ages, 
genders, and classes who make their own meanings about the law against these 
backgrounds. These meanings impact whether people see the law and legal channels as 
appropriate, legitimate, accessible, and fair means of achieving their desired ends. Like 
political concepts such as democracy, which have different meanings to different people, 
legal institutions as I have shown throughout this project do take on different meanings 
depending on people’s interpretation, perception, and lived experiences (Schaffer 1998; 
Schaffer 2006).  
Even after crossing a certain threshold of democratic governance and human 
rights awareness, which is understood to be an important prerequisite for mobilizing the 
law, people’s interpretation of these institutions can still vary, rendering legal 
mobilization unthinkable. For example, as I showed in Chapter 3, despite South Africa’s 
commitment to democracy and human rights, people’s understanding of how the law 
works (e.g., with the use of bribes and, in some cases, witchcraft) has discouraged people 
from wanting to approach the courts for rights-based problems. As I argued in Chapter 2, 
people’s knowledge, understanding, perceptions, and experiences make up the 
thinkability of legal mobilization. These perceptions shape the way people think about 
the law and its challenges and thus are the roadblocks to legal mobilization for 
socioeconomic rights.   
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I started this project curious about why more people did not go to court for 
socioeconomic rights in South Africa. I now know that this dearth in socioeconomic 
rights cases in South Africa is in part due to the various ways people think about the law, 
socioeconomic problems, the state, and themselves, given South Africa’s current age of 
political and legal corruption. It is only by adopting a meaning-centered approach that I 
was able to uncover the various ways people think about mobilizing the law and the 
perceived challenges. Without a meaning-centered approach to studying legal 
mobilization, we can’t really know what really hinders people from going to the court for 
help with rights-based problems. Thus, we must shift our thinking about the roadblocks 
to legal mobilization in any and all contexts. After all, law is mobilized when “a desire or 
want is translated into a demand as an assertion of rights” (Zemans 1983, cited in 
McCann 1994). This translation is conditioned by people’s sense-making of mobilizing 
the law for particular issues and the obstacles they believe exist given their specific 
contexts and the problems being mobilized. My concept of thinkability allows us to 
uncover the various factors that condition the way people interpret and understand the act 
of legal mobilization in their context. Firstly, thinkability allows us to assess what people 
believe the costs and the risks are of legal mobilization given their particular 
circumstances. Secondly, it also allows us to evaluate what problems people think are 
worthy or not worthy of legal intervention regardless of whether the problems are indeed 
justiciable. Finally, thinkability enables us to uncover how people make sense of the 
broader political field in which legal mobilization should occur.  
Ultimately, thinkability is a concept that we should take seriously when exploring 
people’s interactions with the law, whether it is shack dwellers in Durban, South Africa, 
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or residents of Flint, Michigan, suing for clean water. An investigation of people’s 
various perceptions of legal mobilization for rights-based problems allows us to capture 













































Ordinary Language Questions:  
 
1. Do citizens have rights in South Africa  
2. How do you know? What makes you feel citizens have rights in South Africa?  
3. Did citizens always have rights in South Africa? like before 1994? 
4. So, I know you said citizens have rights, do you have rights here?  
5. What makes you feel you have rights in South Africa?  




Right to Housing:  
1. To have shelter is that a right?  
2. You live in a shack, and the municipality tells you have to leave you can’t stay, is that 
a problem?  
3. What do you do about ? , what can you do?  
4. If they don’t mention complaining to anyone, Can you complain to someone?  
5. To live in an RDP house is that a right?  
 
Right to Education: 
For teachers/Teachers in training: 
1. To have an education, to go to school is that a right? 
2. You teach in a government school that has poor resources, not enough school books, 
not enough desk, not enough classrooms maybe, is that a problem?  
3. What do you about it?, what can you do?  
4. If they don’t mention complaining to anyone, can you report this to someone?  
 
For Non-teachers: 
1. To have an education, to go to school is that a right? 
2. Your kids go to a government school that has poor resources, not enough school books, 
not enough desk, not enough classrooms maybe, is that a problem?  
3. What do you about it?, what can you do?  
4. If they don’t mention complaining to anyone, can you report this to someone?  
 
Right to Health:  
1. To be treated at a hospital, to see a doctor, to receive medicine when sick is that a 
right? 
2. You are sick and you go to Umshiyeni, hospital. They tell you there isn’t enough 
resources to treat you today and they send you home? Is that a problem? 
3. What do you do about it ? 
 
1 Questions were translated to English.  
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4. If they don’t mention complaining to anyone, can you report this to someone?  
 
Right to Water and Electricity:  
1. to have water is that a righ ? 
2. to have electricity is that a right?  
3. I notice sometimes the water and electricity goes away around here, has this happened 
to you? is that a problem?  
4. What do you do about it?  
5. Do you report this to anyone?  
6. Does it happened in (deeper rural area, where they are originally from and still have 
family there) 
7. What do you (parents or whoever is still there) do when it happens there?  
 
Right to Social Security:  
1. To have social grants is that a right?  
2. If one month you didn’t receive your grant is that a problem? 
3. What do you do about it?  
4. If they don’t mention complaining to anyone, can you report this to someone?  
 
Life history Questions:  
1. Have you ever been to court?  
If no:      
- Do you know what happens at the court?  
- Do you know someone who has been to court? 
- Have you had an experience with the law?  
- Could you tell me about experience.  
 
If Yes:  
- Can you tell me about your experience  
- Tell me about the case? 
- What did you think of the outcome? 
- Did going to court help you?  
- Would you go to court again if you had a problem?  
 
Scenarios Revisited:  
 
1. I noticed you said you would do x regarding the situation with your shack, could 
you take the municipality to court? Would you go to court in the shack situation?  
 
2. I notice you said you would do x regarding the poor resources at the government 
school example, could you take the Ministry of education or the Dept of 
Education to court ? would you go to court?  
 
3. I notice you said you would do x regarding being turned away at Umshiyeni, 




4. I notice you said you would do x regarding the water/electricity being turned off? 
Could you take the municipality to court about the water? Would you go to court? 
 
5. Have you ever called the councilor for anything? Do you attend the meetings ?  
 
 
Ordinary Language Analysis Questions:  
 
1. What is amalungelo?   
2. So to have rights means x (x is whatever was previously stated)  
3. Are they good or bad? Why?  
4. I know you said you have rights, did someone give them to you or you just have 
them?  
5. Can someone, say the government, take your rights away?  
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